Empirical Essays on Entrepreneurial Finance by Zhang, Yelin
I 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 
 
YELIN ZHANG 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN 
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR 
OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
SCHULICH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
April 2018 
@Yelin Zhang, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation contains three chapters, covering analyses on crowdfunding, mutual 
fund, and entrepreneurial ecosystem. The chapters are connected at a theoretical level by the 
study of information asymmetries among financial intermediaries and the value added (or lack 
thereof) that intermediaries provide in different contexts. 
The first essay on crowdfunding focuses on platform due diligence. Crowdfunding 
platform due diligence comprises background checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-checks, 
account monitoring, and third party proof on funding projects. I conjecture that due diligence is 
associated with the busyness of platform employees and sophistication of platform service 
indicated by fee structure. Due diligence screens lower quality projects and mitigates information 
asymmetries between project issuers and funders; it is associated with higher percentage of 
successful campaigns and larger amount of capital raised on platforms. I test these propositions 
with platform-level data and find strong supportive evidence. 
The second essay on mutual fund studies agency problems associated with fund fee 
structure. Distinguishing between switches, pre-authorized contributions, systematic withdrawal 
plans, reinvestments, and distributions, I find that different types of flow exhibit distinct 
characteristics to retail fund flow with respect to fund fees and past performance. I argue that the 
positive correlation between retail fund inflow and switch-out reflects information asymmetry 
between incoming investors and current unitholders. I further show that this information 
asymmetry, attributed to biased purchase advice, is negatively associated with fund performance. 
A large sample of proprietary Canadian data from 2003– 2014 support the findings. 
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The third essay on entrepreneurial ecosystem studies the joint impact of venture capitalist 
and technology parks on small business development. I argue two alternative routes that lead 
entrepreneurial start-ups to acquisition outcomes instead of liquidation. On one hand, 
acquisitions can come about through the control route with external financers such as venture 
capitalists (VCs). On the other hand, acquisitions can come about through more advice and 
support provided to the start-up, such as that provided by a technology park. Empirical analyses 
on a sample of 251 Crunchbase companies in the U.S. strongly support these propositions.  
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognized in oft-repeated media releases that crowdfunding has drastically 
changed the entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance ecosystem. Relative to the better-
studied traditional forms of finance involving banks (Robb and Robinson, 2012; Ryan et al., 
2014; Tykvová, 2016), venture capital (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Nahata, 2008; Nahata et 
al., 2014; Espenlaub et al., 2015) and private equity (Nielsen, 2008), and initial public offerings 
(IPOs) (Vismara et al., 2012), crowdfunding potentially involves a more pronounced 
democratization of capital, with the frequency and success of capital campaigns more equitably 
distributed across gender and project types. This spurs the creative process, enabling innovation 
and entrepreneurship at new levels of vigor not previously possible through traditional forms of 
entrepreneurial finance (Schwienbacher et al., 2013; Belleflamme et al., 2014; Dorfleitnera et al., 
2016; Vismara, 2016). In recent years, the volume of crowdfunding has at least doubled annually 
around the world; in 2014, the crowdfunding market was $US17.25 billion in North America, 
$US85.74 million in South America, $US6.84 billion in Europe, $US24.16 million in Africa, 
$US10.54 billion in Asia, and $US68.60 million in Oceania (Massolution, 2015). 
With the growth in crowdfunding markets around the world, several questions arise for 
which answers are not easily transferrable from other types of entrepreneurial finance. One 
question hitherto unexplored is very basic: whether all types of platforms are the same, merely 
providing ease of connection between individual funders and those that need capital, or whether 
they, in fact, differ in the sense that, for example, one venture capital fund may differ from 
another, implying massive differences for the venture’s success and the investor’s returns 
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(Nahata, 2008). Given the massive information asymmetries between investors with capital and 
entrepreneurs that need capital, attributable to the scant or non-existent disclosure requirements 
when an entrepreneurial firm is not publicly listed on a stock exchange, it becomes important to 
understand what crowdfunding platforms actually do and whether it influences entrepreneurial 
outcomes and funder returns. Similarly, as many global regions wrestle with legislation 
pertaining to crowdfunding, it is important to know what role platforms can, should, and/or 
might play in the governance of crowdfunding marketplaces. 
In this paper, we address two questions. First, what drives the application of 
crowdfunding platform due diligence?  Second, is there a benefit associated with due diligence in 
terms of more successful crowdfunding campaigns?  We address these questions with a unique 
dataset gathered from 51 Canadian crowdfunding platforms over the years 2013-2017. The data 
comprise a majority of the crowdfunding marketplace, representing 71% of the total number of 
crowdfunding platforms in Canada in 2015, and were collected by a reputable third party (the 
National Crowdfunding Association of Canada, or NCFA Canada
1
). The data enable direct 
investigation of what crowdfunding platforms do. In particular, we examine crowdfunding due 
diligence, meaning the screening of projects that seek listing on crowdfunding platforms. We 
also examine other value-added services provided by platforms that go beyond due diligence. 
Finally, we assess the factors that influence the application of due diligence and other services, 
as well as whether due diligence and other services provided by platforms are associated with the 
success of project campaigns.  
                                                          
1
 http://ncfacanada.org/. Equity crowdfunding in Canada in the years covered by our data was restricted to 
accredited investors.  The institutional setting is explained in full in section 2. 
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The data examined reveal that crowdfunding platform due diligence comprises 
background checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-checks, account monitoring, and third party 
proof. The data indicate that due diligence is less prominent for crowdfunding platforms with 
busy employees that list too many projects, with a less-sophisticated management system, as 
indicated by an inflexible service-fee structure, and with less complex campaigns that do not 
involve security investment. We further find that due diligence application not only facilitates 
fundraising campaign success but also helps to increase the total amount of capital raised on a 
platform. We argue that due diligence application benefits the crowdfunding process by 
screening lower quality or fraudulent projects and mitigating information asymmetries between 
project issuers and funders.  
Our paper is related to a growing number of studies on reward-based crowdfunding 
(Agrawal et al., 2015; Belleflamme et al., 2013; 2014; Berea et al., 2016; Colombo et al., 2016) 
equity crowdfunding (Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016), and crowdfunding regulation (Griffin, 
2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016a; 2016b). A common feature of these papers, however, 
is that the differences across platforms are not empirically studied, as the data typically come 
from just one platform. Our paper is distinct in exploring differences across platforms on due 
diligence application using unique proprietary data on platform operations. Our paper is, 
likewise, related to other forms of entrepreneurial finance, such as work on investor effort; most 
directly, our paper relates to work on the importance of due diligence (Yung, 2009), investor 
value added (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003; 2004; Keuschnigg, 2004;  Andrieu and Groh, 
2012), and venture capital and private equity reputation (Nahata, 2008). There is evidence of 
massive heterogeneity across private equity funds in the extent of due diligence carried out prior 
to investment, and a positive correlation and even a causal connection between the extent of due 
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diligence and the investee firm’s subsequent performance (Cumming and Zambelli, 2016), 
consistent with theory (Yung, 2009). Inspired by these related studies, our analysis examines the 
presence and impact of due diligence on fundraising campaigns in the relatively new field of 
crowdfunding.  
1.2 Institutional Settings and Legal Environment  
Crowdfunding involves sourcing capital from many (typically) retail funders through an 
internet webpage known as a “platform.” Entrepreneurs post projects for which they need 
capital. Anyone in “the crowd” (the pool of possible funders) can see the projects on the 
platform, and decide whether to invest. Some platforms facilitate donation- and reward-based 
crowdfunding without projects offering equity shares, while others list projects offering equity 
shares in entrepreneurial firms. Reward-based crowdfunding is the most common worldwide 
(Massolution, 2015), and involves offering small rewards, such as early product access, to the 
crowd in exchange for capital contributions. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is another form of 
crowdfunding, allowing interest to be paid on investment (Bradford, 2012).  
Crowdfunding regulations are extremely detailed in the Canadian provinces. Here, we 
briefly summarize the general framework of Canadian security crowdfunding regulations as it 
pertains to due diligence. 
Security crowdfunding regulations are imposed on all parties involved in the security 
offering process: funders, issuers, and crowdfunding platforms. For funders, a limit is imposed 
on the amount an ordinary funder can contribute per issuer distribution in a 12-month period. To 
remove this limit, a funder needs to be accredited by either possessing a high level of net assets 
or meeting an annual income requirement. Investment funds are not generally permitted to 
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participate in security crowdfunding. For issuers, their financial statements are required for 
fundraising; depending on project size, financial statements must be prepared by management in 
the least-regulated case and officially audited in the most-regulated case. In addition, biographic 
files for all directors and control persons related to the issuer are required. Although these 
documents are not vetted by security regulators prior to fundraising campaigns, issuers must file 
an official security distribution report and submit copies of financial statements and the directors’ 
and/or control persons’ biographies to the regulators after successful crowdfunding. For 
platforms, they must be registered as security dealers in the province in which they are 
headquartered and review the documents from issuers prior to posting projects on their portal. 
Platforms are not allowed to solicit funders. 
Under this regulatory framework, it may seem reasonable to assume that all security 
crowdfunding platforms apply due diligence on project selection. Nevertheless, two questions 
must be posed before rushing to a conclusion. First, are there specific requirements for the 
procedures that platforms should follow to ensure they meet due diligence expectations? Second, 
are platforms liable for low-quality projects? Unfortunately, no clear answers are given under 
current regulations. As the actual due diligence application is resource-demanding to platforms 
and cannot be fully overseen by regulators, we expect significant variations in due diligence 
application, measured by the specific approaches platforms undertake, across all types of 
crowdfunding platforms, including security crowdfunding. However, due to the demands of 
security regulators, we expect due diligence to be more extensively performed among security 
crowdfunding than among other types of crowdfunding. 
Although not central to regulatory concerns, donation- and reward-based crowdfunding 
platforms have reputational incentives to assure the quality and genuineness of listed projects, as 
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fraud cases can lead to project issuers and funders avoiding the platform in the future.
2
 In 
addition, traditional consumer protection, contract, tort, and business laws apply to reward- and 
donation-based crowdfunding. Potential lawsuits on restitution for fraud claims provides a 
further layer of monetary incentive for due diligence. We, therefore, expect that due diligence is 
also conducted among non-security crowdfunding platforms, but that its use is less prevalent and 
rigorous than in security crowdfunding. 
We do not exclude rewards–based platforms from the data for a variety of reasons.  First, 
for many firms, rewards based crowdfunding is part of their financing cycle. Consider for 
example Pebble Watch, which raised $10 million in a week through Kickstarter’s rewards based 
crowdfunding platform; and, Oculus One which raised $2.4 million on Kickstarter, and was 
subsequently purchased by Facebook for $2 billion, causing outrage amongst their investors (the 
way in which contributors to rewards based crowdfunding campaigns are referred to in the news) 
and leading to the legal change allowing equity crowdfunding in the U.S.
3
  Second, the 
difference between an investor in a rewards based campaign and an investor in an equity 
campaign is merely in the nature of the reward and timing of the potential payoff.  For example, 
in the campaign for Bolt Drones,
4
 the reward is the early access to the product at a discounted 
price.  In an equity crowdfunding campaign, the reward is the share which may potentially be 
sold at a subsequently higher price.  Both are investments, and the only difference is in the nature 
                                                          
2
 Reputation concerns with crowdfunding and misconduct have been discussed repeatedly in mainstream media such 
as the New York Times.  See for example, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/business/dealbook/crowdfunding-
fraud-investing-startups.html  
3
 The Guardian reported: “Early backers of the Oculus Rift project are questioning the value of their investment after 
the virtual reality firm was acquired by Facebook” https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/26/facebook-
oculus-deal-kickstarter-first-billion-dollar-exit.   See also 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2014/05/01/2-
billion-facebook-acquisition-raises-question-is-equity-crowdfunding-
better/&refURL=https://www.google.ca/&referrer=https://www.google.ca/ where Forbes reports “$2B Facebook 
Acquisition Raises Question: Is Equity Crowdfunding Better?” 
4
 https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1394449697/bolt-drones-introducing-a-whole-new-flight-experie  
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of the payoff. Reward investors face the risk that the product will never be developed and 
delivered, making their investment worthless. Equity investors face the risk that the company 
fails and the share is worthless. Third, rewards based crowdfunding investors are consuming a 
product, but at a substantial discount and at a substantial risk. There is no guarantee that the 
product will be delivered. Over half of rewards based crowdfunding projects are in fact not 
delivered. So we believe it the literature is consistent with the view that rewards based 
crowdfunding is an investment and not consumption, and the economics underlying the interplay 
between due diligence and platform success apply in a similar way to different types of 
platforms. In our empirical analyses below, we consider all platform types together and use 
platform fixed effects in our regressions.  We exclude different platform types and provide other 
robustness checks in the Online Appendix that accompanies this paper. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
Our analyses of due diligence focus on two questions. First, what leads to the application 
of platform due diligence? Broadly, we focus on agency costs (Hypotheses 1 and 2).  Second, 
what benefits do platforms receive through due diligence application? To this end, we examine 
the impact of mitigating agency problems and information asymmetries (Hypothesis 3). 
1.3.1. Agency Costs: Multitask Moral Hazard 
A crowdfunding platform’s objective is of course to maximize the amount of capital that 
it makes.  A platform has three primary choices: (1) fee structures, (2) due diligence, and (3) 
platform differentiation in respect of industry focus.  A platform that is more differentiated in 
regards to its focus competes for business with other platforms less intensively on fees and on 
due diligence because the platform captures a niche area.  For example, there are platforms 
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specific to arts, local regional businesses, women, music, real estate, fashion, farming, poverty, 
high tech firms such as blockchain related, among others.  For each of these types of features, 
there is a level of product differentiation offered by the platform that encourages fundraisers to 
list with the platform to reach their target audience.  Very few platforms, such as Kickstarter and 
Indiegogo, are generalist platforms that list everything. Therefore, fee structures and due 
diligence play a role in platforms competing with each other, but not a dominate role as would be 
the case if all platforms were perfectly homogenous. Fundraisers and their investors chose which 
platform to participate.  Platforms select their extent of due diligence and their fee structures, 
which they may modify over time depending on the flow of new projects that seek listing on the 
platform, and the extent of investor interest in the platform. Platforms are much less likely to 
change their brand or product differentiation from one year to the next due to the long-term 
investment that is required to build up the brand. Selecting a high level of due diligence mitigates 
potential reputation costs and litigation risks associated with projects that should not have been 
listed. High levels of due diligence screens lower quality entrepreneurs from entering the 
platform. Platform fee structures further influence which entrepreneurs use the platform, and 
potentially provides incentives for platform employees to be more proactive in their application 
of due diligence. To hypothesize on a platform level, we consider the competition and choice of 
fundraisers, but also recognize that comparative statics are made tractable by virtue of platform 
product differentiation that is rather time invariant, and fee structures and due diligence that is 
time variant. The nascent nature of the crowdfunding industry predictions and enables 
assessment of these comparative statics as platforms sort themselves out over time.  In view of 
platform differentiation, the platform decision rules regarding fee structures and due diligence 
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are not necessarily competing with other platforms as much as they are learning about their 
business model over time. 
Our first hypothesis pertains to the simple notion of agents’ time constraints, and draws 
from the venture capital literature on portfolio size per manager. Value-added active investors 
face a tradeoff in adding more investees to their portfolio, balancing the benefit of network 
externalities across portfolio firms against the cost of having less time to conduct proper due 
diligence and to add value to each investee company, by providing financial, administrative, 
human resource, network, and other forms of advice (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003; 2004; 
Keuschnigg, 2004; Cumming. 2006; Bernile et al., 2007; Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2009). The same 
notion applies to the time spent by crowdfunding platforms conducting due diligence on 
entrepreneurs seeking to list a campaign.  
Platforms do not have unlimited resources, and it takes time to administer background 
checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-checks, account monitoring, and sourcing third party 
proof.  Background checks involve checking the personal history of the entrepreneurial team, 
including whether or not they have crowdfunded in the past on the current platform or other 
platforms and if so how the campaign fared, whether they have a criminal record, and whether 
they have valid identification.  Site visits involve physically going to the office, factory, or other 
space where the entrepreneur does their business. Credit checks, account monitoring and 
sourcing third party proof involves assessing the payment and credit card history of the 
entrepreneurial team, as well as payment of leases and other rentals for office space and 
equipment.  Cross-checks involve talking with customers and suppliers that have interacted with 
the entrepreneurial team, as well as checking social media for improper language or other 
offensive material.  Likewise, services provided to project initiators, such as strategic fundraising 
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guidance, marketing or promotion assistance, contractual help, and financial planning, are all 
time-consuming. The greater the number of listed projects per employee, the lower the likelihood 
of having sufficient time to conduct all these activities due to multitask moral hazard. In this 
regard, slack of human resources should have a positive impact on platform due diligence 
application.  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, platforms that have more employees and fewer listed 
projects are more likely to conduct due diligence due to slack of human resources. 
Hypothesis 1 is not obvious and is worth subjecting to empirical testing. First, there could 
exist a moderating effect on the human resource impact: not all employees are equally productive, 
and platforms that adopt advanced technology skills may carry out due diligence more efficiently 
with fewer employees. If there is wide variation in technology levels among platforms, we 
should observe weak or no correlation between due diligence and employee number, but a strong 
correlation between due diligence and technology.  
There is a second potentially confounding effect pertinent to Hypothesis 1. Crowdfunding 
platforms are for-profit business entities. A platform’s employment demand depends on its 
business strategy and operational needs. Platforms do not over-employ and then assign idle 
workforce members to perform due diligence tasks. If a platform is not required to do due 
diligence, it may not hire designated due diligence staff. Instead, workforce can be used for tasks 
associated with marketing, customer service, website design and maintenance, etc. As such, 
more abundant human resources does not necessarily translate into the application of due 
diligence. 
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Note that while we have one theory as to why an increase in the number of campaigns per 
platform employee is associated with less due diligence due to busyness, and multiple alternative 
theories as to why there is no such association, it is nevertheless worth assessing whether or not 
the busyness theory is valid with empirical testing.  We test this theory in section 4 and thereafter 
below, among other theories and predictions explained here in section 3. 
1.3.2. Agency Costs: Compensation Structures 
Crowdfunding platforms have different fee structures. Different types of fee structures 
may align the interests of the platform with those of the crowd that invests in projects listed on 
the platform. If platforms receive a fee regardless of whether a project campaign is successful, 
then the platform has a greater incentive to list a project regardless of its quality. Conversely, if 
the platform only receives a fee from successfully funded projects, then the platform has more 
incentive to conduct extensive due diligence and only list projects likely to come to fruition. In 
addition, fee structure design reflects the professionalism of platform management: sophisticated 
platforms adopt more flexible fee structures, provide services at different levels, carry higher 
reputation, and are more selective on campaign projects. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, platforms that receive fees regardless of the success of 
fundraising campaigns are less likely to conduct extensive due diligence; platforms that 
adopt advanced fee structures and charge fees based on successful fundraising 
campaigns are more likely to apply due diligence. 
It is not obvious that we should expect to observe Hypothesis 2 in practice. An alternative 
hypothesis is that the main purpose of platform fee structure design is to maximize the number of 
entrepreneurs that use a platform. If a platform charges a low listing commission and obtains 
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revenue mainly from successful fundraising of projects, it may attract more entrepreneurs to list 
on the platform than a competing platform that charges listing commissions regardless of 
fundraising success, since project initiators thus pay less in the event of an unsuccessful 
campaign. In this case, the fee structure design would be uncorrelated with due diligence.  So, as 
with Hypothesis 1, we have one theory that predicts a relationship and potentially more than one 
theory as to why that relationship might not exist. 
1.3.3. Benefits Associated with Mitigating Agency Costs and Information Asymmetries 
It is costly to apply due diligence; therefore, platforms need to obtain sufficient benefit 
from due diligence to justify the according expenses. To evaluate the benefit that platforms 
obtain from due diligence application, we introduce our measurements of platform performance. 
We use three proxies to measure a platform’s operational performance: (1) the percentage 
of projects fully funded on a platform (higher is better); (2) the total amount of capital raised 
through a platform (higher is better); and (3) the average fundraising duration on a platform 
(shorter is better). 
In general, we expect due diligence to be positively associated with crowdfunding 
platforms’ improved performance. Effective due diligence removes the left tail of the quality 
distribution, preventing such low-quality entrepreneurial projects from appearing on the 
platform. Without the left tail, the average project quality is higher. Prior research reinforces the 
view that the left tail is large in crowdfunding markets (Eraker and Ready, 2015). Furthermore, 
platform due diligence processes encourage entrepreneurs to present a more transparent 
campaign to clear the due diligence hurdle, which, in turn, mitigates information asymmetries 
between the entrepreneur and the crowd. Entrepreneurs faced with extensive due diligence 
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checks are more likely to take costly steps to signal their quality, such as preparing quality 
project descriptions, which, in turn, lowers information asymmetries faced by funders and 
signals quality to the crowd (Spence, 2002). 
As the average quality of fundraising campaigns improves and campaign projects become 
more transparent to funders, we should observe a higher rate of successful fundraising
5
 on a 
platform. This higher rate of successful fundraising directly attracts more entrepreneurs to list 
future projects. Moreover, competent due diligence builds a strong reputation for the platform 
among funders; in turn, this reputational effect makes a platform more appealing among potential 
project issuers. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we expect a platform to attract more projects and 
channel more money flow if it conducts due diligence on listed projects. Finally, as platform due 
diligence raises the quality of listed projects, investment decision-making will become easier for 
funders; consequently, we should observe more time-efficient fundraising associated with due 
diligence application. 
Hypothesis 3: Crowdfunding platform due diligence is associated with better platform 
performance, in terms of: higher percentage of fully funded projects, larger total amount 
of capital raised through a platform, and quicker fundraising process. 
Several considerations point to alternative predictions counter to Hypothesis 3. 
Crowdfunding platforms scantly advertise their due diligence activities for at least three reasons.
6
 
First, once publicly announced, project selection criteria imply a guarantee of the minimum 
quality of listed projects to funders. However, the quality of listed projects is not fully observable 
to a platform even after conducting due diligence; and a large proportion of projects will fail to 
                                                          
5
 Fundraising is considered successful when a project is fully funded within the issuer’s expected time horizon. 
6
 We are not aware of any advertisements or promotions of what crowdfunding platforms do in respect of their due 
diligence for any of the platforms in our sample. 
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either meet funders’ expectations or reach their campaign goals. As such, publicly announcing 
project selection criteria increases platforms’ litigation risk.7 Second, empirically, it is difficult 
for a platform to adopt standard and static project selection criteria beyond rudimentary listing 
requirements. Platforms implement flexible selection criteria to accommodate changes in the 
number and quality of projects. In addition, project quality can be evaluated in different 
dimensions: for example, some evaluation criteria, such as site-visit expectations and account-
monitoring requirements, are either subjective by nature or confidential to prevent exploitation of 
loopholes. Since due diligence application is flexible, platforms do not have standard guidelines. 
Third, it is in platforms’ interest to encourage more projects to apply, enabling them to obtain 
more comprehensive market information, on which an appropriate level of due diligence is 
applied. Furthermore, detailed and rigid listing requirements could even deter some good 
projects from listing on the platform, due to concerns over fundraising speed and efficiency.   
The possible assortative matching of project to platform is possibly a function of due 
diligence and platform fees,
8
 as we have noted above at the start of subsection 3.1.  
Entrepreneurs could figure out the extent of due diligence being applied and stop the application 
phase, or the platform could deny entry to the platform through the application of due diligence.  
However, another more critical component of that matching of projects to platforms is through 
the project type.  Projects with a specific niche are more likely to select a platform with the same 
niche (e.g., music, fashion, real estate, etc.), regardless of the extent of due diligence application. 
On the one hand, crowdfunding platforms’ silence on due diligence application produces 
insufficient funder awareness on platform due diligence. On the other hand, even if platforms 
                                                          
7
 See for example https://canadianfraudnews.com/crowdfunding-fraud-litigation-litigation-funding-scams/ and 
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/08/73378-recent-lawsuit-may-show-big-liability-risk-for-crowdfunding-
platforms/  
8
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this helpful comment. 
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claim due diligence application, their due diligence actions are not directly verifiable by project 
funders. It takes time for funders to realize the quality of listed projects and the level of platform 
due diligence. As the extent of due diligence application could vary between periods, funders 
cannot fully infer the level of platform due diligence application in the concurrent fundraising 
period: essentially, platform due diligence cannot directly facilitate funders’ decision-making, 
which brings uncertainty to the benefit of due diligence application on crowdfunding outcomes. 
Taken together, due diligence may be completely unrelated to crowdfunding platform 
performance. It is, therefore, worth examining the data. 
1.4 Data   
This study’s data were provided by NCFA Canada. The data contain information on 51 
crowdfunding platforms, representing 71% of the total Canadian crowdfunding market.
9
 Among 
the 51 platforms, 21 are donation-based, 9 reward-based, 4 lending-based, 9 security-based, and 
8 platforms contain more than one type of crowdfunding. The data cover the time period for each 
of the five years from 2013 to 2017. The data are yearly based and were submitted by the 
platforms: each row in the data shows the operating condition of a platform in a given year. 
There are items of heterogeneity within the platform projects that we do not observe; it is not 
possible for us to observe all of the underlying data within each platform. The unit of observation 
is a platform-year, for a total of 255 observations for 2013-2017. 
Table 1 summarizes different categories of platform information reported in the data. The 
data indicate the general status of a platform, such as the registration date and status, 
crowdfunding type, number of employees, website address, and related details. The data indicate 
                                                          
9
 As of December 2015, there were 72 crowdfunding platforms in Canada. There were fewer platforms in earlier 
years, implying we have coverage of more than 72% of the market for earlier years. 
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the type of due diligence checks conducted by a platform, such as background checks (i.e., 
verification of government-issued ID), personal meeting or site visit, financial or credit checks, 
cross-checks with customers, suppliers and social media (such as Facebook or LinkedIn), 
monitoring account activities, and requests for third party certificates or proof. Only 49% 
platforms acknowledged that they regularly conducted any form of due diligence. Of the six 
different types of due diligence checks (background checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-
checks, account monitoring, and third party proof), the average number employed was 1.2, with 
a median of 0 and a maximum of 6. 
The data indicate the services available to subscribers, such as pre-evaluation before 
listing on the platform, strategic fundraising guidance, business or financial planning, facilitation 
in crowdfunding contract design, and marketing or promotional services. In total, 34.5% of the 
platforms provided regular updates to users (funders and entrepreneurs), while 28.6% offered 
pre-evaluation to start-ups before listing, 26.3% offered fundraising guidance to entrepreneurs, 
16.9% offered marketing and promotional services, 15.3% offered business and financial 
planning services, and 9.8% offered contractual help to start-ups. 
The data comprise information on each platform’s operating conditions in each year from 
2013 to 2017: number of projects launched, average successful fundraising rate, average 
fundraising duration, and total amount of capital raised on a platform. The median platform has 
projects that take 7-9 weeks to achieve full-funding, and the median platform has 21-30% 
entrepreneurs achieving their funding goal. The median platform spends between $2,500 and 
$10,000 CAD on compliance annually,
10
 has 10 employees, 501-1,000 funders per year, 101-250 
entrepreneurial projects listed per year, and total capital raised between $1,000,000 and 
                                                          
10
 Employee salary is excluded from the compliance expenditure. 
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$1,500,000 per year. The crowdfunding projects cover the following industries: non-profit, 
business and professional services, education and research, art, life science, cleantech and energy, 
hardware and software, manufacturing, media, real estate, and social enterprise.  
Fee structure/revenue models of the platform are included in the data, including whether 
the platform: charges a one-time platform listing fee (17.7%), periodical subscription at different 
levels/tiers (20.0%), fixed percentage of the total amount raised (whether funding is successful or 
not) (15.3%), fixed percentage of the total amount raised (only if funding is successful) (23.9%), 
and management fees and carry percentages (23.1%). These and other variables and detailed 
summary statistics (means, medians, standard deviations, minimum, and maximums) are shown 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 (Page 36) 
The comparison tests in Table 2 provide a first impression of some distinct patterns in the 
dataset. Although comparison tests do not show the precise relationships among variables 
because variables are analyzed separately and in isolation, these tests nevertheless present a 
general picture of relationships for some key variables of interest. The joint effect of the same 
variables is discussed in the next section’s consideration of regression analysis. 
Table 2 (Page 38) 
Table 2 Panel A shows there is a higher probability of due diligence application among 
platforms with a smaller number of projects: when the number of campaign projects is greater 
than the median across platforms, only 34.7% of platforms conduct due diligence, and when the 
number of campaign projects is below the median then 51.3% of platforms conduct due 
diligence. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Similarly, there is a higher probability of due 
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diligence among platforms with a great number of employees: when the number of employees is 
greater than the median across platforms, 64.4% of platforms conduct due diligence, and when 
the number of employees is below the median then 19.1% of platforms conduct due diligence. 
Again, this is consistent with Hypothesis 1. There is a higher probability of due diligence among 
platforms that spend more on compliance: when compliance expenditures are greater than the 
median across platforms, 62.8% of platforms conduct due diligence, and when the compliance 
expenditures are below the median then 32.3% of platforms conduct due diligence. Due 
diligence is also more likely among platforms that have fee models with periodical subscription 
at different levels (72.6% for those with these fees, versus 43.6% for platforms without this fee 
structure), consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the likelihood of due diligence is 
indistinguishable between platforms that charge a fixed percentage service fee only if fundraising 
is successful and platforms without the fee structure. Each of the reported differences is 
statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
Table 2 Panel B presents the possible advantages of due diligence application, partially 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. There is a higher level of fully funded projects and a larger amount 
of capital raised through platforms that conduct due diligence, and these differences are 
significant at the 1% level. However, due diligence does not have a significant effect on 
fundraising duration. 
Table 3 presents the correlations among variables of interest. Table 3 Panel A shows that 
due diligence application is positively correlated with resources devoted to compliance, 
employee numbers, all or nothing fundraising policy, and user subscription at different levels. 
Due diligence application is negatively correlated with the number of campaign projects on a 
platform. Table 3 Panel B shows the correlation among due diligence application, platform 
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performance, and different types of platform services. Consistent with the comparison test results 
in Table 2 Panel B, due diligence application is positively associated with a higher percentage of 
fully funded projects and a larger amount of capital raised through a platform, and does not 
exhibit a strong correlation with fundraising duration. The number of due diligence types 
employed is positively correlated with the percentage of fully funded projects, the total amount 
of capital raised through the platform, and several platform services. The number of projects per 
employee ratio is negatively correlated with the total amount of capital raised through the 
platform, periodical updates, and contract help. Further detailed correlations among platform 
services are also presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 (Page 39) 
1.5 Multivariate Analyses 
In this section, we use detailed analysis to reveal the factors influencing platform due 
diligence and demonstrate how due diligence application benefits crowdfunding platforms. 
 
1.5.1. Due Diligence Application 
We use logit regressions to examine the factors influencing platform due diligence. 
Crowdfunding platform fixed effect models are applied in analyses; standard errors are clustered 
by year. For reasons of conciseness, we do not show the regressions for all types of due diligence 
individually: instead, we first report regressions for overall due diligence (all types of due 
diligence combined), and then report regressions for the three most common due diligence 
subcategories: background check, site visit, and cross check. In a prior version of the paper, we 
reported year-by-year regressions, and the statistical and economic significance of the results are 
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very consistent (available on request). 
 
Tables 4 (Page 40)  
Figure 1 (Page 34)  
Figure 2 (Page 34) 
Table 4 shows the factors influencing due diligence application in general. Due diligence 
is applied when at least one of the following actions is taken: background check, site visit, credit 
check, cross-check with customers, suppliers and social media, monitoring account activities, 
and requesting third party certificates or proof. The data indicate that the number of projects in 
each year is negatively correlated with due diligence application, and this effect is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in each of the models. The economic significance is such that, on 
average, an increase by one categorical unit in the number of projects11 is associated with an 
24.5% (Model 5) to 30.2% (Model 1) reduction in the probability of due diligence, consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. Figure 1 presents a graphic illustration of these findings. Similarly, the 
number of employees is positively and significantly (at the 5% level) correlated with due 
diligence: a one standard deviation increase in the number of employees results in a 7.8% (Model 
4) to 10.7% (Model 5) increase in the probability of due diligence, again consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. These results remain even when controlling for resources spent on compliance, 
which is positively and significantly (at the 5% level) correlated with due diligence: an increase 
by one unit in resources spent on compliance12 leads to an 20.0% (Model 6) to 23.7% (Model 2) 
increase in the probability of due diligence (presented graphically in Figure 2). 
                                                          
11
 The number of projects is an ordinal variable; see Table 1. 
12
 Resource is an ordinal variable; see Table 1. 
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Platforms with periodical subscription at different levels are more likely to conduct due 
diligence by 9.4% (Model 6), compared with platforms with plain one-time listing fee. This 
effect is consistent with Hypothesis 2, and significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, platforms 
that adopt all-or-nothing fundraising policy are more likely to conduct due diligence. On 
average, a platform with all-or-nothing fundraising policy is 6.8% (Model 4) to 8.2% (Model 5) 
more likely to carry out due diligence than a platform without all-or-nothing policy; this effect is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in Models 4 and 6 and at the 10% level in Model 5. 
Table 5 (Page 41) 
Table 5 further analyzes three main types of due diligence application: background 
checks (Panel A), site visits (Panel B), and cross-check with customers, suppliers and social 
media (Panel C). The data in Table 5 Panel A indicate the following (each of these effects is 
significant at the 5% level, except where otherwise stated). First, a one-unit increase in the 
number of campaign projects reduces the probability of background checks by 25.3% (Model 2) 
to 28.3% (Model 6). Second, a one-unit increase in the amount of resources spent on compliance 
annually increases the probability of background checks by 6.5% (Model 2) to 7.7% (Model 4). 
Third, a one standard deviation increase in the number of employees increases the probability of 
background checks by 5.9% (Model 3) to 7.4% (Model 5).13 Fourth, all-or-nothing fundraising 
policy increases the probability of background checks by 4.7% (Model 6) to 5.1% (Model 4). 
Fifth, advanced fee structures increase the probability of background checks by 5.4% (Model 6). 
Table 5 Panel B indicates that a one-unit increase in the number of projects reduces the 
probability of site visits by 26.5% (Model 6) to 32.8% (Model 4). A one-unit increase in the 
                                                          
13
 A one standard deviation increase in the number of employees is 10.58; see Table 1. We did not round up this 
figure to a whole number to maintain consistency across each of the variables in reporting the economic 
significance. 
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amount of resources spent on compliance annually increases the probability of site visits by 
18.1% (Model 4) to 22.0% (Model 3); these effects are significant at the 10% level in Models 2-
6, and at 5% level in Model 1. A one standard deviation increase in the number of platform 
employees increases the probability of a site visit by 8.2% (Model 5) to 9.1% (Model 3). The 
advanced fee structure has a statistically significant (at the 5% level) impact on probability of 
site visits where the economic significance is an increase of 8.8% (Model 6) compared with 
platforms adopting plain one-time listing fee. 
Table 5 Panel C indicates that a one-unit increase in resources spent on compliance 
increases the probability of cross-checks by 27.6% (Model 4) to 33.8% (Model 5); these effects 
are significant at the 5% level. A one standard deviation increase in the number of employees 
increases the probability of cross-checks by 11.1% (Model 3) to 12.2% (Model 4); these effects 
are significant at the 5% level in Model 3, Model 4 and Model 6 and at the 10% level in Model 
5. All-or-nothing fundraising policy is associated with an increase in the probability of cross-
checks by 8.5% (Model 4) to 9.7% (Model 5); these effects are significant at the 10% level. 
Advanced fee structures increase the probability of cross-checks by 11.6% (Model 6), significant 
at the 5% level. Neither the number of campaign projects nor the number of funders has a 
consistently noticeable impact on cross-check with customers, suppliers and social media.  
 
1.5.2. Due Diligence Benefit 
We use ordered probit regressions to examine whether due diligence, among other 
factors, influences crowdfunding platform performance. Fix effect models controlling for 
crowdfunding platforms are applied; standard errors are clustered by year.  
Table 6 presents the results for the impact of due diligence application on platform 
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performance, measured by the percentage of fully funded projects,14 total amount of capital 
raised annually, and average fundraising duration.  
Table 6 (Page 44) 
Table 6 Panel A shows that due diligence application is associated with a higher 
percentage of fully funded projects, controlling for all types of services offered by the platform. 
Specifically, the application of due diligence increases the scale on percentage of fully funded 
projects by 1.07 (Model 4) to 1.33 (Model 1). This effect is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Based on the average scale on the percentage of fully funded projects in the matched 
sample (2.73; see Table 1), platform due diligence application leads to a significant 39.3% to 
48.7% increase in fully funded projects on a platform, controlling for different types of platform 
services. 
It should also be noted that the project/employee ratio has a negative impact on the 
percentage of fully funded projects in Table 6: on average, the higher the ratio, the lower the 
resources devoted to each project, the greater the competition across projects and the lower the 
success of projects. On average, an increase in one magnitude of the project/employee ratio on a 
platform reduces the scale on the percentage of fully funded projects on a platform by 0.44 
(Model 3) to 0.52 (Model 6); this effect is significant at the 5% level. Based on the average scale 
on the percentage of fully funded projects in the matched sample (2.73), a one magnitude 
increase in the project/employee ratio reduces the percentage of fully funded projects by 16.1% 
to 19.1%.  
Table 6 Panel B shows that due diligence application is associated with a larger amount 
of capital raised through a platform. Specifically, the application of due diligence increases the 
                                                          
14
  We considered the commonly used transformation for dependent variables that are in percentages (e.g., see 
Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003) but not find material differences in the results.   
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scale of total amount of capital raised by 1.14 (Model 6) to 1.26 (Model 1), each significant at 
the 5% level in Models 1-6, controlling for the number of projects listed on and services 
provided by the platform. Based on the average scale on the total amount of capital raised (4.17), 
platform due diligence application leads to a significant 27.3% to 30.1% increase in the total 
amount of capital raised on a platform, controlling for different types of platform services. 
The effect of the project/employee ratio is significant at the 10% level in Models 1-6. On 
average, an increase in one magnitude of project/employee ratio on a platform reduces the scale 
on the total amount of capital raised on a platform by 0.88 (Model 1) to 1.08 (Model 4). Based 
on the average scale on the total amount of capital raised (4.17), an increase in the 
project/employee ratio by one point on the ordinal scale reduces the total amount of capital 
raised by 21.0% to 26.0%. 
The effect of strategic fundraising guidance is significant at the 10% level in Models 1, 2, 
3, 5, and 6, and at the 5% level in Model 4. On average, strategic fundraising guidance increases 
the scale on the total amount of capital raised on a platform by 0.59 (Model 6) to 0.76 (Model 2). 
Based on the average scale on the total amount of capital raised (4.17), strategic fundraising 
guidance increases the total amount of capital raised on a platform by 14.2% to 18.1%. 
Table 6 Panel C does not present a significant negative relationship between due 
diligence application and fundraising duration, where fundraising duration refers to the time span 
between the first official listing day and the fully funded day, excluding the project listing 
application waiting time before the launch of the official campaign.15 Nevertheless, the negative 
coefficient for due diligence application shows that where due diligence was applied, fundraising 
became quicker, which is consistent with our expectation. The effect of the project/employee 
ratio is positive and significant at the 5% level in Models 1-6. On average, an increase in one 
                                                          
15
 Only fully funded campaigns are considered. 
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magnitude of the project/employee ratio on a platform increases the scale on the average 
fundraising duration on a platform by 0.97 (Model 5) to 1.12 (Model 3). Based on the average 
scale on the average fundraising duration in the matched sample (2.53), a one magnitude increase 
in the project/employee ratio increases the average fundraising duration by 38.3% to 44.4%. 
Promotion and marketing services also has a positive impact on the efficiency of 
fundraising, significant at the 10% level in Model 6. On average, marketing or promotion 
services reduce the scale on the average fundraising duration on a platform by 0.31 (Model 6). 
Based on the average scale on the average fundraising duration in the matched sample (2.53), 
marketing or promotion services reduce the average fundraising duration by 12.2%. 
Figure 3 (Page 35) 
Figure 3 shows the performance of 12 crowdfunding platforms that switched from non-
due diligence to due diligence in year 2014, 2015 and 2016. The average values of total amount 
of capital raised annually and percentage of fully funded projects in each year for the 12 
platforms are 5.42 and 2.67 in scale before the switch and 6.25 and 3.42 after the switch. The 
differences in values prior versus post the switch are statistically significant at 5% level.  
                                                Figure 4 (Page 35) 
Figure 4 shows the performance of 11 crowdfunding platforms that switched from due 
diligence to non-due diligence in year 2014, 2015 and 2016. The average values of total amount 
of capital raised annually and percentage of fully funded projects in each year for the 11 
platforms are 4.18 and 2.45 in scale before the switch and 3.91 and 2.27 after the switch. The 
differences in values prior versus post the switch are however, not statistically significant. 
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Figure 3 and figure 4 show that, due diligence is in general associated with better 
crowdfunding platform performance, measured by total amount of capital raised and percentage 
of fully funded projects. However, the impact of due diligence on platform performance is 
asymmetric across different levels of platform operating conditions: On the one hand, platforms 
that switched from non-due diligence to due diligence are on average have operating conditions 
around or above sample median levels; adopting due diligence enables them to further improve 
platform performance. On the other hand, platforms that switched from due diligence to non-due 
diligence are on average have operating conditions below sample median levels; dropping due 
diligence in the hope of allowing more projects to be listed on a platform is not a solution to 
boost performance for struggling crowdfunding platforms, whose performances are not 
noticeably influenced by due diligence application. We do not observe platforms switch back and 
forth in due diligence application in the sample period. 
1.6 Robustness Checks 
In the multivariate analyses, we applied the same set of tests on all crowdfunding 
platforms. However, security crowdfunding operates under more rigid regulations and faces 
more complex contractual arrangements than other types of crowdfunding. In addition, security 
crowdfunding funders expect monetary returns from crowdfunding projects; this monetary 
incentive differentiates them from funders involved in other types of crowdfunding. In this sense, 
security crowdfunding funders could be more sensitive to platform due diligence application; 
security crowdfunding platforms could drive our regression results. 
To disentangle our findings from the influence of security crowdfunding, we conduct 
robustness checks on due diligence application among platforms without security fundraising. 
The results show that due diligence application is still positively related with the resources spent 
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on compliance annually, number of platform employees, and a more sophisticated fee structure, 
while negatively related with the number of projects listed on a platform, although the according 
marginal effects vary. Further details of the robustness checks are available upon request. 
Another concern in the multivariate analyses is whether due diligence application is 
associated with economies of scale: large crowdfunding platforms can invest more resources on 
technology to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of due diligence application; they are also 
more likely to gain standardized experience through overseeing a larger number of listed 
projects. To test the robustness of our analysis, we applied the same tests on the sample 
excluding the largest four platforms, each of which listed more than 500 projects. The analysis 
results are not materially different. For conciseness, the according test results are not presented. 
We have conducted analyses using separate regressions by year instead of panel 
regressions; again, the results are not materially different and, hence, they are not reported for 
conciseness.   
Another concern with our tests of Hypothesis 3 is that due diligence is endogenous.  In 
prior versions of the paper, and in the Online Appendix accompanying this paper, we provide 
two-stage estimates with fitted values of due diligence.  Those estimates are consistent with the 
estimates here in respect of the inferences drawn about the benefits of due diligence.  We 
recognize there may be the usual concerns regarding the quality of the instruments and the 
assumptions underlying the methods for non-continuous variables, and hence prefer to report the 
base case results without those instruments here in the main paper.16 
We report these and other checks in the accompanying Online Appendix. 
 
                                                          
16
 For a further discussion on how instruments and two step methods are not necessarily better and may even be 
worse, see http://www.mostlyharmlesseconometrics.com/  
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1.7 Discussion 
We argue that due diligence application improves platform performance by rejecting low-
quality projects and reducing information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and funders, based 
on the regression results in Table 6. However, we do not propose direct causal relationships for 
variables pertaining to due diligence application in Tables 4 and 5. For instance, neither an 
upgrade in fee structure nor an increase in employee number guarantees a higher likelihood or 
better quality of due diligence. As platforms become more sophisticated and accumulate more 
resources, they could invest in many areas other than due diligence: platform advertising, 
services to entrepreneurs, funder education, strategic partnerships with business incubators, 
Angels and VCs, and even lobbying for a more supportive legislative environment. What 
platforms do depend on what is most valuable to entrepreneurs and funders: platforms may rank 
their investment agendas by priorities. As due diligence protects funders and signals the quality 
of crowdfunding projects, it deserves high priority on the platform investment agenda. This 
inference is supported by our findings in Tables 4 and 5: in general, factors relating to the slack 
of recourses and management sophistication are reflective of platform due diligence application. 
If we treat crowdfunding due diligence as a selective process for projects seeking to be 
listed on a platform, then the supply and demand of crowdfunding projects will directly affect 
due diligence application. At first glance, more projects on the waiting list and weaker funder 
demand for crowdfunding projects (“Projects beg for investments”) lead to more due diligence or 
rigid project selection processes, and the funders’ rights will be given higher priority; conversely, 
fewer projects on the waiting list and stronger funder demand (“Funders beg for projects.”) lead 
to less due diligence or loose project selection processes, and the entrepreneurs’ fundraising 
needs will be given higher priority. Nevertheless, due diligence can also influence the supply and 
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demand of crowdfunding projects through its impact on platform reputation: platforms that apply 
proper due diligence receive trust and popularity among funders, which, in turn, attracts more 
entrepreneurs for project listing, resulting in improved due diligence application. In this regard, 
due diligence application leads to a virtuous cycle of more funders and better crowdfunding 
projects; therefore, it plays an important role in assuring the healthy development of the 
crowdfunding industry. 
An important factor we cannot omit is technology improvement. Although we do not 
observe significant differences in platform technology levels during the sample horizon
17
, we do 
expect that as the crowdfunding industry develops, the heterogeneity of platform technologies 
will have a significant impact on due diligence application: computer programs may provide 
automatic due diligence recommendations based on account activities, documentations from 
entrepreneurs, publicly available information and credit history, etc. We expect that technology 
development will greatly improve the efficiency of crowdfunding due diligence and, longer-term, 
both influence the competitiveness of crowdfunding platforms and shape the growth pattern of 
the crowdfunding industry. 
One interesting phenomenon we observe is that platforms are quite silent on their due 
diligence activities: few platforms publicly advertise how selective they are regarding listed 
projects or what approaches they take to assure the quality of listed projects. For security 
crowdfunding, this phenomenon could be related to legal risk concerns, as platforms may wish to 
avoid motivating regulatory investigation of whether due diligence is appropriately applied. 
More generally, this phenomenon could be related to platform marketing strategy: platforms may 
want to emphasize the innovativeness of this fundraising channel and the attractiveness of 
                                                          
17
 If technology levels are significantly different among platforms, then project number and employee number 
should have no explanatory power on due diligence application. 
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crowdfunding investment, rather than tedious details of the quality-checking on crowdfunding 
projects. However, it is only when funders know whether a platform conducts due diligence that 
they could react by funding a campaign faster. In this regard, silent due diligence application is 
consistent with our findings in Table 6 Panel C: fundraising duration is not noticeably affected 
by platform due diligence. 
We could imagine many explanations as to why platforms do not advertise their due 
diligence activities.  For example, we are aware that venture capital funds do not advertise their 
due diligence on their webpages.  Similarly, investment banks do not seem to advertise their due 
diligence teams as well.  Crowdfunding is a new industry.  We have recently shown our evidence 
to platforms in Canada, as well as regulators in Canada, the U.S., and other countries around the 
world.  It appears that platforms may now appreciate better the benefits of due diligence.  But to 
date, it appears that most platforms do due diligence in order to avoid being sued later on, or risk 
regulators taking away their right to operate a platform.  That is, due diligence is viewed as a cost 
center, similar to the way that compliance is viewed as a cost center in banks and investment 
banks.  We have added a discussion of these points after the presentation of our empirical results. 
 
1.8 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Our analysis is based on data collected by NCFA Canada from crowdfunding platforms. 
As platforms report their data to NCFA Canada, they could overstate their actions on due 
diligence application to exaggerate the quality of listed projects and their prudence on funder 
protection. If the extent of due diligence application is overstated, then the impact of real due 
diligence application on platform performance is underestimated, while the explanatory power of 
the factors associated with due diligence application is overestimated. In addition, platforms 
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could have different reporting standards, creating measurement errors on variables of interest. 
We expect that a more detailed dataset based on direct evaluations of crowdfunding platforms 
will better reflect the importance of due diligence on platform performance. 
Our study broaches the subject of due diligence application in the fast-growing 
crowdfunding industry. Future studies on the subject could focus on the following areas: 
The efficiency of due diligence application:  
What are the direct and indirect costs associated with due diligence application? When 
does due diligence bring the highest marginal benefit to a platform? What is the optimal level of 
due diligence? Given different levels of platform resource constraint, what are the best ways to 
apply due diligence? Which project characteristics call for more/less due diligence application? 
The platform listing barrier set up by due diligence:  
How selective is the due diligence, measured by project admission rate? Does the scale of 
individual projects listed on a platform become larger because of due diligence? For security 
crowdfunding platforms, to what extent does the due diligence barrier help to signal project 
quality? What are the responses of entrepreneurs to their individual projects being subject to due 
diligence application? 
The long-term effect of due diligence application:  
Do projects become more successful after fundraising when due diligence is applied? 
Does a platform have a higher proportion of funders that invest more than once on the same 
platform? Do entrepreneurs return to the platform to launch other projects after their first 
fundraising campaigns? Does more due diligence from platforms reduce funder incentives to 
apply due diligence before making investments? 
The above list of potential future studies on crowdfunding due diligence is not exhaustive. 
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As the crowdfunding industry becomes increasingly popular among entrepreneurs and funders, 
we expect that platform due diligence will attract more attention from academics, practitioners, 
and policy-makers. 
 
1.9 Conclusion 
The decade leading up to 2017 witnessed massive growth in the popularity of 
crowdfunding as a viable form of entrepreneurial finance. In Canada, thousands of new projects 
are launched on different fundraising websites every year. Connecting donors and funders with 
beneficiaries, borrowers, and entrepreneurs, crowdfunding platforms help idle money realize its 
value. However, exactly what do crowdfunding platforms do? Do they simply provide a cheap 
online forum for business soliciting? Alternatively, do they apply due diligence on listed projects 
and help to reduce information asymmetry between projects’ issuers and subscribers? What 
advantages can platforms obtain through carrying out due diligence?  
In this paper, we have assessed the factors influencing the application of due diligence, as 
well as whether due diligence by platforms is associated with project success. The scope of 
crowdfunding due diligence comprises background checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-
checks, monitoring accounts, and third party proof. Our paper provides the first-ever 
examination of empirical data on this topic, made possible by the innovative data collection 
efforts of NCFA Canada. 
The summary statistics and comparison tests present a transparent picture in the data, as 
do the regression results controlling for other things being equal. The application of due 
diligence is associated with more affluent platform resources, either in compliance expenditure 
or in employee number, and a more sophisticated management structure, indicated by different 
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levels of subscription service. Due diligence is less likely to be applied when platform employees’ 
expected workload is heavy, as shown by a large number of campaign projects launched on a 
given platform.  
The data further indicate that the application of due diligence in general has a very strong 
positive influence on the fundraising success rate and amount raised on the platform, controlling 
for all the services it offers. Among all these services, only strategic fundraising guidance is 
significantly positively related with the fundraising success rate and the total amount raised 
through platforms. The strong positive association between due diligence and fundraising 
success shows the important value for crowdfunding platforms in limiting the number of lower 
quality projects they list through active due diligence. 
The evidence herein strongly suggests that policymakers should require, whether through 
imposition of standards or otherwise, greater stringency of crowdfunding platforms in 
conducting due diligence. The evidence also suggests that further research on crowdfunding 
should pay careful attention to differences across platforms, as there appears to be massive 
heterogeneity in respect of what platforms actually do. 
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Fig.1.1 Probability of Due Diligence and Number of Listed Projects 
This figure shows the predicted probability of due diligence application as the number of listed projects changes 
from scale 1 to scale 6. The figure is based on Model 6 in Table 4. Other explanatory variables are held constant 
at their respective means. The total numbers of projects/financings/loans launched in each year from 2013 to 2017 
are measured in ordinal scales: level 1 is less than 20, level 2 is 21-50, level 3 is 51-100, level 4 is 101-250, level 
5 is 251-500, and level 6 is more than 500. 
 
 
  
Fig. 1.2 Probability of Due Diligence and Resources Spent on Compliance 
This figure shows the predicted probability of due diligence application as the resources spent on compliance 
changes from scale 1 to scale 5. The figure is based on Model 6 in Table 4. Other explanatory variables are held 
constant at their respective means. The total numbers of projects/financings/loans launched in each year from 
2013 to 2017 are measured in ordinal scales: level 1 is less than 20, level 2 is 21-50, level 3 is 51-100, level 4 is 
101-250, level 5 is 251-500, and level 6 is more than 500. 
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Fig. 1.3 Performance of Crowdfunding Platforms Switching from Non-Due Diligence to Due Diligence 
This figure shows the performance of 12 crowdfunding platforms that switched from non-due diligence to due 
diligence over the sample period. The average values of total amount of capital raised and percentage of fully funded 
projects prior to the switches are compared with according values post the switch.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 Performance of Crowdfunding Platforms Switching from Due Diligence to Non-Due Diligence 
This figure shows the performance of 11 crowdfunding platforms that switched from due diligence to non-due 
diligence over the sample period. The average values of total amount of capital raised and percentage of fully funded 
projects prior to the switches are compared with according values post the switch.  
 
  
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Total Amount of Capital Raised Percentage of Fully Funded Projects
Platforms Switch from Non Due Diligence to Due 
Diligence 
Non-Due Diligence
Due Diligence
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Total Amount of Capital Raised Percentage of Fully Funded Projects
Platforms Switch from Due Diligence to Non Due 
Diligence 
Non-Due Diligence
Due Diligence
36 
 
Table 1.1. Definitions and Summary Statistics. 
This table provides definitions of the main variables, as well as summary statistics. 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Any Due Diligence is applied? (Yes=1; No=0) 
Dummy Variable: Is Any of the Following Due Diligence Regularly Applied: 
Background Check, Site Visit, Credit Check, Cross-check through Social 
Media Connections, Monitoring Account Activities, and Requesting Third 
Party Certificates or Proof? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.4941 0 0.5009 0 1 
Total Number of types of Due Diligence applied 
Total Number of Types of Due Diligence Applied by a Platform. Types of Due 
Diligence refer to: Background Check, Site Visit, Credit Check, Cross-check 
through Social Media Connections, Monitoring Account Activities, and 
Requesting Third Party Certificates or Proof 
255 1.2196 0 1.4249 0 6 
Number of Employees Number of Employees Working for a Crowdfunding Platform 255 14.7490 10 10.5815 2 50 
All or Nothing Fundraising Policy? (Yes=1; No=0) 
Dummy Variable: Does the platform adopt “All-Or-Nothing” (AON) policy in 
fundraisng? (Yes=1; No=0) 
255 0.2902 0 0.4547 0 1 
Fee Structure: One-time Platform Listing Fee 
Dummy Variable: Is the Main Service Charge a One-time Listing Fee? 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.1765 0 0.3917 0 1 
Fee Structure: Periodical Subscription at Different 
Levels/Tiers 
Dummy Variable: Is the Main Service Charge based on Periodical 
Subscription at Different Levels/Tiers? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.2000 0 0.4121 0 1 
Fee Structure: Fixed percentage of total amount 
raised, whether funding is successful or not 
Dummy Variable: Is the Main Service Charge based on a Fixed Percentage of 
Total Amount Raised, regardless of whether Funding is Successful? (Yes=1, 
No=0) 
255 0.1529 0 0.3752 0 1 
Fee Structure: Fixed percentage of total amount 
raised, only if funding is successful 
Dummy Variable: Is the Main Service Charge based on a Fixed Percentage of 
Total Amount Raised, only if Funding is Successful? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.2392 0 0.4471 0 1 
Fee Structure: Management fee and carry 
percentage 
Dummy Variable: Is the Main Service Charge based on a Management Fee and 
Carry Percentage? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.2314 0 0.4451 0 1 
Average Fundraising Duration 
Ordinal Variable: Average Fundraising Duration—Level 1: 1-3 Weeks; Level 
2: 4-6 Weeks; Level 3: 7-9 Weeks; Level 4: 10-12 Weeks; Level 5: More than 
12 Weeks 
255 2.5255 3 0.8909 1 5 
Resources Spent on Compliance Annually 
Ordinal Variable: Total Resources Spent on Compliance Annually—Level 1: 
less than $2500; Level 2: $2501-10000; Level 3: $10001-30000; Level 4: 
$30001-50000; Level 5: more than $50000 
255 2.2784 2 0.8447 1 5 
37 
 
Percentage of Fully Funded Projects 
Ordinal Variable: fully funded projects as a percentage of all projects launched 
on the platform—Level 1: 0-10%; Level 2: 11-20%; Level 3: 21-30%; Level 4: 
31-40%; Level 5: 41-50%; Level 6: more than 50% 
255 2.7255 3 0.9729 1 6 
Platform Provides Periodical Updated Information 
to Users 
Dummy Variable: Does a Platform Provide Periodical (weekly, bi-weekly, 
monthly) Platform Updates and Activities to Users (Funders and Startups)? 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.3451 0 0.4763 0 1 
Platform offers pre-evaluation before listing 
Startups 
Dummy Variable: Does a Platform Offer Pre-evaluation to Startups before 
their Listing? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.2863 0 0.4529 0 1 
Platform offers strategic fundraising guidance 
Dummy Variable: Does a Platform Offer Strategic Fundraising Guidance to 
Startups? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.2627 0 0.4410 0 1 
Platform helps with business and financial planning 
Dummy Variable: Does Platform Help Startups with Business and Financial 
Planning? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.1529 0 0.3606 0 1 
Platform offers contractual help to Startups 
Dummy Variable: Does a Platform Offer Contractual Help to Startups? 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.0980 0 0.2980 0 1 
Platform offers marketing or promotion service 
Dummy Variable: Does a Platform Offer Marketing or Promotion Service to 
Startups? (Yes=1, No=0) 
255 0.1686 0 0.3752 0 1 
Number of Funders 
Ordinal Variable: Total Number of Funders in Each Year from 2013 to 2016 
(estimated)—Level 1: fewer than 100; Level 2: 101-500; Level 3: 501-1000; 
Level 4: 1001-2500; Level 5: 2501-5000; Level 6: 5001-10000; Level 7: 
10001-20000; Level 8: 20001-50000; Level 9: more than 50000 
255 3.3176 3 1.4048 1 8 
Number of Projects 
Ordinal Variable: Total Number of Projects/Financings/Loans Launched in 
Each Year from 2013 to 2016 (estimated)—Level 1: fewer than 20; Level 2: 
21-50; Level 3: 51-100; Level 4: 101-250; Level 5: 251-500; Level 6: more 
than 500 
255 3.5098 4 1.1633 1 6 
Project/Employee Ratio 
Ordinal Variable: Total Number of Projects Launched in Each Year from 2013 
to 2016 (estimated) divided by Number of Employees for Each Platform—
Level 1: fewer than 10 projects per employee; Level 2: 11-20 projects per 
employee; Level 3: 21-50 projects per employee; Level 4: 51-100 projects per 
employee; Level 5: more than 100 projects per employee. 
255 2.9255 3 1.0454 1 5 
Total Amount of Capital Raised (CAD) 
Ordinal Variable: Total Amount of Money Raised in Each Year from 2013 to 
2016 (estimated)—Level 1: Less than 300 K; Level 2: 300 K-500 K; Level 3: 
500 K-1 M; Level 4: 1M-1.5 M; Level 5: 1.5M-3 M; Level 6: 3 M-5 M; Level 
7: 5 M-10 M; Level 8: more than 10 M 
255 4.1725 4 1.7004 1 8 
 
38 
 
Table 1.2. Comparison Tests 
 
This table shows the impact of different platform characteristics on due diligence application (Panel A) and the impact of due diligence application on platform performance (Panel B) using comparison 
tests. The table is based on platform activities in 2013--2017. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Factors Affecting Due Diligence Application  
      
 
      
  
Project Number 
(Below Median) 
Project Number 
(Above Median) 
Z Value 
Compliance 
Expenditure 
(Below Median) 
Compliance 
Expenditure 
(Above Median) 
Z Value 
Probability of Due Diligence Application 0.5133 0.3469 2.43** 0.3229 0.6283  -5.16*** 
       
 
Employee 
Number 
 (Below Median) 
Employee 
Number 
 (Above Median) 
Z Value 
All or Nothing 
Policy (No) 
All or Nothing 
Policy (Yes) 
Z Value 
Probability of Due Diligence Application 0.1905 0.6439  -4.57*** 0.2597 0.4595  -2.46** 
    
  
 
  
Fee Structure: 
Periodical 
Subscription at 
Different 
Levels/Tiers (No) 
Fee Structure: 
Periodical 
Subscription at 
Different 
Levels/Tiers (Yes) 
Z Value 
Fee Structure: 
Fixed percentage 
of total amount 
raised, only if 
funding is 
successful (No) 
Fee Structure: 
Fixed percentage 
of total amount 
raised, only if 
funding is 
successful (Yes) 
Z Value 
Probability of Due Diligence Application 0.4363 0.7255  -3.62*** 0.4742 0.5574 -0.91 
       
       Panel B: Impact of Due Diligence Application on Platform Performance  
     
       
  
Due Diligence 
(Not Applied) 
Due Diligence 
(Applied) 
T Value 
   
Average Percentage of Fully Funded Projects (in Levels/Ordinal Scale) 2.3648 3.0778 -4.19*** 
   
Average Amount of Capital Raised (in Levels/Ordinal Scale) 3.6118 4.7202 -3.76*** 
   
Average Fund-raising Duration (in Levels/Ordinal Scale) 2.4217 2.6269 -0.92 
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Table 1. 3. Correlation Matrix for Key Variables. 
 
This table shows the correlations among variables of interest. The correlation matrix shown below is based on platform activities in 2013--2017. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Factors Affecting Due Diligence Application  
 
         
  
Due 
Diligence 
Dummy 
Project 
Number 
Resources 
on 
Compliance 
Employee 
Number 
All or 
Nothing 
Fundraising 
Policy 
Dummy 
      Project Number -0.352*** 
    
      Resources on Compliance 0.573*** 0.363 
   
      Employee Number 0.386*** 0.267 0.422*** 
  
      All or Nothing Fundraising Policy 
Dummy 
0.310*** -0.241* 0.283* 0.0809 
 
      Subscription at Different Levels 0.159** 0.0624 0.187 0.126 -0.103 
      
 
            
 
Panel B: The Influence of Due Diligence Application on Platform Performance  
 
       
  
Percentage 
of Fully 
Funded 
Projects 
Total 
Amount of 
Capital 
Raised 
Average 
Fundraising 
Duration 
Due 
Diligence 
Dummy 
Periodical 
Update 
Pre-listing 
Evaluation 
Strategic 
Guidance 
Business 
Planning 
Contract 
Help 
Promotion 
Service 
Number of 
Types of 
Applied 
Due 
Diligence 
Total Amount of Capital Raised 0.646*** 
          
Average Fundraising Duration -0.191 0.328 
         
Due Diligence Dummy 0.365*** 0.283*** 0.172 
        
Periodical Update 0.204** 0.460** -0.305** 0.484*** 
       
Pre-listing Evaluation 0.165 0.0859 0.297* 0.322*** 0.287* 
      
Strategic Guidance 0.327*** 0.487*** 0.262 0.193** 0.512** 0.359*** 
     
Business Planning -0.0594 -0.0673 0.241 0.315** 0.246 0.0875 0.0759 
    
Contract Help -0.0172 -0.0812 -0.254 0.155 0.263 0.207* 0.254* 0.308* 
   
Promotion Service 0.318*** 0.364*** -0.359** 0.103 0.309* 0.228* 0.516*** -0.0764 0.175 
  
Number of Types of Applied Due 
Diligence 
0.233* 0.216* -0.183 0.630*** 0.325** 0.311** 0.285* 0.267 0.186 0.243 
 
Number of Projects/ Number of 
Employees 
0.205 -0.351** 0.280 0.143 -0.244* -0.0748 -0.262 0.156 -0.129* 0.135 -0.0921 
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Table 1.4 Factors Affecting Platform’s Due Diligence Application. 
 
This table shows the factors affecting a crowd-funding platform’s due diligence application. Fixed effect logit regression models controlling for crowdfunding platforms are applied to evaluate the 
influence of different platform characters and activities. Standard errors are clustered by year. Due diligence is applied when at least one of the following actions is taken: background check, site visit, 
credit check, cross-check with customers, suppliers and social media, monitoring account activities, and requesting third party certificates or proof. Dependent variables equal 1 if due diligence is 
applied; 0 otherwise. Model specification and goodness of fit tests are applied. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
        Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Number of Funders per Year -0.0714 -0.0648 -0.0703 -0.0665 -0.0822 -0.0769 
  (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.84) (-0.96) (-1.05) 
Number of Projects per Year -0.149*** -0.145** -0.139** -0.137** -0.121** -0.133** 
  (-2.66) (-2.51) (-2.32) (-2.40) (-2.29) (-2.18) 
Resources Spent on Compliance Annually 
 
0.117** 0.104** 0.113** 0.101** 0.0988** 
  
 
(2.29) (2.14) (2.37) (2.11) (2.33) 
Number of Employees 
  
0.0451** 0.0385** 0.0527** 0.0468** 
  
  
(2.41) (2.35) (2.43) (2.37) 
All or Nothing Fundraising Policy? (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
0.0338** 0.0405* 0.0376** 
  
   
(2.18) (1.89) (1.99) 
Fee Structure: One-time platform listing fee  
    
-0.0672** 
 
  
    
(-2.35) 
 
Fee Structure: Periodical Subscription at Different Levels/Tiers 
     
0.0465** 
  
     
(2.46) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, whether Funding is Successful or Not 
     
0.0304 
  
     
(0.21) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, only if Funding is Successful 
     
0.0123 
  
     
(1.64) 
Fee Structure: Management Fee and Carry Percentage 
     
0.0562 
  
     
(0.83) 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.2853 0.2947 0.3205 0.3248 0.3352 0.3471 
F 4.46 4.84 5.23 5.31 6.03 6.58 
Prob > F   0.0058 0.0027 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 1.5 Application of Main Types of Due Diligence. 
 
This table shows the application of three main types of due diligence: background check, site visit, and cross check with customers, suppliers and social media. Fixed effect logit regression models 
controlling for crowdfunding platforms are applied to evaluate the influence of different platform characteristics and activities. Standard errors are clustered by year. Panel A shows the application of a 
background check; Panel B, a site visit; and Panel C, a cross check. The models are based on platform characteristics and activities in 2013--2017. Dependent variables equal 1 if the type of due 
diligence is applied; 0 otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Background Check  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Number of Funders per Year 0.0303 -0.0185 -0.0137 0.0259 -0.0324 0.0362 
  (0.83) (-0.29) (-0.58) (0.61) (-0.48) (0.74) 
Number of Projects per Year -0.120** -0.109** -0.115** -0.117** -0.113** -0.122** 
  (-2.53) (-2.48) (-2.29) (-2.33) (-2.16) (-2.25) 
Resources Spent on Compliance Annually 
 
0.0281** 0.0315** 0.0332** 0.0294** 0.0308** 
  
 
(2.18) (2.13) (2.04) (2.21) (2.07) 
Number of Employees 
  
0.0254** 0.0283** 0.0317** 0.0268** 
  
  
(2.28) (2.31) (2.19) (2.16) 
All or Nothing Fundraising Policy? (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
0.0218** 0.0212* 0.0203* 
  
   
(2.07) (1.79) (1.88) 
Fee Structure: One-time platform listing fee  
    
-0.0565** 
 
  
    
(-1.98) 
 
Fee Structure: Periodical Subscription at Different Levels/Tiers 
     
0.0233** 
  
     
(2.24) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, whether Funding is Successful or Not 
     
0.0185 
  
     
(1.27) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, only if Funding is Successful 
     
0.00859 
  
     
(0.93) 
Fee Structure: Management Fee and Carry Percentage 
     
0.00313 
  
     
(1.24) 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.2368 0.2435 0.2605 0.2648 0.2759 0.3032 
F 4.32 4.57 4.85 5.14 5.38 5.72 
Prob > F   0.0143 0.0039 0.0009 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
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Panel B. Dependent Variable: Site Visit  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Number of Funders per Year -0.113 -0.0822 -0.0843 -0.0785 -0.0801 -0.0986 
  (-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.73) (-1.02) (-0.81) (-0.95) 
Number of Projects per Year -0.130** -0.126** -0.133** -0.135** -0.128** -0.109** 
  (-2.23) (-2.44) (-2.36) (-2.55) (-2.29) (-2.26) 
Resources Spent on Compliance Annually 
 
0.0865** 0.0904* 0.0746* 0.0841* 0.0811* 
  
 
(2.11) (1.79) (1.87) (1.73) (1.90) 
Number of Employees 
  
0.0376** 0.0354** 0.0339** 0.0368** 
  
  
(2.31) (2.24) (2.18) (2.29) 
All or Nothing Fundraising Policy? (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
0.0164* 0.0182* 0.0156 
  
   
(1.86) (1.75) (1.64) 
Fee Structure: One-time platform listing fee  
    
-0.0489** 
 
  
    
(-2.57) 
 
Fee Structure: Periodical Subscription at Different Levels/Tiers 
     
0.0362** 
  
     
(1.98) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, whether Funding is Successful or Not 
     
0.0285 
  
     
(1.03) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, only if Funding is Successful 
     
0.0149 
  
     
(0.74) 
Fee Structure: Management Fee and Carry Percentage 
     
0.00428 
  
     
(0.79) 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.2431 0.2569 0.2684 0.2711 0.2948 0.3154 
F 4.17 4.39 4.81 4.93 5.26 5.68 
Prob > F   0.0165 0.0050 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
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Panel C. Dependent Variable: Cross Check with customers, suppliers and social media 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Number of Funders per Year -0.249 -0.325 -0.357 -0.404 -0.296 -0.268 
  (-0.88) (-0.79) (-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.76) (-0.52) 
Number of Projects per Year -0.186* -0.163* -0.172* -0.159 -0.160 -0.144 
  (-1.70) (-1.68) (-1.92) (-1.47) (-1.59) (-0.84) 
Resources Spent on Compliance Annually 
 
0.103** 0.0986** 0.0964** 0.118** 0.110** 
  
 
(2.57) (2.46) (2.29) (2.30) (2.42) 
Number of Employees 
  
0.0388** 0.0425** 0.0413* 0.0397** 
  
  
(2.05) (1.99) (1.87) (2.18) 
All or Nothing Fundraising Policy? (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
0.0296* 0.0338* 0.0315* 
  
   
(1.90) (1.86) (1.70) 
Fee Structure: One-time platform listing fee  
    
-0.0391** 
 
  
    
(-2.53) 
 
Fee Structure: Periodical Subscription at Different Levels/Tiers 
     
0.0404** 
  
     
(2.41) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, whether Funding is Successful or Not 
     
0.00753 
  
     
(0.85) 
Fee Structure: Fixed Percentage of Total Amount Raised, only if Funding is Successful 
     
0.0130 
  
     
(1.17) 
Fee Structure: Management Fee and Carry Percentage 
     
0.0216 
  
     
(1.43) 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.1815 0.2146 0.2430 0.2509 0.2657 0.3168 
F 2.75 3.92 4.36 4.54 5.28 5.57 
Prob > F   0.0659 0.0093 0.0020 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 1.6 Impact of Due Diligence Application on Platform Performance. 
 
This table shows the impact of due diligence application on the percentage composition of fully funded projects, total amount of capital raised through a platform, and average crowdfunding duration on 
a platform. Due diligence is applied when at least one of the following actions is taken: background check, site visit, credit check, cross-check with customers, suppliers and social media, monitoring 
account activities, and requesting third party certificates or proof. Fixed effect ordered probit regressions controlling for crowdfunding platforms are used to evaluate the influence of due diligence 
application on platform performance in 2013--2017. Standard errors are clustered by year. Different services offered by crowd-funding platforms are used as controls. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Fully Funded Projects  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Due Diligence Application? (Yes=1; No=0) 1.327***  1.117** 1.235** 1.072** 1.184** 1.128** 
  (2.65) (2.42) (2.31) (2.27) (2.35) (2.44) 
Total Number of types of Due Diligence applied 0.169* 0.140* 0.158* 0.146* 0.135* 0.147 
  (1.89) (1.77) (1.68) (1.71) (1.84) (1.63) 
Project/Employee Ratio  -0.521** -0.503** -0.439** -0.465** -0.474** -0.518** 
  (-2.44) (-2.37) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.03) (-1.98) 
Platform offers strategic fundraising guidance 0.627* 0.563 0.649 0.714* 0.598* 0.605* 
  (1.88) (1.59) (1.61) (1.77) (1.85) (1.90) 
Platform Provides Periodical Updated Platform Information to Startups 
 
-0.0318 -0.0445 0.0169 -0.0347 0.0426 
  
 
(-0.49) (-0.53) (0.68) (-0.62) (1.12) 
Platform offers pre-evaluation before listing Startups 
 
 
0.152 -0.0895 -0.108 0.133 
  
 
 
(0.38) (-0.80) (-0.75) (1.03) 
Platform helps with business and financial planning 
   
-0.0653 -0.0724 -0.0595 
  
   
(-0.56) (-0.47) (-0.54) 
Platform offers contractual help to Startups 
    
0.286 0.317 
  
    
(1.52) (0.97) 
Platform offers marketing or promotion services 
     
0.298 
  
     
(1.29) 
"All or Nothing" Fundraising Policy Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.2645 0.2846 0.2953 0.3147 0.3208 0.3274 
F 3.96 4.05 4.11 4.64 4.72 4.81 
Prob > F   0.0018 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Panel B. Dependent Variable: Total Amount of Capital Raised  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Due Diligence Application? (Yes=1; No=0) 1.255** 1.146** 1.210** 1.204** 1.172** 1.139** 
  (2.40) (2.53) (2.34) (2.28) (2.16) (2.09) 
Total Number of types of Due Diligence applied 0.0947* 0.0873* 0.110* 0.108 0.0975* 0.0864 
  (1.90) (1.78) (1.81) (1.55) (1.74) (1.58) 
Project/Employee Ratio -0.877* -0.945* -0.932* -1.084* -0.977* -0.963* 
  (-1.86) (-1.91) (-1.83) (-1.75) (-1.69) (-1.72) 
Platform offers strategic fundraising guidance 0.633* 0.756* 0.734* 0.682** 0.701* 0.592* 
  (1.80) (1.69) (1.95) (1.98) (1.71) (1.73) 
Platform Provides Periodical Updated Platform Information to Startups 
 
0.0821 0.0866 0.0736 0.0925 0.0963 
  
 
(0.75) (0.93) (0.67) (0.84) (0.66) 
Platform offers pre-evaluation before listing Startups 
  
0.135 0.127 0.119 0.123 
  
  
(1.13) (1.09) (1.47) (0.98) 
Platform helps with business and financial planning 
   
0.149 0.167 -0.132 
  
   
(1.08) (1.25) (-1.14) 
Platform offers contractual help to Startups 
    
0.238* 0.205 
  
    
(1.83) (1.60) 
Platform offers marketing or promotion services 
     
0.384 
  
     
(1.05) 
"All or Nothing" Fundraising Policy Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Listed Projects Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.2433 0.2517 0.2635 0.2714 0.2852 0.2916 
F 3.85 3.96 4.07 4.21 4.33 4.59 
Prob > F   0.0011 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Panel C. Dependent Variable: Average Fundraising Duration  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Due Diligence Application? (Yes=1; No=0) -1.122 -1.105 -1.127 -1.124 -1.139 -1.084 
  (-1.38) (-1.24) (-0.95) (-1.07) (-1.33) (-0.86) 
Total Number of types of Due Diligence applied -0.0988* -0.0916 -0.104 -0.115 -0.109 -0.112 
  (-1.75) (-1.53) (-1.36) (-1.20) (-1.58) (-1.32) 
Project/Employee Ratio  1.023** 1.106** 1.121** 1.113** 0.967** 1.085** 
  (2.55) (2.34) (2.28) (2.46) (2.38) (2.19) 
Platform offers strategic fundraising guidance 0.741* 0.685 0.836 0.953 0.708 0.652* 
  (1.89) (1.63) (1.48) (1.50) (1.45) (1.67) 
Platform Provides Periodical Updated Platform Information to Startups 
 
-0.496* -0.530* -0.615 -0.638 -0.584 
  
 
(-1.71) (-1.68) (-1.64) (-1.63) (-1.58) 
Platform offers pre-evaluation before listing Startups 
  
-1.133 -0.952 -0.926 -1.059 
  
  
(-1.05) (-1.22) (-0.86) (-0.71) 
Platform helps with business and financial planning 
 
  
0.413 0.367 0.384 
  
 
  
(0.14) (0.23) (0.37) 
Platform offers contractual help to Startups 
    
-0.258 -0.242 
  
    
(-1.32) (-1.22) 
Platform offers marketing or promotion services 
     
-0.308* 
  
     
(-1.79) 
"All or Nothing" Fundraising Policy Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crowdfunding Platform Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.234*** 1.093*** 1.137** 1.115*** 1.158*** 1.209*** 
  (2.77) (3.05) (2.47) (2.83) (2.75) (2.64) 
Number of Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R2  0.2367 0.2453 0.2509 0.2558 0.2640 0.2785 
F 3.28 3.69 3.95 4.21 4.38 4.82 
Prob > F   0.0069 0.0016 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Introduction 
Not all mutual fund flows are created equal. Beneath the veil of changes in total assets 
under management (AUM) over time, there are appreciations or depreciations in fund assets and 
different types of money flow. Specifically, total fund inflow is composed of new purchases, pre-
authorized contribution (PAC) plan purchases, switch-in, and reinvested distributions; total fund 
outflow is composed of one-time redemptions, systematic withdrawal plan (SWP) redemptions, 
switch-out, and distributions to unitholders. Among these flows, new purchases and one-time 
redemptions, hereinafter referred to as “retail fund flow,” are, respectively capital flows’ first 
entry into or final exit out of a mutual fund. The rest are transitional or operational capital flows 
generated in mutual fund operating processes.  
Different mutual fund flows are not weighted equally. Overall, retail fund flows dominate 
the capital movement in a fund. Inevitably, mutual fund managers strive to attract and retain 
capital from retail investors. To raise a fund’s appeal, they produce higher returns, demand lower 
service fees, and advertise through the radio, television, newspapers, magazines, and posters on 
buses and trains. Retail fund flow is so important and popular that the existing literature treats it 
as the same as the overall capital flow of a mutual fund.  
Nevertheless, the overall capital flow, or changes in AUM net of asset appreciation, does 
not fully or completely depict the investment behavior of mutual fund unitholders. Some fund 
flows, such as switches, are transitional money flows directed by current unitholders with 
ongoing financial interest in a mutual fund company. Other fund flows, such as PACs and SWPs, 
consist of regular deposits from and withdrawals by current unitholders. In addition, distribution 
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flows are designed for tax purposes. These fund flows are, by nature, different from both retail 
fund inflows, in which new money enters a fund for the first time, and retail fund outflows, in 
which investments leave a fund permanently. As mutual fund flows vary by type and function, 
overall capital flow alone is too ambiguous to explain the diverse preferences of mutual fund 
investors. 
Some mutual fund flows, such as switches, are overlooked in the extant literature, yet 
actively affect AUM. In addition, PAC flows, SWP flows, distributions to unitholders, and 
reinvested distribution flows all impact the AUM of a mutual fund. To what extent these fund 
flows contribute to the aggregate capital movement of a mutual fund has not been examined in 
the extant literature. 
Mutual fund flows are sensitive to fund performance and service charges. In general, 
better performance and lower fund fees attract retail fund flow from investors. Extant literature 
has studied the relationship between overall capital flow and fund performance (Warther (1995), 
Carhart (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Edelen (1999), Jain and Wu (2000), Chen, Hong, 
Huang, and Kubik (2004), Bollen and Busse (2005), Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005), Frazzinia 
and Lamont (2008), Ivković and Weisbenner (2009), Gil-bazo and Ruiz-verdu (2009), Barras, 
Scaillet, and Wermers (2010)), but does not distinguish among the various types of flows that 
compose overall capital movement. In addition, the marginal impacts of various mutual fund 
service charges on fund flows remain unclear. The characteristics of each specific type of fund 
flow, with respect to changes in past fund performance and fund fees, have not previously been 
investigated.  
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Although different types of mutual fund flows are distinct in volume, flow–
performance/fee sensitivity, and function, they are not isolated from one another. Different 
mutual fund flows are directed by the same group of investors, whose risk preferences and 
investment behaviors do not change across fund flow structures. However, the relationships 
among different types of fund flows have not yet been extensively studied. As retail fund flow 
sways the overall capital movement, whether or how other types of flows correlate with retail 
fund flow, and the implications of fund flow correlations, are important questions that remain 
unanswered.  
The relationships between retail fund flow and other fund flows draw attention to the 
integrity of information possessed by investors. Specifically, retail fund inflows are contributed 
by incoming investors with little experience of the funds they are entering; they choose to invest 
in a mutual fund following advice received from dealers or brokers.
18
 Retail fund outflows are 
directed by outgoing unitholders wishing to either cash out profits or cut their losses. Fund 
switches occur among different FundSERV
19
 units within the same mutual fund company. 
Mutual fund unitholders who make these switches are acquainted with the performance of a 
FundSERV unit in which they have previously invested; they choose to switch out to a new 
FundSERV unit due to changed risk preference or anticipated better fund performance. While it 
is difficult to disentangle outgoing investors’ motivation for leaving, as different investors 
evaluate the return of a fund over different time horizons—not just fund return in the investor’s 
exit month—it is easy to assume that most investors have stable risk preferences under normal 
                                                          
18
 In the Canadian mutual fund market, more than 80% of funds (excluding fund of funds) are sold through dealers and brokers; the remaining 
funds can be purchased directly from fund managers. 
19
 FundSERV is an online hub that electronically connects fund companies, distributors, and intermediaries, enabling them to buy, sell and 
transfer investment funds amongst one other. A unique FundSERV code is provided for each fund series/purchase option combination. 
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economic conditions. In this respect, switching out of a FundSERV unit reveals an insider’s 
discontent regarding fund performance. Although one investor’s switch-out does not indicate 
lower performance of a fund, the switch-out from a herd of investors, i.e., the aggregate switch-
out fund flow, does.  
All mutual funds, including those that underperform, want to attract investments from 
clients. An agency problem is then created when an investor is enticed to an underperforming 
mutual fund by an advisor who receives sales commissions from the fund company. Here, there 
exists information asymmetry between the new investor and the fund’s insiders, namely the 
managers and existing unitholders. The leaving of existing unitholders and entry of new 
investors, reflected by the positive correlation between switch-out fund flow and retail fund 
inflow, demonstrates the information asymmetry between current unitholders and incoming 
investors. The impact of this information asymmetry on mutual fund performance has not yet 
been analyzed. 
In this paper, we reveal the percent compositions of each type of fund flow in total capital 
movement, analyze the sensitivity of each type of flow with respect to changes in past fund 
performance and in service fees, investigate the correlations between retail flow and other fund 
flows, uncover the information asymmetry between current mutual fund unitholders and 
incoming investors, and examine the impact of this information asymmetry on fund performance. 
Our study is based on proprietary data obtained directly from mutual funds in Canada, relating 
detailed mutual fund fee structures to specific types of fund flows and to performance. 
This paper is related to many others on mutual fund flows, both in general (Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2002), Christofferson et al. (2013), (2014)) and in particular respect to the fact that 
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fees affect flows (Chalmers and Reuter (2012)). Prior works have shown that option-like 
incentive contracts can exacerbate risk-taking by fund managers (Starks (1987)). By contrast, 
fulcrum fees, or fees that encourage managers to just beat a benchmark, lead managers to just 
buy the benchmark (Admati and Pfleiderer (1997)) and reduce the reward for good performance 
or ‘flow–performance sensitivity’ (Heinkel and Stoughton (1994)). Hence, fulcrum fees are rare 
(Golec (1992), Elton et al. (2003)). More generally, prior work is consistent with the view that 
fixed fees and incentive fees significantly vary with fund flows and performance (Warner and 
Wu (2011), Deli (2002), Kuhnen (2004)). The present paper adds to an important stream of 
literature by providing specific information on the different components of fee structures that 
were not available in prior data sets, relating fee structure details to specific types of fund flows 
that cannot be estimated from publicly available sources, revealing the relationships among 
different types of fund flows, and disclosing the agency problems associated with flow 
correlation. To this end, we provide an empirical assessment of the possible and often-debated 
conflicts of interest between agent and principal in the mutual fund industry. 
2.2 Institutional Background
20
 
There are four primary purchase options for mutual funds in Canada. The no-load (NL) 
purchase option does not include a front-end commission, nor can it result in deferred sales 
charges, but a trailer fee is paid to the fund dealer. The deferred sales charge (DSC) purchase 
option (which includes low-load purchase options) requires the investor to pay a redemption fee 
to the fund company if the units are sold before the elapse of a predetermined period. The fund 
dealer receives an upfront commission directly from the fund company under this option, as well 
as a trailer fee. The front-end (FE), or initial sales charge, purchase option allows the fund dealer 
                                                          
20
 This section is based on an earlier version of this paper (Cumming, Johan, and Zhang (2015)). 
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to charge a negotiable front-end commission directly upon the initial sale, in addition to 
receiving a trailer fee. In the fee-based (FB) purchase option, no FE commission may be charged, 
no trailer fees are paid to the dealer, and no DSCs may be levied. Instead, the dealer charges fees 
directly to the investor’s account. High net worth or institutional series/purchase options, where 
no FE commission, DSC, or trailer fees are paid, are also reported as FB.  
Mutual fund fees in Canada encompass more than just the publicly available management 
expense ratios (MERs): they also comprise trading expenses, trailer fees, DSCs, FE 
commissions, switch fees, performance fees, and negotiated management fees. Some of these 
items change over the life of a fund. The stated purpose of trailer fees is to compensate the 
advisor’s dealer firm for the ongoing investment services and advice they provide to investors.21 
In some funds, trailer fees are paid at the same rate in perpetuity, while in other funds they may 
fluctuate over time. Differed sales charge (DSC) is a back-end charge to mutual fund unitholders 
who redeem investments early. The DSC decreases over time and usually disappears when 
investments are redeemed after five to eight years. FE commissions are paid when investors 
choose the “front-end” purchase option. Switch fees apply to investors when they switch from 
one fund to another within the same mutual fund company. Performance fees are incentive fees 
paid to fund managers. Finally, negotiated management fees are paid when the management fees 
of a particular fund series/purchase option are negotiable. 
                                                          
21 In practice, trailer fees pay for many aspects not associated with advice. There is currently no legal requirement to provide advice in order to 
receive a trailer fee. For example, discount brokerages receive trailer fees without providing any advice. Trailer fees are often paid quarterly, as 
long as clients hold investments in the fund manager’s mutual funds. Each dealer then pays out a portion of those trailer fees to its advisors, 
according to the firm’s own compensation grid. Generally, under this compensation grid, the more commission or fee revenue the advisor 
generates for the firm, the greater the portion of that revenue the advisor retains. 
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Some mutual funds in Canada must be purchased through an advisor or intermediary, 
while others may be purchased directly from the fund company, although when buying directly, 
the person with whom the investor deals would still be considered an advisor. The advice 
provided may significantly influence flows. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Our analyses focus on four questions. First, do different types of fund flows exhibit 
materially different characteristics or are they essentially alike? Second, can the mutual fund fee 
structure impact on fund flow and fund performance; if so, what is the rationale? Third, do 
different types of fund flows correlate with each other; if so, what can we learn from the 
correlations? Fourth, can fund flows predict future fund performance; if so, what is the 
mechanism? 
2.3.1 Fund Flow Characteristics: Alike or Different? 
The return of mutual fund investors is affected by fund performance and fund charges. In 
general, better past performance and lower fund fees attract investors, while poorer past 
performance and higher fund fees dissuade them. Consequently, mutual fund flows are sensitive 
to fund past performance and fees. As mutual fund flows vary by type, it is natural to conjecture 
that different types of flows exhibit distinct characteristics with respect to past fund performance 
and fees. The important question is whether the characteristic distinctions are significant such 
that the aggregate fund flow, measured by changes in AUM net of asset appreciation, is 
misleading in evaluating dynamic investor behavior, despite its extensive adoption in the 
literature. 
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On the one hand, on average, switch-in flow, reinvested distribution flow, and PAC flow 
jointly account for approximately 20% of total inflow; switch-out flow, distribution to 
unitholders flow, and SWP flow jointly account for approximately 20% of total outflow. The 
relative weights of fund flows other than new purchases and one-time redemptions are nontrivial. 
If these fund flows exhibit characteristics with respect to prior fund performance and fees that 
are distinct from retail fund flow, then aggregate fund flow alone cannot accurately reflect 
investor behavior. Compared with other types of fund flows, net retail flow—measured by new 
purchases net of one-time redemptions—is more influenced by recommendations from fund 
advisors due to the incentive effect of trailer fees. In particular, switches occur within the same 
fund company and do not generally affect trailer fee payments to fund advisors; PACs and SWPs 
are preset fund flows determined by investors’ embedded contribution preference and 
consumption needs, not by advisors’ promoting effort; distribution to unitholders is designed for 
tax avoidance; and reinvested distributions are flows mainly based on investors’ previous 
experiences with the fund. Only net retail flow is directly associated with trailer fee payments to 
fund advisors, and critically depends on fund advisors’ promoting effort. In this regard, we 
should expect material differences in flow sensitivities between retail flow and other types of 
flows with respect to prior fund performance and the fee structure. 
On the other hand, as retail fund flow dominates aggregate fund flow, variations in retail 
fund flow significantly drive aggregate flow movement. In addition, new purchases can be 
significantly correlated with switches in, as both are primarily based on prior fund performance, 
as are one-time redemptions and switch out. Fund performance also has a long-term impact on 
PACs and SWPs, due to its influence on investor expectation. In this regard, the differences in 
flow–performance and flow–fee sensitivities among distinct types of flows can be trivial. The 
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positive correlations among distinct types of fund flows can make retail fund flow representative 
of aggregate flow, enabling aggregate flow alone to reflect general investor preference. 
The impact of factors that affect mutual fund flow, such as fee structures, may differ 
depending on the type of flow. For example, trailer fees paid to fund advisors for promoting the 
fund to retail investors may enable fund managers to attract and retain AUM without 
demonstrating strong fund performance. Furthermore, higher trailer fees may cause fund 
advisors to deviate from recommendations based on prior fund performance and investors’ risk-
tolerance level; an underperforming fund may, thus, be favored by an advisor simply due to a 
high trailer fee payment. In addition to incentivizing fund advisors, the trailer fee also provides a 
comfort zone for fund managers: without delivering effort and skill, they can still attract and 
retain assets from retail investors. Another example is DSCs, which penalize early investment 
withdrawal and restrict AUM outflow when a mutual fund underperforms. Hence, trailer fees 
and DSCs would be expected to mitigate net retail flow performance sensitivity and enable funds 
to attract more flow regardless of past performance; however, these fees may differently impact 
other components of aggregate fund flow, such as switches, reinvested distributions, 
preauthorized plan purchases, or systematic plan redemptions, for the possibly different 
economic reasons considered below. 
Hypothesis 1： Aggregate fund flow exhibits different properties and determinants than net 
retail flow (inflows comprising new purchases net of pre-authorized 
contribution plan purchases, switches-in, and reinvested distributions;  
outflows comprising one-time redemptions net of systematic withdrawal plan 
redemptions, switches -out, and distributions made to unitholders). 
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2.3.2 Fund Flow Correlations: Reflection of Information Asymmetry? 
Different types of mutual fund flows reveal different investment decisions. Existing 
unitholders’ investment decisions are mainly based on their prior experiences with the fund, 
whereas future unitholders’ investment decisions are generally influenced by purchase 
recommendations from fund advisors, who tempted by higher trailer fees, may recommend 
underperforming funds to their clients. 
An important question regarding underperforming funds is whether there is information 
asymmetry between existing and future unitholders. If so, then they may react differently to the 
same fund status: existing unitholders escape while future unitholders are guided in; if not, then 
existing and future unitholders’ actions should be synchronized: existing unitholders cash out 
and potential future unitholders refrain from investment. 
On the one hand, neither existing nor future mutual fund unitholders have access to 
private asset information. In addition, funds’ portfolio composition, prior performance, and 
service charges information are all publicly available. Existing unitholders should, thus, have no 
information advantage over incoming unitholders. 
On the other hand, under the classical search theory, transactions do not occur until 
buyers and sellers find each other. The searching process can be inefficient and costly; agents 
must choose between continuing to search for a better deal and accepting a current offer. In the 
mutual fund context, thousands of fund series are available to investors, each containing 
miscellaneous details in its fund prospectus. An average mutual fund investor has neither the 
time nor expertise to select the fund that best matches their investment expectation and risk-
tolerance level. In this circumstance, even if detailed fund information is publicly available, 
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whether an average investor can utilize it is another matter. In this regard, search cost creates 
market frictions (Sirri and Tufano (1998)) that lead to information asymmetry between existing 
and future mutual fund unitholders: existing unitholders are aware of a fund’s suitability, 
whereas future unitholders face uncertainties in both deciding whether a fund is an appropriate 
choice and evaluating alternative investment opportunities. Fund advisors mitigate information 
asymmetry and reduce the search cost for investors when recommending based on clients’ best 
interest. However, where advisors breach their fiduciary duty by making inappropriate 
recommendations, they amplify the information asymmetry between existing and future fund 
investors. 
The level of correlations among different types of fund flows, such as investor switch-out 
flow and new purchases flow, reveal the extent of information asymmetry between existing and 
future fund unitholders, as well as the classical principal-agent problem between mutual fund 
investors and advisors. Furthermore, if fund managers can induce fund advisors to entice 
investors even when funds underperform, they have less incentive to create value for existing 
fund unitholders. Consequently, the correlations among different types of mutual fund flows 
should impact significantly on fund performance. 
Hypothesis 2: A positive correlation between retail fund inflow and switches out reflects 
information asymmetry between incoming investors and current unitholders. 
This information asymmetry, which is more common when fund series are sold 
through dealers or brokers and is attributed to biased purchase advice, is 
negatively associated with fund performance. 
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2.4 Data 
The data were collected on behalf of the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) with 
the assistance of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) in 2015.
22
 The sample covers the 
period 2003–2014 and includes 43 fund families of the 113 total in Canada, or 38.1% of the 
market, and covering $746 billion of AUM, or 66.7% of the market
23
. More specifically, the 
sample comprises 18,102 FundSERV codes. In total, the sample comprises more than 1 million 
monthly FundSERV code observations on fees, flows, and performance. We conducted 
comparison tests for the representativeness of the respondent fund families by examining 
publicly available data, such as location and ratings; we did not find any statistically significant 
differences. For reasons of confidentiality and to ensure no fund identity can be reverse 
engineered, we do not present specific information on fund families. Fund of funds are not 
included in this analysis. 
Table 1 (Page 85) 
Table 1 defines the main variables from the data. The first key variable is 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW, calculated as the fund flows net of PACs, SWPs, switches, 
reinvestments, and distributions. NET_RETAIL_FLOW is measured over each FundSERV 
code—a monthly observation in the data given as a percentage of the prior month’s FundSERV 
AUM—to make comparative assessments of flow across funds and over time. Table 1 indicates 
that the FundSERV code monthly observation shows an average NET_RETAIL_FLOW of 
                                                          
22The mutual fund data for this research were obtained further to a data request sent to all Canadian fund managers offering conventional mutual 
funds to the public under prospectus. Canadian fund managers’ participation in the research was voluntary. The data request questionnaire may be 
accessed here: https://www.securities-administrators.ca/uploadedFiles/General/pdfs/Mutual%20Fund%20Fees%20Research%20Data%20Request.pdf. 
23 According to Investment Funds Institute of Canada, the estimated market size of Canadian stand-alone mutual funds in 2015 was $1.1 trillion. 
59 
 
0.49%, with a median of 0.00% and a standard deviation of 3.28%. Including all types of inflows 
and outflows, the average monthly flow was 0.49%, with a median of 0.00% and a standard 
deviation of 3.28%. The average flows attributable to PACs and SWPs, switches, and 
reinvestments and distributions were 0.03%, 0.09%, and –0.02%, respectively. 
It is worth noting that as different mutual funds vary in size, the basic arithmetic average 
of flows across different funds does not accurately reflect the overall trend of capital movement. 
The trend of aggregate capital movement for mutual funds in the sample follows:
24
 
Figure 1 (Page 105) 
Figure 1 shows that the sample mutual fund companies’ AUM experienced strong growth, 
from CAD 286 billion in January 2003 to CAD 667 billion in December 2014, or an average 
7.31% annual growth over 12 years, compared to an average 1.99% growth in Canadian GDP 
over the same period.
25
 
Table 1 further indicates that the sample’s average 12-month Fama-French 4-factor gross 
return annualized alpha is 0.25%, with a median of 0.25% and a standard deviation of 0.74%.
26
 
                                                          
24
 Mutual funds established after January 2003 or liquidated before December 2014 are excluded from Figure 1. 
25
 According to the World Bank, Canada’s GDP in 2003 and 2014 was CAD 1.433 trillion and CAD 1.780 trillion, respectively; based on 
constant 2010 USD.  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?end=2014&locations=CA&start=2003  
26 Fama and French (2014) point out that, for calculating alpha, their new 4-factor model is the appropriate model, improving on earlier models 
such as that of Carhart (1997). They have, thereby, updated the Kenneth R. French Data library. Our factors are taken directly from the Kenneth 
French Library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_developed.html. We checked robustness by considering separately 
funds that are and are not North American-focused, as well as other fund categories. The flow-performance results are quite stable. We use a 
homogenous set of factors to calculate alpha, as we do not have the requisite information to pick different factors for different funds. Our findings 
are also robust to other specifications, such as a single-factor model based on market conditions, for example. The positive alpha we have found 
is consistent with the existing literature. For example, Fama and French (2010) report positive alpha, based on a sample period from January 1984 
to September 2006. Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten (2005) document both positive alpha and negative alpha in different sample periods using data 
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To the best of our ability and the fund companies’ ability to provide the data, we have created a 
survivorship bias-free data set by including live and defunct FundSERV codes.
27
 
Figure 2 reveals the sizes of different types of mutual fund inflows and outflows relative 
to total inflow and outflow directed by investors. The relative sizes are calculated by aggregating 
each type of fund flow across all FundSERV units in each observation month, then dividing the 
aggregate value of each type of fund flow by the aggregate value of total investor flow in each 
month. 
Figure 2 (Page 106) 
Figure 2 shows that, when measured in aggregate flow volume, new purchases, on 
average, account for around 79% of total investor inflow over time; switch-in, 16%; reinvested 
distribution, 4%; and PAC, 1%. One-time redemption, on average, accounts for around 76% of 
total investor outflow over time; switch-out, 19%; distribution to unitholder, 4%; and SWP, 1%. 
Contrary to the growth pattern of aggregate AUM in Figure 1, in which financial crisis shifts the 
value line downward, the compositions of mutual fund flows are resistant to economic downturn. 
Figure 2 further reveals seasonality in mutual fund flow compositions: December is a 
period in which distribution to unitholders and reinvested distribution increase, whereas investors 
switching in and out decreases. This seasonality could be attributed to different practices 
between fund managers, who want to demonstrate their performance to investors before New 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Kosowski et al. (2006) report positive and negative alpha, based on different sample 
periods. Our results are likewise robust to other approaches, such as those explored by Barber et al. (2016) and Berk and van Binsbergen (2016). 
27 It is possible that some fund managers had difficulty gathering the data for all funds closed and merged over the sample period; in some cases, 
it was not possible to gather data on fund companies that had ceased operations over the period, but based on what we could ascertain from 
publicly available information, we did not identify any gaps in the data. 
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Year’s Eve, and fund investors, who usually spend more time with their families during 
Christmas, thus postponing investment decisions until January. 
More details on fund flow compositions are illustrated in Figure 3, in which distributions 
on the weight of each type of flow within total fund flow are presented.  
Figure 3 (Page 108) 
Figure 3A shows that new purchases equals total inflow for less than 25% of all monthly 
observations in the sample; investor switch-in is absent for around 35% of all observations; PAC 
is absent for around 50% of observations; and around 75% of monthly flows do not contain 
reinvested distribution. Figure 3B shows that retail outflow equals total outflow for around 25% 
of all monthly observations; investor switch-out flow is absent for around 35% of observations; 
SWP flow is absent for around 70% of observations; and around 75% of monthly flows do not 
contain distribution to unitholders.  
Some fund inflows are positively correlated with fund outflows within the same 
FundSERV unit, indicating discrepancy in investors’ judgment on future fund performance. 
Specifically, 13.43% of FundSERV units exhibit a positive correlation between retail fund 
inflow and investor switch-out; this correlation is more common when fund series are sold 
through dealers or brokers.
28
 In addition, 2.43% of FundSERV units exhibit a positive correlation 
between retail fund outflow and investor switch-in; 21.25% of FundSERV units exhibit a 
positive correlation between retail fund inflow and distribution to unitholders; and 3.46% of 
                                                          
28
 Of the fund series sold through dealers and brokers, 14.81% exhibit a statistically significant positive correlation between retail fund inflow 
and investor switch-out. The ratio is 4.52% when fund series can be purchased directly through fund managers. 
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FundSERV units exhibit a positive correlation between retail fund outflow and reinvested 
distribution. 
In total, 45.79% of the monthly observations in the sample comprise funds purchased as 
DSC options, while 39.56% were purchased as FE options, 8.35% as FB options, and 6.29% as 
NL options. 
The summary statistics for fee variables in Table 1 are indicated for the full sample of 
monthly fund observations across all purchase options. The average maximum posted initial 
trailer fee for the entire sample of month-year observations is 0.58%, with a median of 0.50% 
and a standard deviation of 0.36%. Table 1 shows that the average initial DSC for the entire 
sample of month-year observations is 4.79%, with a median of 5.50% and a standard deviation of 
1.52%. The data suggest that DSCs in subsequent years are lower, as indicated by the DSC slope 
variable. The average MER in the sample is 2.07%, with a median of 2.16% and a standard 
deviation of 0.66%.
29
 Further details on the data distribution for other variables are also recorded 
in Table 1. 
In the data set, 87% of mutual fund series are sold through dealers and brokers; the other 
13% can be purchased directly from fund managers. Dealers and brokers are compensated by 
trailer fees from mutual fund companies, to reward their efforts in recommending funds to 
investors. When fund series are purchased directly, managers act as fund advisors and receive 
trailer fees. The difference is that trailer fees constitute the main income for dealers and brokers 
but only a small proportion of income for mutual fund managers, whose compensation is mostly 
based on the AUM amount and fund performance. 
                                                          
29 In the summary statistics, we report the full MER to show the totals. In the regression analyses, we exclude trailer fees and sales charges from 
the MER to avoid double counting and correlation across variables. 
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Table 2 presents comparison test results for the effect of trailer fees on different types of 
fund flows. The comparison analyses results are indicative of sample distribution by trailer fee 
levels, and provide us with the first insights into the data regarding the impact of trailer fees on 
fund flows. Specifically, the comparison tests are constructed by first calculating the means and 
medians of different types of fund flows for each FundSERV code over the sample horizon; then, 
for all FundSERV codes, we apply two-sample t-tests on the calculated means and medians 
based on whether the corresponding trailer fee level of a FundSERV code is above or below the 
group median. Each FundSERV code has one related observation in the two-sample t-tests. 
Table 2 (Page 87) 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that for fund series sold through dealers and brokers, trailer 
fees are positively associated with NET_RETAIL_FLOW, NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, and 
PAC inflow net of SWP outflow, and negatively associated with net investor switch-in and the 
reinvested distribution net of paid distributions. The results are at least statistically significant at 
the 5% level, except for the differences between the median value of the PAC inflow net of SWP 
outflow, which is only weakly significant at the 10% level. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows similar results to those in Panel A for NET_RETAIL_FLOW, 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, and net investor switch-in. However, when fund series can be 
directly purchased from fund managers, the trailer fee does not exhibit significant impact on the 
PAC inflow net of SWP outflow; its impact on the reinvested distribution net of paid distribution 
is not stable. 
Overall, Table 2 indicates there are substantial differences in flow levels depending on 
what type of flow is measured. It should be noted, though, that the comparison test results are not 
64 
 
conclusive, as they do not control for the impacts of other influential factors. Further detailed 
analyses on the effects of mutual fund fee structures on fund flow are supported by multivariate 
regressions, presented below. 
2.5. Fund Flow Characteristics 
In this section, we analyze whether retail fund flow exhibits materially different 
characteristics to aggregate fund flow and investigate the rationale behind the differences. 
2.5.1 Analyses of Specific Types of Mutual Fund Flows 
We examine the marginal impacts of past fund performance and fund fees on mutual fund 
flows. Specific types of fund flows are analyzed first, followed by further analyses comparing 
retail flow with total flow. More detailed analyses of fund inflows and outflows are presented in 
the Appendix.  
The basic model specification is as follows: 
(1) FLOWt+1 = CONSTANT + β1 * ALPHAt + β2 * ALPHA
2
t + β3 * FUND_FEEt  
+ β4 * FUND_FEEt * ALPHAt + β5 * CONTROLS
30
 + RESIDUALS 
The regression is estimated as a panel model clustering on each fund series/purchase 
option and observation month. Observations are clustered into fund series/purchase options 
based on FundSERV codes to account for potential time-series correlation for flow variables 
within each fund. Standard errors are also clustered by time, based on observation month, 
                                                          
30 We use dummies to control for Canadian Investment Funds Standards Committee (CIFSC) Fund Category, Fund Risk Classification, and 
Discount Brokerage Series. For definitions of the control variables, please refer to  
https://www.securities-administrators.ca/uploadedFiles/General/pdfs/Mutual%20Fund%20Fees%20Research%20Data%20Request.pdf. 
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because macroeconomic factors and systematic risk could lead to cross-sectional correlations 
among fund flows.   
We also test two-way fixed effect models controlling for FundSERV code and month, to 
address the unobserved heterogeneity across different FundSERV codes and months, and to 
focus exclusively on variations within FundSERV codes in a given month. The marginal impacts 
and statistical significance of explanatory variables in the two-way fixed effect models are not 
materially different from the results reported in the two-dimensional cluster regressions. 
However, it is noteworthy that for fund series purchasable directly from managers, some fee 
variables do not exhibit sufficient within-group variations and are, thus, dropped from the two-
way fixed effect models, resulting in fewer explanatory variables in the fixed effect model setup. 
For conciseness, the two-way fixed effect regression results are not reported. Note that some 
papers estimating flow include on the right-hand-side a variable for assets under management.  
We have excluded such a variable because our dependent variable divides by assets under 
management, and hence by construction there is a negative relation.  Regardless, including or 
excluding such a variable has no material effect on the other variables in the regression.  These 
and other specifications are available on request. 
Table 3 presents regression analyses of fund flows relative to past performance for the 
subset of funds that do not permit FB purchase options (i.e., only including funds that allow for 
DSCs, commissions, and trailer fees). The dependent variable in Table 3 is the monthly net retail 
flow, the total monthly inflows minus outflows, the net investor switches in, the total monthly 
PAC inflows net of SWP outflows, and the reinvested distributions net of distributions to unit 
holders, all divided by AUM at the start of month. Models 1–5 in Table 3 are presented for the 
subset of funds that sold through dealers or brokers, and models 6–10 are presented for the 
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subset of funds that can be purchased directly from the fund company. Each of the models 
includes a squared alpha term to account for possible non-linearity in flow. Prior work on mutual 
fund flows (Del Guerci and Tkac (2002)) shows that flow–performance relationship is convex: 
retail investors are quick to rush to invest into funds that have had recent success but slow to 
withdraw capital from funds that have had poor recent performance. The regressions in Table 3 
examine in detail the convexity between different types of fund flows and fund performance. 
The data in Panel A of Table 3 indicate the following for fund series sold through dealers 
or brokers: 
Table 3 (Page 88) 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that net aggregate flow exhibits a convex relationship with 
respect to prior alpha, such that a 1-standard-deviation increase in prior alpha on average 
increases NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW by 33% and increases NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW–
performance sensitivity by 4%. This convex flow–performance relationship is consistent with the 
findings of Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). However, alpha does not have a significant second-
order impact on NET_RETAIL_FLOW, indicating that new purchases net of one-time 
redemptions do not become more sensitive to fund performance as performance improves, due to 
the influence of the MER, trailer fees, DSCs, sales commissions for DSC, switch fees, and 
negotiated management fees, whose interactions with prior alpha are statistically significant in 
Panel A of Table 3. In addition, the marginal impacts of different service fees on different fund 
flows and related flow–performance sensitivities vary. For example, a 1-standard-deviation rise 
in MER, on average, increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW by 9% (4% for 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW) and reduces flow–performance sensitivity by 4% (insignificant 
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for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); a 1-standard-deviation rise in trailer fees, on average, 
increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW by 23% (14% for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW) and reduces 
flow–performance sensitivity by 8% (4% for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); a 1-standard-
deviation rise in trailer slope, or rate of changes in trailer fees, increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW 
by 19% (insignificant for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); the rate of change in trailer fees does 
not have a statistically significant impact on the NET_RETAIL_FLOW–performance sensitivity, 
but does increase NET AGGREGATE FLOW-performance sensitivity by 5%. A 1-standard-
deviation rise in DSC, on average, reduces NET_RETAIL_FLOW by 26% (insignificant for 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW) and reduces flow–performance sensitivity by 7% (9% for 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); a 1-standard-deviation rise in sales commission for DSC reduces 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW by 26% (22% for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); a 1-standard-deviation 
rise in switch fees increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW–performance sensitivity by 1% (1% for 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); a 1-standard-deviation rise in FE commission, on average, 
increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW by 9% (12% for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW); a 1-standard-
deviation rise in performance fees, on average, increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW by 6% (4% for 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW). 
Given the magnitude of different fund flows shown in Figures 2 and 3, special attention is 
paid to investor switch-in and -out. Net investor switch flow is positively correlated with prior 
fund performance, such that a 1-standard-deviation increase in prior alpha increases net switch 
flow by 18%, compared to a 26% increase in net aggregate flow and a 37% increase in net retail 
flow. Switch flow is less reactive to prior fund performance than net aggregate flow and net 
retail flow due to frictions caused by switch charges. However, a 1-standard-deviation rise in 
prior alpha increases the net switch flow–performance sensitivity by 9%, compared to a 4% 
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increase in aggregate net flow–performance sensitivity and an insignificant impact on retail 
flow–performance sensitivity, showing that investors are more likely to switch to a high-
performance fund that realized strong growth in the prior period than to a low performance fund 
that just started to catch up. In addition, higher FE commissions, performance fees, and 
negotiated management fees encourage net switch flow, while higher TER, trailer fees, and 
DSCs deter net switch flow. This shows that mutual fund unitholders who make switches prefer 
upfront service charges, a clear incentive fee structure that aligns the interests of fund managers 
with those of investors, and higher investor discretion; they are averse to inefficient trading costs, 
sales commissions paid to dealers and brokers, and fees that restrict their redemption flexibility. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of net switches to prior fund performance is moderated by the fee 
structures specified in Panel A of Table 3.  
PACs net of SWPs is positively correlated with prior fund performance, MER, sales 
commission for DSCs, FE commission paid, and negotiated management fee, and negatively 
correlated with TER and DSCs, showing that investors who set up a PAC and SWP are averse to 
direct high trading expenses and fees discouraging early redemptions, but not averse to less 
straightforward management expenses. Surprisingly, trailer fee does have a significant positive 
impact on PACs net of SWPs flow, revealing the impact of mutual fund dealers and brokers on 
investors’ long-term contribution and withdrawal preference.  
Distributions paid out and reinvested are individually positively correlated with prior 
fund performance, as shown in the Appendix. However, reinvestment net of paid distributions 
does not exhibit a strong correlation with prior fund performance; instead, it is positively 
correlated with DSCs and negatively correlated with trailer fees, sales commissions for DSC, and 
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FE commissions paid, showing that mutual funds that pay high commissions to dealers and 
brokers are less likely to receive reinvestment after a distribution is paid out. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the analyses results for fund series purchasable directly from 
mutual fund managers. 
Panel B of Table 3 shares a few similarities with Panel A of Table 3. 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW, NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, net switches, and PACs net of SWPs are 
positively correlated with prior fund performance when the fund series can be purchased directly 
from fund managers. Reinvested distributions net of paid distributions do not exhibit significant 
correlations with prior fund performance. In addition, as prior fund performance rises, 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW increases at an accelerating rate. The MER has a positive impact 
on the flow–performance sensitivity of the PACs net of SWPs flow. Trailer fees have a negative 
impact on the flow–performance sensitivity for NET_RETAIL_FLOW, 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, and reinvested distribution net of paid distribution, and a positive 
impact on the flow–performance sensitivity for net switch-in. The rate of change in trailer fees 
over time (the trailer slope) is positively correlated with NET_RETAIL_FLOW. TER is 
negatively correlated with NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW. DSCs have a negative impact on 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW and net switch-in, and reduce the flow–performance sensitivity for 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW. The rate of change in DSCs over time (the DSC slope) is 
negatively correlated with NET_RETAIL_FLOW, net switch-in, and PACs net of SWPs flow, 
and has a negative impact on the flow–performance sensitivity for net switch-in and reinvested 
distribution net of paid distribution. The sales commission for DSC is negatively correlated with 
the reinvested distribution net of paid distribution, and reduces the flow–performance sensitivity 
for NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW and PACs net of SWPs flow. Maximum posted switch fee has 
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a positive impact on the flow–performance sensitivity for NET_RETAIL_FLOW and 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, and a negative impact on the flow–performance sensitivity for net 
switch-in. FE commission paid is positively correlated with NET_RETAIL_FLOW, 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, and net switches. Negotiated management fees are positively 
correlated with net switches and the PACs net of SWPs flow. 
Panel B of Table 3 is, however, distinct from Panel A of Table 3 in many aspects, among 
which the following differences are especially noteworthy: The marginal effects of prior alpha 
on NET_RETAIL_FLOW, NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, and net switches notably dropped 
from respective increases of 42%, 33%, and 25% per 1-standard-deviation rise in prior alpha 
(Panel A) to respective increases of 28%, 20%, and 16% (Panel B). This shows that investors are 
less reactive and more cautious to changes in prior fund performance when the fund series is 
directly purchasable. The MER is no longer positively correlated with NET_RETAIL_FLOW 
and NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, showing that, in the absence of dealers and brokers, high 
MER funds do not exhibit additional attraction to investors, who evidently do not associate high 
MER with better future fund performance. In addition, MER is positively associated with the 
flow–performance sensitivity for NET_RETAIL_FLOW and NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, 
showing that management expenses stimulate investors’ reaction to prior fund performance when 
fund series are directly purchased. Trailer fees no longer exhibit significant impact on the 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW and NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW in Panel B of Table 3, suggesting that 
the sales incentives to dealers and brokers do not influence investor decision making when fund 
series are directly purchasable. In addition, trailer fees are no longer negatively associated with 
reinvested distribution net of paid distribution, showing that, in the absence of dealers and 
brokers, investors are more likely to reinvest in a fund after a distribution is paid out. TER 
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negatively influences NET_RETAIL_FLOW and NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, such that a 1-
standard-deviation rise in TER reduces NET_RETAIL_FLOW and 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW by 11% and 10%, respectively, compared to insignificant impacts 
in Panel A of Table 3, suggesting that investors are averse to high TER when fund series are 
directly purchasable. The marginal impact of DSCs on NET_RETAIL_FLOW is –15%, 
compared to –26% in Panel A of Table 3, suggesting that investors who choose to purchase 
funds directly from fund managers are less averse to DSCs. This weakened aversion to DSCs can 
be explained by stronger investor confidence, as investors who do not rely on dealers’ advice to 
make decisions also foresee less probability of withdrawing their investments in the short run. 
Similarly, investors are not noticeably averse to sales commissions for DSC when fund series are 
purchasable directly from managers. The negotiated management fee is positively correlated 
with NET_RETAIL_FLOW and NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, compared to insignificant 
impacts when fund series are sold through dealers and brokers, suggesting that negotiation 
flexibility attracts investors when fund series are directly purchasable. 
2.5.2 Analyses of New Purchases and One-time Redemptions 
Table 4 presents analyses results comparing new purchases with total inflows and one-
time redemptions with total outflows. Panel A of Table 4 reveals the regression results when 
fund series are sold through dealers and brokers; Panel B of Table 4 reveals the regression results 
when fund series can be directly purchased from fund managers.  
Table 4 (Page 92) 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that new purchases and one-time redemptions share strong 
similarities with all inflows and all outflows, respectively, with respect to changes in prior fund 
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performance and mutual fund fees. Both new purchases and all inflows are positively correlated 
with prior fund performance, MER, trailer fees, and FE commissions paid, and are negatively 
correlated with TER and DSCs. In addition, the flow–performance sensitivity for both new 
purchases and all inflows are positively affected by MER, switch fees, TER, and negotiated 
management fees, and are negatively affected by trailer fees, DSCs, and sales commissions for 
DSC. Both one-time redemptions and all outflows are positively correlated with MER and are 
negatively correlated with prior fund performance, trailer fees, and DSCs. In addition, the flow–
performance sensitivity for one-time redemptions and all outflows is both positively affected by 
MER and the DSC slope, and negatively affected by trailer fees, the trailer slope, and negotiated 
management fees. The flow–performance relationships for one-time redemptions and all 
outflows are concave, but they are convex for all inflows and insignificant for new purchases, 
indicating asymmetric investor behavior with respect to changes in prior fund performance: good 
mutual fund performance quickly attracts investment, whereas inferior mutual fund performance 
slowly deter potential investment. 
Panel A of Table 4 further shows that retail flows, namely new purchases and one-time 
redemptions, are generally more sensitive to prior fund performance and fund fees than total 
flows. For instance, a 1-standard-deviation rise in prior alpha increases new purchases by 28% 
and all inflows by 19%, and reduces one-time redemptions by 21% and all outflows by 13%. A 
1-standard-deviation rise in MER increases new purchases by 10% and all inflows by 8%. A 1-
standard-deviation rise in trailer fees increases new purchases by 12% and all inflows by 7%, and 
reduces one-time redemptions and all outflows by 8%. A 1-standard-deviation rise in TER 
reduces new purchases by 10% and all inflows by 9%. A 1-standard-deviation rise in DSC 
reduces new purchases by 21%, all inflows by 16%, one-time redemptions by 19%, and all 
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outflows by 14%. The exception is that a 1-standard-deviation rise in MER increases one-time 
redemptions by 13% and total outflows by 14%. 
Panel B of Table 4 shares a few similarities with Panel A of Table 3. A 1-standard-
deviation rise in prior alpha increases new purchases by 26% and all inflows by 18%, while 
reducing one-time redemptions by 23%, and all outflows by 15%. In addition, all inflows exhibit 
a convex relationship with prior fund performance, whereas one-time redemptions and all 
outflows exhibit a concave relationship therewith. Trailer fee is positively correlated with new 
purchases and all inflows; DSC is negatively correlated with new purchases, all inflows, one-
time redemptions, and all outflows; TER is negatively correlated with new purchases and all 
inflows; and FE commission paid is positively correlated with new purchases and all inflows. 
Panel B of Table 4 differs from Panel A of Table 4 in the following aspects. MER does 
not exhibit a significant correlation with new purchases and all inflows when the fund series is 
directly purchasable, whereas, when fund series are sold through dealers and brokers, MER is 
positively correlated with new purchases and all inflows. The marginal impact of trailer fees on 
new purchases and all inflows drops in the absence of dealers and brokers: from 12% to 9% for 
new purchases and from 7% to 5% for all inflows; TER is positively correlated with one-time 
redemptions and all outflows, such that a 1-standard-deviation rise in TER increases one-time 
redemptions by 6% and all outflows by 7%; switch fee is positively correlated with one-time 
redemptions and all outflows, such that a 1-standard-deviation rise in the switch fee increases 
one-time redemptions by 3% and increases all outflows by 2%; FE commission paid is positively 
correlated with one-time redemptions and all outflows, such that a 1-standard-deviation rise in 
FE commission paid increases one-time redemptions by 14% and all outflows by 8%; negotiated 
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management fee is positively correlated with new purchases, one-time redemptions, and all 
outflows, compared with the insignificant effects in Panel A of Table 4. 
The analyses results indicate that when mutual funds are purchased directly, rather than 
through dealers and brokers, investors exhibit different attitudes and reactions to changes in fund 
performance and fees. This difference can be attributed to two possible reasons. Investors who 
choose to purchase mutual funds directly are more sophisticated than those who make decisions 
based on recommendations from dealers and brokers. Alternatively, if two groups of investors 
are of similar sophistication, then recommendations from mutual fund dealers and brokers are 
pivotal in shaping investor behavior. 
2.5.3 Comparing Net Retail Flow with Net Aggregate Flow 
We evaluate whether the NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, measured by changes in AUM 
net of asset appreciation, is fully representative of NET_RETAIL_FLOW, measured by new 
purchases net of one-time redemptions. Conceptually, NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW indicates 
overall fund movement, which is not directly related to investor actions. NET_RETAIL_FLOW, 
however, is directly determined by investment decisions and accurately reflects investor 
preferences. Tables 3 and 4 reveal that NET_RETAIL_FLOW exhibits different sensitivities 
with respect to prior fund performance and fund fees compared to NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW. 
Whether this difference is of statistical and economic significance warrants examination. 
In Table 5, we regress NET_RETAIL_FLOW on predicted NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, 
prior fund performance, and fund fee variables, where predicted NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW is 
based on model 2 (Panel A) or model 7 (Panel B) in Table 3. If NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW is 
fully representative of NET_RETAIL_FLOW, we should observe that neither prior fund 
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performance nor fund fee variables exhibit statistical significance in Table 5, as their impact on 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW has been absorbed by the predicted aggregate flow variable. 
Alternatively, statistically significant prior fund performance or fee variables would reveal 
material differences between NET_RETAIL_FLOW and NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW.  
Table 5 (Page 96) 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that, for fund series sold through dealers and brokers, 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW is more sensitive to prior fund performance than 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW: NET_RETAIL_FLOW increases by an additional 22%–34% 
compared to NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW when alpha increases by 1-standard-deviation. In 
addition, compared to NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW, NET_RETAIL_FLOW increases by an 
additional 8%–12%, 34%–42%, and 6%–13% when the MER, trailer fee, and trailer slope, 
respectively, increases by 1-standard-deviation. NET_RETAIL_FLOW reduces by an additional 
15%–25%, 34%–44%, and 3% when DSCs in Year 1, the DSC slope, and front-end commission 
paid, respectively, increase by 1-standard-deviation. 
Panel B of Table 5 shows that, for fund series purchasable directly from fund managers, a 
1-standard-deviation increase in the trailer slope and switch fee increases NET_RETAIL_FLOW 
by an additional 5%–12% and 15%–24%, respectively, compared to net aggregated flow. A 1-
standard-deviation increase in DSCs in Year 1 and front-end commission paid reduces 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW by an additional 36%–47% and 3%–4%, respectively, compared to 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW. 
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In general, the empirical data analyses results are consistent with Hypothesis 1: different 
types of fund flow exhibit significantly different sensitivities with respect to prior fund 
performance and fund fees. 
2.6. Fund Fees and Fund Performance 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between mutual fund fees and performance 
and investigate whether agency problems are embedded in inappropriate fee structure.  
Table 6 presents the analyses results on the factors influencing management skill 
transitions from one period to the next. The basic model specification is as follows: 
(2) FUND_PERFORMANCEt+12 = CONSTANT + β1 * ALPHAt + β2 * FUND_FEEt  
+ β3 * CONTROLS + RESIDUALS 
Panel regression models with standard errors clustered on FundSERV codes and 
observation month are applied in the analyses. We choose 12-month lead alpha as the dependent 
variable to avoid overlap between estimation windows in future and current fund performance. 
Explanatory variables include lagged alpha and mutual fund fees. Fund characteristic variables 
are used as controls. Panel A of Table 6 reveals regression results for fund series sold through 
dealers and brokers; Panel B of Table 6 reveals regression results for fund series purchasable 
directly from fund managers. 
Table 6 (Page 98) 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that prior fund performance is positively correlated with fund 
performance in the 12 months ahead, statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, a 1-
standard-deviation improvement in prior fund performance increases fund performance in the 12 
77 
 
months ahead by 5% (model 3) to 7% (model 1), showing that management skills are 
transferrable from one period to the next. 
Panel A of Table 6 further shows that a mutual fund fee structure has a significant impact 
on management skill delivery. A 1-standard-deviation rise in the performance fee increases 
future alpha by 5% (model 3) to 9% (model 6); a 1-standard-deviation rise in DSCs in Year 1 
reduces future alpha by 12% (model 6) to 16% (model 1). An increase in DSCs in the following 
years further reduces future fund alpha. A 1-standard-deviation rise in negotiated management 
fee increases future alpha by 5% (model 1) to 6% (model 3); a 1-standard-deviation rise in trailer 
fees reduces future alpha by 7% (model 1) to 10% (model 4); a 1-standard-deviation rise in sales 
commissions for DSC reduces future alpha by 4% (model 5) to 5% (model 4). These results are 
at least statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows that lagged fund alpha is positively correlated with future alpha, 
such that a 1-standard-deviation improvement in prior alpha increases future alpha by 6% (model 
12) to 8% (model 9). DSCs in Year 1 is negatively correlated with future alpha, such that a 1-
standard-deviation rise in DSCs reduces future alpha by 7% (model 7) to 9% (model 10), 
compared to 12%–16% reduction in future alpha in Panel A of Table 6. FE commission paid is 
negatively correlated with future alpha, but the economic significance is limited: a 1-standard-
deviation rise in FE commission paid reduces future alpha by 1% (model 11) to 2% (model 10). 
MER and TER do not exhibit a significant impact on future alpha. The trailer fee is negatively 
correlated with future alpha: a 1-standard-deviation increase in trailer fees reduces future alpha 
by 4%–7%, compared to 7%–10% in Panel A of Table 6. 
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In general, Table 6 shows that the mutual fund fee structure has a significant impact on 
fund managers’ skill delivery from one period to the next. Performance fees encourage 
management effort and lead to better fund performance in the following period; as the negotiated 
management fee needs to be justified by fund performance, management effort is thus 
incentivized, leading to better fund performance. However, trailer fee reduces management 
incentives and leads to worse fund performance in the future. This effect is more obvious when 
fund series are sold through dealers and brokers. 
2.7. Fund Flow and Fund Performance 
In this section, we investigate the correlations among different types of fund flows and 
examine whether certain fund flow correlations have significant impact on future fund 
performance. 
Table 7 presents comparison tests on the effects of fund flow correlations on mutual fund 
performance. The comparison test results are not conclusive as these tests do not control for 
impacts from other influential factors. However, they exhibit general correlations for variables in 
the data set. 
Table 7 (Page 100) 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that for fund series sold through dealers and brokers, 33% of 
monthly observations exhibit a statistically significant positive correlation between new 
purchases and switches in; 15% of monthly observations exhibit a statistically significant 
positive correlation between new purchases and switches out; 3% of monthly observations 
exhibit a statistically significant positive correlation between one-time redemptions and switches 
in; and 29% of monthly observations exhibit a statistically significant positive correlation 
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between one-time redemptions and switches out. Panel A of Table 7 further shows that average 
fund performance is higher when new purchases are positively correlated with switches in and 
when one-time redemptions are positively correlated with switches out. Average fund 
performance is lower when new purchases are positively correlated with switches out and when 
one-time redemptions are positively correlated with switches in; the results are at least 
significant at the 5% level. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows that, for fund series purchasable directly from fund managers, 
27% of monthly observations exhibit a statistically significant positive correlation between new 
purchases and switches in; 5% of monthly observations exhibit a significant positive correlation 
between new purchases and switches out; 1% of monthly observations exhibit a significant 
positive correlation between one-time redemptions and switches in; and 23% of monthly 
observations exhibit a significant positive correlation between one-time redemptions and 
switches out. Similar to Panel A of Table 7, average fund alpha is higher when retail flows and 
switch flows move in the same direction, and lower when they move the opposite directions; 
these results are significant at the 1% level. 
Table 8 presents cross-sectional regressions on the effect of flow correlations on fund 
performance. The basic model specification is as follows: 
(3) FUND_PERFORMANCE= CONSTANT + β1 * FUND_FEE + β2  
* FLOW CORRELATION DUMMIES + β3 * CONTROLS + RESIDUALS 
Each FundSERV code has one corresponding observation in the model; the dependent 
variable is the average alpha for each FundSERV code; explanatory variables include dummy 
variables indicating whether a FundSERV code exhibits statistically significant correlations for 
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specified fund flows, and control variables for the most common mutual fund fee types, where 
the average value for each fee is taken.  
Table 8 (Page 101) 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that for fund series sold through dealers and brokers, the MER 
does not exhibit a statistically significant correlation with fund performance; TER does exhibit a 
positive correlation with fund performance, but the correlation is weak and unstable; trailer fees 
are negatively correlated with fund performance, statistically significant at the 1% level; and a 
performance fee is positively correlated with fund performance, statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
Panel A of Table 8 further shows that the average fund performance is 8% (model 5) to 
14% (model 1) lower when new purchases are positively correlated with investor switches out; 
and 1% lower when one-time redemptions are positively correlated with distribution to 
unitholders. Average fund performance is 5% (model 2) to 6% (model 5) higher when one-time 
redemptions are positively correlated with switches out. 
Panel B of Table 8 shows that for fund series purchasable directly from fund managers, 
the MER and TER do not exhibit significant correlations with fund performance; trailer fee is 
negatively correlated with fund performance, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel B of Table 8 further shows that average fund performance is 5% (model 5) to 6% 
(model 6) lower when new purchases are positively correlated with switches out; 2% lower when 
one-time redemptions are positively correlated with switches in; and 1% (model 4) to 2% (model 
5) lower when one-time redemptions are positively correlated with reinvested distributions. 
Average fund performance is 3% higher when one-time redemptions are positively correlated 
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with switches out, and 2% higher when new purchases are positively correlated with reinvested 
distributions. 
In general, Table 8 provides empirical support for Hypothesis 2: a positive correlation 
between new purchases and switches out is negatively correlated with average fund performance, 
and the marginal impact of this effect is especially obvious when fund series are sold through 
dealers and brokers. 
2.8 The Trend of Fund Performance: Catch it or Miss it? 
In this section, we study the correlation between fund flow and future fund performance 
and investigate whether certain types of fund flow are predictive of future fund performance.  
Table 9 presents panel regression results with standard errors clustered by two 
dimensions: FundSERV code and observation month. The basic model specification is as 
follows: 
(4) FUND_PERFORMANCEt+12 = CONSTANT + β1 * ALPHAt + β2 * FUND_FEEt  
+ β3 * FUND_FLOWt + β3 * CONTROLS + RESIDUALS 
The dependent variable is the lead 12-month fund alpha
31
. Explanatory variables include 
lagged fund performance, fund flow variables, and variables controlling for mutual fund fees 
exhibiting statistical significance in Table 6. Panel A of Table 9 presents the results when fund 
series are sold through dealers and brokers; Panel B of Table 9 presents the results when fund 
series are purchasable directly from fund managers. 
Table 9 (Page 103) 
                                                          
31
 As alpha is estimated based on 12 month rolling window, a lead 12 month future alpha does not have any overlap in estimation window with 
prior alpha used as explanatory variable. 
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Panel A of Table 9 shows that lagged new purchases and one-time redemptions are not 
associated with changes in future fund performance, suggesting that an average investor is not 
able to catch the trend of fund performance. Lagged switch-in is positively associated with future 
alpha, but the economic significance of the association is small: a 1-standard-deviation rise in 
switch-in is associated with a 1% improvement in future alpha, showing that investors who 
switch in usually receive improved fund performance in the new fund, but the economic benefit 
of the switch is small and can be offset by switch fees. Lagged switch-out is negatively 
associated with future fund performance, such that a 1-standard-deviation rise in switch-out is 
associated with a 6% (model 5) to 7% (model 2) reduction in future alpha, showing that investors 
who switch out of a fund successfully avoid future losses. PACs, SWPs, distribution to 
unitholders, and reinvested distributions do not exhibit a statistically significant correlation with 
future fund performance. 
Panel B of Table 9 shows that lagged new purchases and one-time redemptions do not 
exhibit strong correlations with changes in future alpha; switches in and out exhibit statistically 
significant positive and negative correlations, respectively, with future alpha, but the economic 
impact is small: a 1-standard-deviation increase in switch-in (-out) is associated with a 1%–2% 
increase (decrease) in future fund performance. Other types of fund flows do not exhibit a 
statistically significant relationship with future fund performance. 
The associations between fund switching and future fund performance can be attributed 
to the barriers to fund switches, namely switch fees and discouragement from dealers and 
brokers. Due to these barriers, investors do not make switches among different fund series 
without strong preference or discontent. The convex relationship between net switch flow and 
prior fund performance further indicates that without substantial fund underperformance, 
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investors are reluctant to switch out. The compelling attitude towards a fund, especially for 
switches out, is based on investors’ prior experiences with fund management and performance, 
which are strongly correlated with fund performance in the following period, as demonstrated by 
the positive correlation between lagged and future alpha. The economic impact of the correlation 
between switches and fund alpha is higher when fund series are sold through dealers and brokers, 
whose advice increases the barrier to investor switches, consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
2.9 Conclusion 
Mutual fund flows are more than just changes in AUM net of asset appreciation. 
Different types of fund flows reflect distinct investor incentives and dynamic skill and effort 
delivery from fund managers. In this paper, we study the characteristics of each type of fund 
flow—new purchases, one-time redemptions, switches in and out, PACs, SWPs, distribution to 
unitholders, and reinvested distributions—with respect to changes in prior fund performance and 
mutual fund fees. We find that the mutual fund fee structure directly influences fund flows and 
changes the flow-performance sensitivity. 
We further compare characteristics between new purchases and total inflow, and between one-
time redemptions and total outflow, and discuss the similarities and differences among the 
assessed flows. We propose that total inflows and outflows are barely sufficient and not accurate 
in reflecting the diverse investment behaviors of mutual fund unitholders. In addition, we test the 
correlations among new purchases, one-time redemptions, and investor switches, and relate these 
correlations with fund performance in the 12 months ahead. We find that a positive correlation 
between new purchases and investor switch-out is negatively correlated with future fund 
performance, and that this correlation is both statistically and economically significant. We 
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further propose that this correlation is indicative of the information asymmetry between 
incoming unitholders and existing unitholders. We attribute this information asymmetry to 
search cost initiated in investors’ fund selection process and argue that the biased advice from 
mutual fund dealers and brokers, who recommend funds that pay them the highest trailer fees 
rather than those that best match investors’ financial interests, amplifies the information 
asymmetry problem. Empirical evidence further shows that this information asymmetry is 
negatively correlated with future fund performance. Finally, we examine whether fund flows can 
catch the trend of fund performance and find that, among different types of fund flows related to 
investor behavior, only switch flows have a strong association with future fund performance. We 
attribute this strong association to barriers to investor switches, and find higher switching 
barriers and stronger economic significance in the positive association between new purchases 
and investor switch-out when fund series are sold through dealers and brokers. 
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TABLE 2.1 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table defines the variables in the data set and provides summary statistics for the number of fund-month observations (Obs.) between January 2003 and December 2014. 
 
 
Definition Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Fund Flow and Performance Variables           
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW 
(Total monthly inflows - total monthly outflows) / assets under management (AUM) at 
start of month. All flow data are winsorized at the 1% level. 
1102377 0.49% 0.00% 0.0328 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW 
(New Purchases - One-time Redemptions) / AUM at start of month, where New Purchases 
is the total monthly inflow net of switches in, pre-authorized contribution (PAC), and 
reinvested distribution; One-time Redemptions is the total monthly outflow net of 
switches out, systematic withdrawal plan (SWP), and distribution to unitholders. 
1102377 0.39% 0.00% 0.0297 
SWITCHES_IN-SWITCHES_OUT (Total monthly switches in - total monthly switches out) / AUM at start of the month. 1102377 0.09% 0.00% 0.0075 
PAC_INFLOWS-SWP_OUTFLOWS (Total monthly PAC inflows - total monthly SWP outflows) / AUM at start of month. 1102377 0.03% 0.00% 0.0010 
REINVESTED_DISTRIBUTIONS-PAID_DISTRIBUTIONS (Total reinvested distributions - distributions to unit holders) / AUM at start of month. 1102377 -0.02% 0.00% 0.0013 
Alpha 
The annualized abnormal return in percent, calculated by 12-month rolling windows, 
based on monthly gross return and Fama-French North America 4 factors. Monthly gross 
returns are winsorized at the 1% level; Fama-French 4 factors (market, SMB, HML and 
WML) and the risk-free rate are sourced from the Kenneth R. French Data Library. 
1010575 0.2502 0.2492 0.7433 
Flow Composition and Correlation Data   
    
Total Inflow (%) Total inflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 2.37% 0.94% 0.0310 
Total Outflow (%) Total outflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 1.88% 0.55% 0.0188 
New Purchases (%) New retail purchases fund inflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 1.87% 0.75% 0.0284 
One-time Redemptions (%) One-time redemption fund outflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 1.48% 0.36% 0.0157 
Switch-In (%) Investor switches in fund flow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 0.36% 0.15% 0.0078 
Switch-Out (%) Investor switches out in fund flow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 0.27% 0.15% 0.0070 
Pre-authorized Contribution (%) PAC fund inflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 0.05% 0.01% 0.0014 
Systematic Withdrawal Plan (%) SWP fund inflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 0.02% 0.00% 0.0004 
Reinvested Distribution (%) Reinvested distribution fund inflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 0.09% 0.00% 0.0024 
Distribution to Unitholders (%) Distribution to unitholders fund outflow as a percentage of AUM in a month. 1102377 0.11% 0.00% 0.0031 
Positive Correlated: Retail Inflow and Switch-In (Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Inflow volume and Investor Switch-In volume is positive 
and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.3194 0.00% 0.4667 
Positive Correlated: Retail Inflow and Switch-Out (Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Inflow volume and Investor Switch-Out volume is positive 
and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.1333 0.00% 0.3638 
Positive Correlated: Retail Outflow and Switch-In (Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Outflow volume and Investor Switch-In volume is positive 
and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.0243 0.00% 0.1529 
Positive Correlated: Retail Outflow and Switch-Out (Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Outflow volume and Investor Switch-Out volume is 
positive and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.2822 0.00% 0.4438 
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TABLE 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Definition Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Positive Correlated: Retail Inflow and Distribution to Unitholders 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Inflow volume and Distribution to Unitholders volume is positive 
and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.2125 0.00% 0.4129 
Positive Correlated: Retail Inflow and Reinvested Distribution 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Inflow volume and Reinvested Distribution volume is positive and 
significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.2427 0.00% 0.4305 
Positive Correlated: Retail Outflow and Distribution to Unitholders 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Outflow volume and Distribution to Unitholders volume is 
positive and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.0133 0.00% 0.1146 
Positive Correlated: Retail Outflow and Reinvested Distribution 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
The correlation between Retail Outflow volume and Reinvested Distribution volume is positive 
and significant at the 5% level (Yes=1; No=0). 
18102 0.0348 0.00% 0.1782 
Service Fee Data   
    
Deferred Sales Charge Year 1 The deferred sales charges (DSCs) as a percentage of AUM in Year 1. 1209285 4.7928 5.5 1.5236 
DSC Slope The average of the percentage change in DSCs from one period to the next. 868685 -0.186 -0.1831 0.0486 
Sales Commission for DSC 
The sales commission rate paid by the fund company to the fund dealer, as reported in the 
simplified prospectus at the time of purchase. 
1209285 1.6704 0 2.1481 
Front-End Commissions Paid 
The total amount of front-end (FE) commissions paid each month, divided by AUM at the start of 
the month. 
1102377 0.0196 0 0.0871 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee The maximum switch fee rate as reported in the simplified prospectus at the time of purchase. 1209285 1.9964 2 0.083 
Performance Fee The percentage incentive fee charged by the fund manager to the fund. 1209285 0.0845 0 0.561 
Negotiated Management Fees Paid 
Where the management fees of a particular fund series/purchase option are typically negotiated: 
the total amount of management fees received each month, divided by AUM at the start of the 
month. This amount includes any payments made to the fund and any payments made directly to 
the fund company for fund management. 
1102377 0.0244 0 0.0909 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) 
The management expense ratio (MER) after waivers and absorptions, as reported in the 
management report of fund performance (or the financial statements before 2006) at the time of 
purchase. Please refer to National Instrument 81-106 part 15 for the calculation.  
1110152 2.0736 2.1604 0.6552 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) 
The trading expense ratio (TER) (%) for the fund series/purchase option, as reported in the 
management report of fund performance at the time of purchase. For periods before 2006, TER 
calculated (estimates are acceptable) and reported as outlined in National Instrument 81-106F1.  
1209285 1.3137 0.2467 2.3835 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer 
For purchase option type "FE," "DSC," or "NL," the maximum trailer fee annualized rate that 
applied to assets held during the period reported. 
1110152 0.5823 0.5 0.3628 
Trailer Slope The average of the percentage change in the trailer fee from one period to the next. 1074741 0.0664 0 0.1644 
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TABLE 2.2 Comparison Test on the Effect of Trailer Fee on Fund Flows 
This table presents comparisons of the means and medians of different types of fund flows based on the corresponding level of trailer fee. Panel A shows the results for fund series sold through dealers 
and brokers; Panel B shows the results for fund series purchasable directly from the fund manager. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
 
 
 
  
Average Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee above Median 
Average Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee below Median 
T-Value for 
Comparison 
of Means 
Median Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee above Median 
Median Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee below Median 
T-Value for 
Comparison 
of Medians 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW 0.52% 0.43% 4.52*** 0.51% 0.40% 4.93*** 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW 0.42% 0.34% 4.17*** 0.41% 0.36% 2.86*** 
SWITCHES_IN-SWITCHES_OUT 0.07% 0.12% -4.25*** 0.08% 0.13% -4.13*** 
PAC_INFLOWS-SWP_OUTFLOWS 0.04% 0.03% 3.15*** 0.03% 0.03% 1.90* 
REINVESTED_DISTRIBUTIONS-
PAID_DISTRIBUTIONS 
-0.03% -0.01% -3.76*** -0.03% -0.02% -2.23** 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
  
Average Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee above Median 
Average Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee below Median 
T-Value for 
Comparison 
of Means 
Median Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee above Median 
Median Flow for 
Maximum Posted Initial 
Trailer Fee below Median 
T-Value for 
Comparison 
of Medians 
NET_RETAIL_FLOW 0.59% 0.50% 4.43*** 0.57% 0.48% 5.12*** 
NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW 0.49% 0.41% 3.73*** 0.46% 0.39% 3.59*** 
SWITCHES_IN-SWITCHES_OUT 0.11% 0.13% -2.13** 0.10% 0.13% -2.50** 
PAC_INFLOWS-SWP_OUTFLOWS 0.03% 0.02% 1.94** 0.02% 0.02% 0.97 
REINVESTED_DISTRIBUTIONS-
PAID_DISTRIBUTIONS 
-0.02% -0.03% 2.04** -0.03% -0.03% 1.48 
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TABLE 2.3 The Effect of Mutual Fund Fees on Fund Flow 
This table presents unbalanced panel regressions on the determinants of different types of fund flow (1 month ahead), excluding fund of funds and the subsample of fee-based purchase option types. 
Standard errors are clustered by FundSERV Code and month. Explanatory variables include lagged alpha, mutual fund fees and the interaction terms with lagged alpha and fund fees. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
NET_RETAIL_ 
FLOW 
NET_AGGREGATE 
_FLOW 
SWITCHES_IN-
SWITCHES_OUT 
PAC_INFLOWS-
SWP_OUTFLOWS 
REINVESTED_ 
DISTRIBUTIONS-
PAID_ 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Alpha Lagged 0.00265*** 0.00189*** 0.000732*** 0.0000195** 0.0000436 
  (3.57) (4.98) (3.36) (1.97) (1.34) 
Alpha Lagged2 0.000336 0.000295** 0.000258*** 0.00000699 0.00000301 
  (1.28) (2.19) (3.19) (0.83) (1.62) 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) 0.000638*** 0.000278*** -0.000602* 0.000117*** -0.000105 
  (5.19) (3.58) (-1.68) (5.40) (-1.24) 
Alpha Lagged * MER -0.000281** -0.000267 -0.000108*** 0.00000373** 0.0000145 
  (-2.37) (-0.67) (-2.74) (2.37) (1.55) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) 0.000259 -0.000162 -0.000119*** -0.00000189*** -0.0000407* 
  (1.16) (-0.96) (-4.10) (-2.59) (-1.67) 
Alpha Lagged * TER 0.0000303 0.000124 -0.0000157* -0.00000155 -0.00000104 
  (0.22) (1.46) (-1.74) (-0.80) (-0.47) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) 0.0118*** 0.00657*** -0.00263*** 0.000208*** -0.0000295** 
  (5.31) (3.54) (-4.31) (5.90) (-1.97) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee -0.00381*** -0.00171*** 0.000984*** 0.000035 -0.0000316** 
  (-3.30) (-3.25) (3.56) (1.13) (-2.49) 
Trailer Slope 0.00512*** 0.00547 0.00113 -0.000291*** 0.000223** 
  (3.14) (1.57) (1.58) (-9.34) (2.02) 
Alpha Lagged * Trailer Slope 0.00552* 0.00115*** 0.000624*** 0.0000501*** -0.000111* 
  (1.71) (4.76) (3.47) (2.80) (-1.66) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.000734*** -0.000850 -0.0000522*** -0.0000245*** 0.0000285*** 
  (-3.65) (-1.21) (-3.19) (-6.37) (5.66) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Amount Year 1 (%) -0.000192** -0.000235*** 0.0000700 0.0000136*** -0.0000146 
  (-2.55) (-5.77) (0.74) (5.68) (-1.45) 
DSC Slope -0.0284*** -0.0256* -0.00785*** -0.00278 -0.00136*** 
  (-2.62) (-1.75) (-3.50) (-1.47) (-3.05) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Slope -0.00865*** -0.00245*** -0.00633*** 0.000231** -0.000281** 
  (-3.80) (-3.81) (-2.61) (2.04) (-2.07) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) -0.000542*** -0.000419*** -0.000355*** 0.00000915*** -0.0000224*** 
  (-4.03) (-7.98) (-6.05) (4.27) (-3.24) 
Alpha Lagged * Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase -0.0000826*** -0.0000433*** 0.000125*** -0.00000236*** -0.0000107 
  (-3.94) (-3.83) (3.12) (-2.63) (-1.46) 
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TABLE 3 Panel A (Continued) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
NET_RETAIL_ 
FLOW 
NET_AGGREGATE_
FLOW 
SWITCHES_IN-
SWITCHES_OUT 
PAC_INFLOWS-
SWP_OUTFLOWS 
REINVESTED_ 
DISTRIBUTIONS-
PAID_ 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 0.0104 -0.00652 -0.00178 0.000321 -0.000692* 
  (0.87) (-1.14) (-0.76) (1.48) (-1.72) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 0.000646** 0.000549** -0.000183*** 0.000105 0.000255* 
  (2.01) (2.11) (-3.27) (1.53) (1.91) 
Front-End (FE) Commission paid (%) 0.00434*** 0.00556*** 0.000898*** 0.00021*** -0.000273*** 
  (10.65) (7.81) (3.62) (2.59) (-3.21) 
Alpha Lagged * FE Commission paid -0.00711 0.00184*** 0.00144* -0.000142 0.0000620 
  (-1.54) (4.08) (1.70) (-1.12) (1.20) 
Performance Fee (%) 0.000458*** 0.000277*** 0.000456** -0.0000889 0.0000232 
  (3.17) (5.10) (2.53) (-0.11) (1.14) 
Alpha Lagged * Performance Fee 0.000175 0.000176 0.000183** -0.0000178* 0.0000113** 
  (0.23) (0.31) (2.01) (-1.68) (2.34) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.00501 0.00421 0.00379*** 0.000267** -0.000643 
  (1.56) (1.24) (6.59) (2.27) (-0.11) 
Alpha Lagged * Negotiated Management Fee 0.00259 0.00149 -0.000761*** 0.0000616 -0.000119 
  (0.39) (1.54) (-3.01) (1.04) (-1.52) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0295 0.0137*** 0.00202 0.0000801 0.000148 
  (1.15) (2.65) (0.42) (0.49) (0.18) 
Number of Observations 508121 508121 508121 508121 508121 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 9595 9595 9595 9595 9595 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.068 0.055 0.047 0.059 0.061 
F 611.7 416.2 251.8 969.7 543.0 
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Panel B. Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  
NET_RETAIL_ 
FLOW 
NET_AGGREGATE
_ 
FLOW 
SWITCHES_IN-
SWITCHES_OUT 
PAC_INFLOWS-
SWP_OUTFLOWS 
REINVESTED_DISTRIBUTION
S-PAID_DISTRIBUTIONS 
Alpha Lagged 0.0131*** 0.0223*** 0.00378*** 0.000362*** -0.000213 
  (8.06) (5.68) (3.50) (2.61) (-0.32) 
Alpha Lagged2 0.00122* 0.00355*** 0.0000850* 0.0000229 0.0000970 
  (1.69) (3.11) (1.73) (0.43) (0.65) 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) -0.00686 -0.00525 -0.00278*** -0.0000250*** 0.000280** 
  (-1.26) (-0.31) (-5.84) (-3.85) (2.21) 
Alpha Lagged * MER 0.00388*** 0.00320*** 0.000678 0.0000685*** 0.000252*** 
  (5.52) (4.49) (1.53) (2.65) (3.22) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) 0.00326 0.00375* 0.00119 -0.000164*** 0.0000299 
  (0.85) (1.70) (1.19) (-3.33) (0.16) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee -0.00264*** -0.00393*** 0.000114*** 0.000153 -0.000487** 
  (-3.05) (-2.59) (5.01) (0.94) (-1.98) 
Trailer Slope 0.0145*** 0.00564*** 0.00187** -0.000142 -0.00104*** 
  (3.07) (3.27) (2.05) (-1.52) (-4.21) 
Alpha Lagged * Trailer Slope 0.00514 -0.00133 -0.000279 0.0000788*** 0.000250* 
  (1.35) (-0.63) (-0.48) (2.69) (1.78) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) -0.000340*** -0.000367*** -0.0000794* 0.0000113 0.000149 
  (-4.65) (-3.83) (-1.90) (1.60) (1.10) 
Alpha Lagged * TER -0.000177 0.000420* 0.000173* -0.00000492 -0.0000376 
  (-0.44) (1.91) (1.73) (-0.12) (-1.34) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.00311*** -0.00569** -0.000453** -0.0000535* 0.0000596 
  (-3.02) (-2.17) (-2.19) (-1.87) (1.25) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Amount Year 1 (%) 0.000862 -0.000856*** 0.000146 0.0000237 -0.0000268*** 
  (1.43) (-2.61) (1.17) (1.55) (-5.76) 
DSC Slope -0.0371** -0.0336*** -0.0171*** -0.00174*** -0.00112 
  (-2.02) (-2.98) (-3.65) (-2.77) (-1.45) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Slope 0.0117 0.0181 -0.0161** 0.0019* -0.00132*** 
  (1.46) (1.11) (-2.40) (1.65) (-6.35) 
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Table 3 Panel B (Continued) 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  
NET_RETAIL_ 
FLOW 
NET_AGGREGATE_
FLOW 
SWITCHES_IN-
SWITCHES_OUT 
PAC_INFLOWS-
SWP_OUTFLOWS 
REINVESTED_ 
DISTRIBUTIONS-
PAID_ 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) 0.00272 0.00177 0.000169 -0.0000214 -0.000176** 
  (1.52) (0.30) (0.56) (-0.87) (-2.25) 
Alpha Lagged * Sales Commission on DSC purchase -0.00148 -0.00132*** -0.000371** -0.0000437*** 0.0000245*** 
  (-1.26) (-2.60) (-2.21) (-3.98) (2.83) 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) -0.0243*** -0.0338*** -0.0219*** 0.0000792*** -0.000341 
  (-5.41) (-4.80) (-3.43) (2.73) (-0.33) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 0.00610*** 0.00962*** -0.00497*** 0.000120 0.000189 
  (7.73) (3.36) (-4.27) (0.17) (0.64) 
Front-End (FE) Commission paid (%) 0.0270*** 0.0302*** 0.0211*** 0.000314 0.00212*** 
  (7.19) (9.23) (8.23) (1.35) (4.28) 
Alpha Lagged * FE Commission paid -0.00945*** -0.00545* 0.00390*** -0.0000578*** -0.000481*** 
  (-6.83) (-1.74) (2.84) (-2.70) (-4.48) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.0338*** 0.0749*** 0.00725*** 0.000362*** 0.00174* 
  (7.42) (5.16) (5.01) (3.63) (1.82) 
Alpha Lagged * Negotiated Management Fee 0.00588*** 0.0118*** 0.00248** 0.000223** 0.000524 
  (2.81) (3.18) (2.22) (2.54) (1.07) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.00119*** 0.00951*** 0.00314*** -0.0000784 -0.0000688 
  (-9.74) (5.88) (4.36) (-1.55) (-0.29) 
Number of Observations 134505 134505 134505 134505 134505 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.510 0.047 0.061 0.026 0.111 
F 275.6 280.6 260.1 262.9 374.9 
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TABLE 2.4 Retail Flow and Total Flow 
This table presents unbalanced panel regressions on the factors influencing new purchases, one-time redemptions, total inflow, and total outflow in the next period. Fund of funds are excluded from the 
analysis. Explanatory variables include lagged alphas, fee types, and interaction terms. Standard errors are clustered by FundSERV Code and month. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  New Purchases All Inflows One-time Redemptions All Outflows 
Alpha Lagged 0.00752*** 0.00629*** -0.00414** -0.00350*** 
  (3.66) (3.01) (-2.43) (-2.72) 
Alpha Lagged2 -0.000336* -0.000491** 0.000738*** 0.000405** 
  (1.85) (2.43) (2.68) (2.36) 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) 0.00292*** 0.00310*** 0.00305*** 0.00421*** 
  (3.55) (4.57) (2.61) (7.20) 
Alpha Lagged * MER 0.000858** 0.000746*** 0.000202*** 0.000631*** 
  (2.29) (2.69) (2.75) (3.70) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) 0.00647*** 0.00473*** -0.00331*** -0.00422*** 
  (5.97) (3.60) (-5.20) (-4.59) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee -0.000913*** -0.00126** -0.000428*** -0.000866*** 
  (-3.28) (-2.34) (-4.79) (-4.55) 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) -0.00808 -0.00896 -0.00185 -0.00409 
  (-1.50) (-1.10) (-0.97) (-0.02) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 0.00821*** 0.00942*** -0.00204 -0.00189 
  (5.17) (5.22) (-1.35) (-0.99) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) -0.000751*** -0.000823*** -0.000422 -0.000474 
  (-2.61) (-8.74) (-1.04) (-1.03) 
Alpha Lagged * TER 0.000194*** 0.000212*** 0.0000639 0.0000541 
  (2.91) (2.64) (1.55) (0.95) 
Performance Fee (%) 0.00263 0.00489 0.00182 0.00220 
  (1.25) (1.01) (1.20) (0.65) 
Alpha Lagged * Performance Fee -0.000566*** -0.000592 -0.000240 -0.000885 
  (-3.34) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.07) 
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TABLE 4 Panel A (Continued) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  New Purchases All Inflows One-time Redemptions All Outflows 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.00251*** -0.00226*** -0.00175*** -0.00167** 
  (-4.98) (-2.73) (-3.39) (-2.09) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Amount Year 1 (%) -0.000350*** -0.000388*** -0.000643 -0.000691 
  (-6.55) (-6.55) (-1.63) (-1.40) 
Trailer Slope -0.00398** -0.00710*** -0.00261** -0.00121 
  (-2.08) (-4.58) (-2.53) (-0.79) 
Alpha Lagged * Trailer Slope 0.00527*** 0.00555*** -0.00108** -0.00129** 
  (3.01) (2.67) (-2.55) (-2.31) 
DSC Slope -0.0116*** -0.0201 -0.0143*** -0.00292** 
  (-3.67) (-1.45) (-3.93) (-2.52) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Slope -0.0134 -0.0194 0.00955*** 0.00481*** 
  (-0.35) (-0.65) (4.31) (3.11) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) -0.00155 -0.00118 -0.000473 0.000462 
  (-1.01) (-0.95) (-1.62) (1.32) 
Alpha Lagged * Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase -0.000466*** -0.000449*** 0.000175* 0.000115 
  (-3.99) (-3.42) (1.77) (1.39) 
Front-End (FE) Commission paid (%) 0.0136*** 0.0175*** -0.0134 -0.0181 
  (5.06) (4.56) (-0.65) (-0.86) 
Alpha Lagged * FE Commission paid 0.00128 0.00335** 0.00149 0.00154 
  (0.74) (1.98) (1.45) (1.60) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.0121 0.0197 0.00579 0.00129 
  (1.60) (1.41) (1.37) (0.39) 
Alpha Lagged * Negotiated Management Fee 0.00738** 0.00791** -0.00167** -0.00305*** 
  (2.27) (2.03) (-2.07) (-3.02) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0354*** 0.0407*** 0.0170*** 0.0303*** 
  (6.87) (6.67) (3.90) (6.69) 
Number of Observations 508121 508121 508121 508121 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 9595 9595 9595 9595 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.047 0.054 0.045 0.058 
F 362.0 425.7 352.9 244.6 
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Panel B. Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  New Purchases All Inflows One-time Redemptions All Outflows 
Alpha Lagged 0.00723*** 0.00526** -0.00461*** -0.00382*** 
  (2.89) (2.28) (-4.00) (-3.48) 
Alpha Lagged2 0.000581* 0.000762** 0.000173** 0.000707*** 
  (1.87) (2.22) (2.23) (3.28) 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) -0.0112 -0.0136* 0.00556 -0.0046 
  (-1.57) (-1.87) (1.58) (-1.49) 
Alpha Lagged * MER 0.00249*** 0.00305*** 0.00193*** 0.00265*** 
  (3.56) (5.06) (4.69) (4.23) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) 0.00451*** 0.00276*** -0.00588* -0.00974* 
  (3.38) (4.17) (-1.67) (-1.86) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee 0.000265 0.0000347 0.00241 0.00222 
  (0.13) (0.01) (1.27) (1.62) 
Trailer Slope 0.00131*** 0.00224*** 0.000618*** 0.00247*** 
  (6.64) (3.96) (2.68) (4.75) 
Alpha Lagged * Trailer Slope -0.000772 -0.00262 0.000663 0.00181** 
  (-0.58) (-1.56) (1.16) (2.10) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.00332*** -0.00273*** -0.00116*** -0.000934*** 
  (-3.78) (-4.41) (-3.89) (-6.42) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Amount Year 1 (%) -0.000751** -0.00105*** 0.000104 0.000291 
  (-2.52) (-2.90) (0.67) (1.40) 
DSC Slope -0.0219** -0.0289* -0.0234*** -0.0203*** 
  (-2.20) (-1.79) (-3.29) (-4.50) 
Alpha Lagged * DSC Slope 0.0335 0.0436 0.00523 0.0115 
  (1.43) (1.46) (0.74) (1.20) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) 0.00028 0.00145* -0.000744** -0.000732* 
  (1.49) (1.65) (-2.39) (-1.69) 
Alpha Lagged * Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase -0.000323** -0.000502* 0.0000861 0.000478* 
  (-1.97) (-1.78) (0.49) (1.88) 
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TABLE 2.4.Panel B (Continued) 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  New Purchases All Inflows One-time Redemptions All Outflows 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) -0.000806** -0.000728*** 0.000386*** 0.000524*** 
  (-2.44) (-2.61) (2.94) (2.60) 
Alpha Lagged * TER 0.000235*** 0.0000666 -0.00017 -0.000343* 
  (3.48) (0.34) (-1.45) (-1.76) 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) -0.00264 0.000164 0.00433*** 0.00354*** 
  (-1.56) (0.21) (2.78) (7.62) 
Alpha Lagged * Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 0.00213 0.00612** -0.000238 -0.000956 
  (1.01) (2.10) (-0.21) (-0.62) 
Front-End (FE) Commission paid (%) 0.0461*** 0.0393*** 0.0211*** 0.0159*** 
  (8.72) (8.19) (9.31) (4.99) 
Alpha Lagged *FE Commission paid -0.00839*** -0.0113*** -0.00133*** -0.00350*** 
  (-3.01) (-3.48) (-4.98) (-3.23) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.0117** 0.0107* 0.00444** 0.00258*** 
  (2.53) (1.84) (2.11) (3.57) 
Alpha Lagged * Negotiated Management Fee 0.00329*** 0.0043*** -0.00253 0.00467 
  (5.61) (5.67) (-1.27) (0.17) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0362*** 0.0459*** 0.0254*** 0.0334** 
  (6.06) (3.43) (2.96) (2.17) 
Number of Observations 134505 134505 134505 134505 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.087 0.079 0.078 0.044 
F 507.3 495.4 506.1 289.5 
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TABLE 2.5 Difference between Net Retail Flow and Net Aggregate Flow 
This table presents unbalanced panel regressions on NET_RETAIL_FLOW, excluding fund of funds and the subsample of fee-based purchase option types. Standard errors are clustered by FundSERV 
Code and month. Explanatory variables include predicted value of NET_AGGREGATE_FLOW and mutual fund fees. Predicted net aggregate flow is based on Model 2 (Panel A) or Model 7 (Panel B) 
in Table 3. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Predicted Net Aggregate Flow 0.536*** 0.524*** 0.531*** 0.540*** 0.527*** 0.538*** 
  (8.48) (8.65) (8.57) (8.72) (8.29) (8.40) 
Alpha Lagged 0.00184*** 0.00165** 0.00176*** 0.00130*** 0.00158*** 0.00116*** 
  (2.67) (2.55) (2.62) (2.76) (3.04) (2.88) 
Alpha Lagged2 
   
-0.000539* -0.000481* -0.000507 
  
   
(-1.83) (-1.67) (-1.62) 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) 0.000497*** 0.000674*** 0.000740*** 0.000519*** 0.000508*** 0.000613*** 
  (5.29) (5.83) (6.39) (4.57) (4.49) (5.19) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) 0.00182 0.000924 0.000903 0.000873 0.000812 0.000839 
  (0.49) (1.03) (1.04) (0.38) (0.71) (0.72) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) 0.00468*** 0.00425*** 0.00375*** 0.00370*** 0.00392*** 0.00407*** 
  (7.07) (6.19) (6.40) (7.93) (8.06) (5.02) 
Trailer Slope 
 
0.00289** 0.00292** 0.00174** 0.00137*** 0.00223** 
  
 
(2.24) (2.33) (2.23) (2.62) (2.11) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 
 
-0.000354** -0.000371** -0.000353** -0.000592*** -0.000603*** 
  
 
(-2.37) (-2.24) (-2.06) (-3.20) (-3.78) 
DSC Slope 
 
-0.0381*** -0.0335*** -0.0376*** -0.0315*** -0.0298*** 
  
 
(-3.39) (-3.51) (-4.12) (-4.06) (-2.98) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) 
  
0.000550 -0.000219 -0.000394 -0.000908 
  
  
(1.59) (-0.65) (-1.17) (-0.65) 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 
  
0.0112 0.0138 0.0156 0.0140 
  
  
(1.01) (1.24) (1.40) (1.24) 
Front-End Commission paid (%) 
   
-0.00132*** -0.00124*** -0.00136*** 
  
   
(-6.31) (-6.33) (-6.27) 
Performance Fee (%) 
    
-0.000592 -0.000606* 
  
    
(-1.60) (-1.73) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 
     
-0.00111 
  
     
(-1.41) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0118*** 0.0283*** 0.00739 0.00357 0.0129 0.0240 
  (-5.74) (2.75) (0.31) (0.15) (0.55) (1.00) 
Number of Observations 508121 508121 508121 508121 508121 508121 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 9595 9595 9595 9595 9595 9595 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.103 0.117 0.118 0.155 0.157 0.170 
F 1792.45 2006.38 1805.24 1763.09 1843.60 1952.75 
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Panel B. Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Predicted Net Aggregate Flow 0.389*** 0.365*** 0.371*** 0.406*** 0.424*** 0.412*** 
  (6.85) (6.59) (6.93) (6.22) (6.71) (6.44) 
Alpha Lagged 0.0163 0.0179 -0.0171 -0.00525 0.00855 0.0145 
  (0.89) (1.34) (-0.21) (-0.61) (0.99) (1.54) 
Alpha Lagged2 -0.00434* -0.00394* -0.00203** -0.00212** -0.00175* -0.00254** 
  (-1.72) (-1.84) (-2.17) (-2.39) (-1.92) (-1.96) 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) 0.00633 0.00959 0.00110 0.00113 -0.00106 -0.00309 
  (0.88) (1.64) (1.22) (1.29) (-0.20) (-0.58) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) -0.000206 -0.000662 -0.000682 -0.000697 0.000342 0.000338 
  (-0.93) (-0.88) (-0.97) (-0.99) (0.56) (0.59) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) 
 
-0.00139* 0.000864 0.000880 -0.000992 -0.00138 
  
 
(-1.74) (1.05) (1.10) (-1.20) (-1.02) 
Trailer Slope 
 
0.00225*** 0.00130** 0.00152*** 0.00262** 0.00310*** 
  
 
(3.15) (2.39) (2.64) (2.38) (3.05) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 
 
-0.00107** -0.00116*** -0.00139*** -0.00122*** -0.00123** 
  
 
(-2.28) (-2.90) (-2.78) (-3.86) (-2.18) 
DSC Slope 
  
-0.00145 -0.00146 0.00205 0.00261 
  
  
(-1.06) (-1.07) (1.21) (1.54) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) 
  
0.000758 0.000756 0.000660 0.000644 
  
  
(0.58) (1.50) (1.76) (1.25) 
Maximum Posted Switch Fee (%) 
   
0.00815*** 0.0135*** 0.0115*** 
  
   
(2.79) (3.35) (2.94) 
Front-End Commission paid (%) 
    
-0.00186*** -0.00169*** 
  
    
(-3.32) (-3.28) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 
     
-0.00724 
  
     
(-1.60) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0968*** -0.0218** -0.0122*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.122*** 
  (-4.37) (-2.31) (-3.50) (-3.26) (-4.05) (-6.13) 
Number of Observations 134505 134505 134505 134505 134505 134505 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.0976 0.112 0.116 0.124 0.136 0.138 
F 670.70 611.20 691.86 638.34 657.38 667.49 
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TABLE 2. 6 The Effect of Fund Fees on Fund Performance 
This table presents unbalanced panel regressions on the factors influencing fund performance in the 12 months ahead, measured by abnormal return (alpha). Fund of Funds are excluded from the 
analysis. Explanatory variables include lagged alpha and mutual fund fees. Standard errors are clustered by FundSERV Code and month. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Prior Performance 
      Alpha Lagged 0.0228*** 0.0197*** 0.0165*** 0.0186*** 0.0181*** 0.0167** 
  (3.76) (3.41) (3.39) (2.68) (2.59) (2.43) 
Incentive Fees 
      
Performance Fee (%) 0.0295*** 0.0221*** 0.0216*** 0.0285*** 0.0341** 0.0389** 
  (3.72) (3.54) (3.38) (2.95) (2.57) (2.34) 
Sales Charges 
      
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.0244*** -0.0236*** -0.0227*** -0.0209*** -0.0206** -0.0191** 
  (-4.48) (-3.53) (-3.57) (-3.14) (-2.49) (-2.46) 
DSC Slope 
 
-0.322*** -0.329*** -0.283*** -0.295*** -0.327*** 
  
 
(-4.29) (-4.30) (-3.76) (-3.22) (-2.77) 
Front-End Commission paid (%) 
   
-0.00603 -0.00442 0.00665 
  
   
(-0.14) (-0.10) (0.16) 
Management Fees and Operating Expenses 
      
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) -0.0171 -0.0302 -0.0223* -0.0224* -0.0197* -0.0275 
  (-1.35) (-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.93) (-1.67) (-1.04) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.00476*** 0.00583*** 0.00595*** 0.00593*** 0.00586*** 0.00497** 
  (3.46) (4.52) (2.83) (3.55) (3.54) (2.66) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) 
    
0.187 0.160 
  
    
(1.58) (0.27) 
Trailing Commissions 
      
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) -0.0477*** -0.0575*** -0.0713*** -0.0714*** -0.0615*** -0.0592*** 
  (-3.53) (-3.48) (-3.72) (-3.82) (-3.11) (-2.88) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) 
  
-0.00547** -0.00552** -0.00482** -0.00539** 
  
  
(-2.22) (-2.11) (-2.24) (-2.26) 
Trailer Slope 
     
0.0490 
  
     
(0.96) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0907*** -0.148*** -0.0538*** -0.0393*** -0.0390*** -0.0532*** 
  (-2.98) (-3.57) (-3.68) (-3.01) (-3.00) (-3.30) 
Number of Observations 406775 406775 406775 406775 406775 406775 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 9595 9595 9595 9595 9595 9595 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.042 0.056 0.061 0.068 0.075 0.085 
F 112.2 55.74 56.87 50.65 50.30 43.09 
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Panel B: Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Prior Performance 
     
 Alpha Lagged 0.0256*** 0.0231*** 0.0291*** 0.0280*** 0.0265*** 0.0229*** 
  (3.45) (3.37) (3.41) (3.29) (2.85) (2.70) 
Sales Charges 
      
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.0119*** -0.0128*** -0.0136*** -0.0150*** -0.0129*** -0.0131*** 
  (-7.09) (-10.36) (-10.31) (-10.10) (-10.29) (-9.98) 
DSC Slope 
 
-0.0218*** -0.0167*** -0.0261*** -0.0240*** -0.0258*** 
  
 
(-8.92) (-8.93) (-8.83) (-8.63) (-8.31) 
Front-End Commission paid (%) 
   
-0.0512*** -0.0405*** -0.0425*** 
  
   
(-3.11) (-2.93) (-2.82) 
Management Fees and Operating Expenses 
      
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) 0.0936 0.0825* 0.0748** 0.0743* 0.0820** 0.0664* 
  (1.51) (1.90) (1.96) (1.94) (1.97) (1.84) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 
 
0.171*** 0.182*** 0.176*** 0.160*** 0.144*** 
  
 
(4.90) (5.04) (5.10) (4.19) (4.68) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) 
 
   
0.0281 0.0284 
  
 
   
(1.34) (1.40) 
Trailing Commissions 
      
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) -0.0364*** -0.0458*** -0.0395** -0.0441*** -0.0415** -0.0256** 
  (-3.10) (-2.76) (-2.36) (-2.67) (-2.51) (-2.48) 
Trailer Slope 
  
-0.124*** -0.115*** -0.104*** -0.0954** 
  
  
(-3.45) (-3.24) (-2.99) (-2.24) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) 
     
0.0344 
  
     
(0.94) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0284* -0.0279* -0.0302** -0.035** -0.0381** -0.0392*** 
  (-1.91) (-1.89) (-2.06) (-2.33) (-2.51) (-2.59) 
Number of Observations 97820 97820 97820 97820 97820 97820 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.025 0.033 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.043 
F 668.8 584.3 473.7 402.2 348.1 307.8 
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TABLE 2.7 Comparison Tests on Fund Performance  
This table shows the comparison test results on abnormal returns (alpha) between the group of funds in which retail flow is positively correlated with other flows and the group of funds that do not 
exhibit this positive correlation. Two sample t-tests (results in T-Value) with equal variance are used to evaluate the impact of correlation between new purchases (outflow) and other outflow (inflow) on 
average fund performance. Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (results in Z-Value) is also used to evaluate the same impact on the distribution of fund performance. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Series Not Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
For each FundSERV Code, Positive Correlation Between: Yes=1/No=0 Total Obs Average Alpha T-Value  Z-Value 
New Purchases / Switches In 0 540,605 0.2445 
-6.46*** -8.79*** 
New Purchases / Switches In 1 262,103 0.2522 
New Purchases / Switches Out 0 683,772 0.2504 
15.33*** 17.14*** 
New Purchases / Switches Out 1 118,306 0.2273 
One-time Redemptions / Switches In 0 780,903 0.2471 
2.11** 10.83*** 
One-time Redemptions / Switches In 1 21,175 0.2440 
One-time Redemptions / Switches Out 0 568,928 0.2439 
-7.54*** -14.68*** 
One-time Redemptions / Switches Out 1 233,150 0.2545 
 
 
Panel B: Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
For each FundSERV Code, Positive Correlation Between: Yes=1/No=0 Total Obs Average Alpha T-Value  Z-Value 
New Purchases / Switches In 0 119,153 0.2677 
-4.89*** -11.38*** 
New Purchases / Switches In 1 44,925 0.2791 
New Purchases / Switches Out 0 155,989 0.2717 
11.15*** 13.54*** 
New Purchases / Switches Out 1 8,089 0.2531 
One-time Redemptions / Switches In 0 162,372 0.2710 
9.87*** 16.42*** 
One-time Redemptions / Switches In 1 1,706 0.2526 
One-time Redemptions / Switches Out 0 126,742 0.2692 
-3.56*** -17.59*** 
One-time Redemptions / Switches Out 1 37,336 0.2761 
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TABLE 2.8 Cross-sectional Regression on Fund Performance 
This table presents cross sectional regressions evaluating the impact of flow correlations on average fund performance. The dependent variable is the average abnormal return (alpha) for a FundSERV 
code over the whole sample period. Funds that experienced changes in service fees (around 3% of the sample FundSERV codes) over the sample period are excluded from the analyses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) -0.0412* -0.0307* -0.0289 -0.0368* -0.0353* 
  (-1.79) (-1.69) (-0.98) (-1.92) (-1.83) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) 0.00679** 0.0068* 0.00678* 0.00678** 0.00677** 
  (2.04) (1.86) (1.72) (2.15) (1.99) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) -0.0564*** -0.0569*** -0.0563*** -0.0562*** -0.0567*** 
  (-8.06) (-7.93) (-8.42) (-8.03) (-8.17) 
Performance Fee (%) 0.00847*** 0.00859*** 0.00833*** 0.00853*** 0.00853*** 
  (3.89) (3.95) (3.83) (3.93) (3.92) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Switch-In (Yes=1; No=0) 0.0131 
   
0.0107 
  (0.39) 
   
(0.31) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Switch-Out (Yes=1; No=0) -0.0341*** 
   
-0.0207*** 
  (-3.46) 
   
(-3.81) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Switch-In (Yes=1; No=0) 
 
-0.0111** 
  
-0.00891* 
  
 
(-2.08) 
  
(-1.87) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Switch-Out (Yes=1; No=0) 
 
0.013*** 
  
0.0154*** 
  
 
(4.04) 
  
(4.67) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Distribution to Unitholders (Yes=1; No=0) 
  
0.00498 
 
0.00904 
  
  
(0.11) 
 
(1.02) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Reinvested Distribution (Yes=1; No=0) 
  
0.00982 
 
0.00369 
  
  
(0.22) 
 
(0.81) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Distribution to Unitholders (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
-0.00278*** -0.00312*** 
  
   
(-4.37) (-4.81) 
Positive Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Reinvested Distribution (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
0.00895 0.00746 
  
   
(1.42) (1.16) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.329*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 
  (3.14) (3.68) (3.98) (4.79) (3.05) 
Number of Observations 15667 15667 15667 15667 15667 
R2 0.040 0.036 0.038 0.043 0.054 
F 43.22 48.13 42.93 51.56 79.52 
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Panel B. Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) (%) 0.0351* 0.0354* 0.0368 0.0355* 0.0352* 
  (1.65) (1.82) (1.23) (1.79) (1.77) 
Trading Expense Ratio (TER) (%) 0.0036 0.00347 0.00352* 0.00362* 0.00339* 
  (1.61) (1.55) (1.88) (1.83) (1.72) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) -0.0293*** -0.0294*** -0.0286*** -0.0279*** -0.028*** 
  (-4.94) (-5.01) (-4.86) (-4.71) (-4.78) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Switch-In (Yes=1; No=0) 0.00875 
   
0.00628 
  (1.34) 
   
(0.95) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Switch-Out (Yes=1; No=0) -0.0138*** 
   
-0.0108** 
  (-2.92) 
   
(-2.10) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Switch-In (Yes=1; No=0) 
 
-0.00567*** 
  
-0.00504** 
  
 
(-2.74) 
  
(-2.07) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Switch-Out (Yes=1; No=0) 
 
0.00603*** 
  
0.00629*** 
  
 
(4.35) 
  
(3.93) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Distribution to Unitholders (Yes=1; No=0) 
  
0.00265* 
 
0.00335* 
  
  
(1.95) 
 
(1.80) 
Positively Correlated: New Purchases and Reinvested Distribution (Yes=1; No=0) 
  
0.00425*** 
 
0.0047*** 
  
  
(5.60) 
 
(6.16) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Distribution to Unitholders (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
0.0115 -0.00733 
  
   
(1.62) (-1.02) 
Positively Correlated: One-time Redemptions and Reinvested Distribution (Yes=1; No=0) 
   
-0.00316*** -0.00409*** 
  
   
(-4.60) (-5.96) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.00159 -0.000366 -0.00793 0.00632 -0.00351 
  (-0.27) (-0.06) (-1.34) (1.07) (-0.59) 
Number of Observations 2435 2435 2435 2435 2435 
R2 0.091 0.104 0.097 0.092 0.114 
F 76.8 68.41 86.35 79.52 79.27 
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TABLE 2.9 The Association between Fund Flow and Fund Performance 
This table presents unbalanced panel regressions on the factors influencing fund performance in the 12 months ahead, measured by abnormal return (alpha). Fund of Funds are excluded from the 
analysis. Explanatory variables include lagged alpha, fee variables, and different fund flows. Standard errors are clustered by FundSERV Code and month. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Series Sold through Dealers or Brokers 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Alpha Lagged 0.0223*** 0.0194*** 0.0264*** 0.0248** 0.0204** 
  (3.36) (3.37) (3.12) (2.39) (2.38) 
Performance Fee (%) 0.0226*** 0.0330*** 0.0302** 0.0193*** 0.0176** 
  (3.52) (3.34) (2.34) (3.09) (2.18) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.0106*** -0.0104*** -0.0114*** -0.0127*** -0.0133*** 
  (-2.74) (-2.73) (-2.80) (-2.89) (-2.45) 
DSC Slope -0.0580*** -0.0455*** -0.0569*** -0.0131*** -0.0104*** 
  (-3.40) (-3.31) (-4.38) (-3.59) (-2.61) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.215*** 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.218*** 0.222*** 
  (2.99) (2.94) (2.98) (3.03) (3.12) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) -0.0735*** -0.0704*** -0.0693*** -0.0643*** -0.0675*** 
  (-3.29) (-3.03) (-3.25) (-3.17) (-2.70) 
Sales Commission paid on DSC purchase (%) -0.00875** -0.00771** -0.00734** -0.00705** -0.00804** 
  (-2.05) (-2.09) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-1.97) 
New Purchases Lagged (%) -1.163 
   
-1.021 
  (-1.03) 
   
(-1.39) 
One-time Redemptions Lagged (%) -0.780 
   
-0.614* 
  (-1.53) 
   
(-1.76) 
Switch-In Lagged (%) 
 
0.387*** 
  
0.452*** 
  
 
(3.39) 
  
(3.28) 
Switch-Out Lagged (%) 
 
-2.481*** 
  
-2.203*** 
  
 
(-4.21) 
  
(-3.75) 
Pre-authorized Contribution Lagged (%) 
  
-4.765* 
 
-2.708 
  
  
(-1.69) 
 
(-1.25) 
Systematic Withdrawal Plan Lagged (%) 
  
3.086 
 
-2.695 
  
  
(0.24) 
 
(-0.47) 
Distribution to Unitholders Lagged (%) 
   
2.264 1.736 
  
   
(0.69) (0.52) 
Reinvested Distribution Lagged (%) 
   
5.709 7.146 
  
   
(1.25) (1.61) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.386*** 0.370*** 0.375*** 0.377*** 0.398*** 
  (4.21) (4.11) (4.23) (4.24) (4.42) 
Number of Observations 406775 406775 406775 406775 406775 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 9595 9595 9595 9595 9595 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
F 51.68 36.72 37.74 55.83 44.32 
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Panel B: Fund Series Purchasable Directly from Fund Manager 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Alpha Lagged 0.0304*** 0.0284*** 0.0264*** 0.0223*** 0.0242*** 
  (3.41) (3.37) (3.11) (3.16) (2.89) 
Deferred Sales Charge (DSC) Year 1 -0.0122*** -0.0119*** -0.0120*** -0.0123*** -0.0126*** 
 
(-9.37) (-9.48) (-9.22) (-9.31) (-9.18) 
DSC Slope -0.0248*** -0.0313*** -0.0425*** -0.0331*** -0.0214*** 
  (-8.81) (-8.84) (-8.75) (-8.77) (-8.08) 
Front-End Commission paid (%) -0.0407*** -0.0693*** -0.0732*** -0.0713*** -0.0650*** 
  (-2.89) (-2.78) (-2.69) (-3.05) (-2.66) 
Negotiated Management Fee (%) 0.228*** 0.233*** 0.284*** 0.232*** 0.261*** 
  (4.05) (4.24) (4.10) (4.59) (4.18) 
Maximum Posted Initial Trailer Fee (%) -0.0286*** -0.0319** -0.0328** -0.0365** -0.0281*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.25) (-2.31) (-2.50) (-2.60) 
Trailer Slope -0.0328*** -0.0331*** -0.0310*** -0.0265*** -0.0227*** 
  (-3.39) (-3.44) (-3.15) (-3.27) (-2.84) 
New Purchases Lagged (%) -0.308 
   
-0.279 
  (-1.20) 
   
(-1.07) 
One-time Redemptions Lagged (%) -0.459 
   
-0.597* 
  (-1.15) 
   
(-1.75) 
Switch-In Lagged (%) 
 
0.482*** 
  
0.546*** 
  
 
(3.42) 
  
(3.27) 
Switch-Out Lagged (%) 
 
-0.613*** 
  
-0.470*** 
  
 
(-4.31) 
  
(-3.58) 
Pre-authorized Contribution Lagged (%) 
  
-1.462 
 
-1.290 
  
  
(-0.09) 
 
(-0.54) 
Systematic Withdrawal Plan Lagged (%) 
  
2.313 
 
2.234 
  
  
(1.55) 
 
(1.49) 
Distribution to Unitholders Lagged (%) 
   
-1.763 -1.589 
  
   
(-1.08) (-0.97) 
Reinvested Distribution Lagged (%) 
   
-3.597 -2.297 
  
   
(-0.32) (-0.15) 
CIFSC Fund Category Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Risk Classification Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discount Brokerage Series Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0710*** 0.0454*** 0.0504*** 0.0684*** 0.0719*** 
  (4.42) (3.02) (3.35) (4.37) (4.13) 
Number of Observations 97820 97820 97820 97820 97820 
Number of Clusters (FundSERV Code) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Number of Clusters (Month) 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.023 
F 144.0 139.2 138.6 157.9 105.4 
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FIGURE 2.1 Growth of Mutual Fund Assets 
Figure 2.1 shows the growth of total assets under management (AUM) for all mutual funds in the sample data set over time. Mutual funds 
established after January 2003 or liquidated before December 2014 are included in other analyses in the paper but excluded from Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 2.2 Relative Weight of Different Types of Mutual Fund Flows over Time 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relative weight of each type of flow to total flow over the period of January 2003 to December 2014. The percentage 
weights in each graph are the ratios of the aggregate volume of a specific type of flow across all FundSERV codes to the aggregate volume of 
total flow for all FundSERV codes in a given month. Graph A of Figure 2 exhibits the relative weight of each type of inflow to total inflow; 
Graph B of Figure 2 exhibits the relative weight of each type of outflow to total outflow. 
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Graph B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Jan
2003
Jan
2004
Jan
2005
Jan
2006
Jan
2007
Jan
2008
Jan
2009
Jan
2010
Jan
2011
Jan
2012
Jan
2013
Jan
2014
P
e
r
c
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
T
o
ta
l 
O
u
tf
lo
w
 
One-time Redemptions
Systematic Withdraw Plan
Switch Out
Distribution to Unitholder
  
108 
 
FIGURE 2. 3A Percent Compositions in Total Monthly Inflow 
 
Figure 2.3A shows the weight distribution of four types of flows included in total monthly inflow: investor controlled new purchases, pre-
authorized contribution, switch-in, and reinvested distribution. 
 
FIGURE 2.3B Percent Compositions in Total Monthly Outflow 
 
Figure 2.3B shows the weight distribution of four types of flows included in total monthly outflow: investor-controlled retail outflow, systematic 
withdrawal plan flow, switch-out, and distribution to unitholders. 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the financial crisis, there has been a growth in acquisition exits for start-ups, 
including VC-backed start-ups.  The relatively higher costs associated with going public, 
attributable in part to regulatory changes around the IPO process (Ferran, Moloney, Hill, and 
Coffee, 2012), have made IPOs less common (Ritter, 2016) and acquisition exits much more 
common for entrepreneurial start-ups, particularly in the United States (Cumming and Johan, 
2013a).  And in Europe, firms are frequently acquired within 3 years of an IPO (Signori and 
Vismara, 2017).  Given this new environment where investors in start-ups more often 
successfully exit via acquisitions, in this paper we explore the avenues on which start-ups 
achieve such an acquisition outcome.  We focus our comparison on two different types of 
important resources for start-ups: venture capital (VC) finance, and technology parks.  We show 
that these two routes have substantially different governance paths: technology parks are 
characterized by advice and networks, while VCs are characterized by control. 
There has been extensive work on entrepreneurial ecosystems (Acs et al., 2013; 2014a,b; 
2016; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Audretsch, 2015; Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann, 2006; 
Audretsch and Thurik, 2004;  Hwang and Horowitt, 2012; Holling, 2001; Lee et al., 2004; 
Mason and Brown, 2014; Stam, 2014).  The comparative dearth of IPOs relative to acquisitions 
post financial crisis in the U.S. has given rise to a marked shift in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
and the effect of this institutional shift away from IPOs on entrepreneurial ecosystems in the U.S. 
has been underexplored in prior studies.  In particular, the shift away from IPOs has the potential 
to affect the type of support, governance, and financing in the early stages of the entrepreneurial 
 
 
110 
 
firm.  If a start-up achieves an IPO then the founding entrepreneur typically becomes the CEO of 
the publicly traded company.  By contrast, acquisition exits are peculiar in the sense that the 
founding entrepreneur of the start-up must either become an employee in the merged entity, or 
leave to work for another start-up or become an angel investor (Cumming, Werth and Walz, 
2016).  Often, entrepreneurs are very reluctant to sell a firm that they had created, and it is an 
emotional event to give up the entity by merging it with another one and thereby lose control 
(Petty, Martin, and Kensinger, 1999).  Venture capitalists (VCs), by contrast typically only care 
about the financial return to an investment and do not have non-pecuniary incentives that 
entrepreneurs may have.  For this reason, it is possible that there are conflicts of interest between 
outside investors and entrepreneurs when investors want to maximize the return on investment 
through an acquisition and entrepreneurs do not wish to exit via an acquisition.   
Prior to the financial crisis when IPOs were more feasible, the tension between the choice 
of IPOs versus acquisitions was more pronounced in the U.S.  Post-financial crisis, the tension is 
not so much whether the founding entrepreneur will give up control in an acquisition exit, but 
instead when the entrepreneur will give up control.  If the entrepreneur obtains VC finance, the 
entrepreneur gives up board seats and other contractual rights through which VCs can exercise 
control and even replace the founding entrepreneur as CEO prior to an exit event.  If the 
entrepreneur does not obtain VC finance, there is a smaller chance that the entrepreneur will 
achieve a successful acquisition exit and greater likelihood of liquidation unless the entrepreneur 
has access to other forms of support in the entrepreneurial ecosystem.  
Apart from VC finance, incubators and technology parks are a widely recognized form of 
support for entrepreneurs (Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, and Sull, 2000; Hülsbeck, Lehmann, 
Starnecker, 2013; Audretsch, Lehmann, Paleari, Vismara, 2016).  Technology parks, unlike VCs, 
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do not take equity cash flow rights and various control rights over the companies that they help.  
Instead, technology parks offer a physical space and a support network (from technology park 
staff or other tenant companies) to enable a start-up to successfully grow.  As well, an affiliation 
with a technology park can enable visibility to potential new investors and/or strategic acquirers 
(Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Squicciarini, 2009; Cumming and Johan, 2013b).  Hence, we 
expect that firms making use of technology parks are more likely to successful grow through the 
support and advice, leading to acquisitions.  The critical governance difference with between 
technology parks and VC finance is that with VC finance the founding entrepreneur is typically 
replaced as the CEO years prior to the acquisition, unlike that with technology parks, unless a 
VC is involved in the firm together with the technology park.   
In this paper we introduce a new hand-collected dataset of 251 software/Internet start-up 
firms from Crunchbase, an extremely detailed tech entrepreneur webpage resource.  A total of 
181 of these firms received either angel or VC finance, 99 were affiliated with a technology park, 
and 78 had angel or VC finance and were affiliated with a technology park.  We know whether 
or not and when firms were acquired, liquidated, or remained private, whether or not and when 
the founding entrepreneur was replaced as CEO, the timing of board changes and other details on 
the structure and changes in the board over time.  We followed in detail all of these firms from 
January 2007 to May 2014.  The data indicate that entrepreneurs financed by VCs typically lead 
to CEO replacement (normally after 1.5 years) and then acquisition exits (normally after 6.5 
years).  Further, the data indicate that start-ups that make use of technology parks, not VCs, are 
less likely to experience CEO replacement and yet still achieve an acquisition exit.  But when 
VCs are on the board of a start-up that is resident at a technology park, exit via acquisition is 
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delayed and CEO replacement is much more likely and faster.  These details are described 
herein. 
This paper is related to a long literature on VCs (Mason and Harrison, 1995, 2002a,b; 
Cumming, 2008; Jolink and Niesten, 2016; Colombo, Cumming, and Vismara, 2016), PEs 
(Rigamonti, Cefis, Meoli, and Vismara, 2016) and angels (Goldfarb et al., 2007, 2012; 
DeGennaro, 2013; DeGennaro and Dwyer, 2014), and a separate stream of literature on 
incubators and technology parks (Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, Sull, 2000; Lofsten and Lindelof, 
2002; Squicciarini, 2009; Cumming and Fischer, 2012; Cumming and Johan, 2013b; Gykpali, 
Kokkinos, and Bouras, 2016).  Few papers study VCs, angels, and technology parks at the same 
time.  Perhaps the paper closest to ours is a study by Chen (2009) on 122 start-ups with VC or 
incubator support, who finds both VCs and incubators moderate the role of technology 
commercialization on new venture performance.  Cosh, Cumming, and Hughes (2009) note that 
the literature on entrepreneurial finance is highly segmented by virtue of the data coming from 
the source of capital, and not from the entrepreneurial firm, and hence papers on VC for example 
typically only know about VC and no other forms of finance.  In this paper, we use data from 
entrepreneurial firms and use a recent sample of firms that do and do not have a wide range of 
sources of finance, and that are and are not in incubators/technology parks, etc.  We document 
changes over time among these firms to understand the governance implications of different 
sources of finance, boards, and support mechanisms such as incubators, among other things as 
documented herein. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the hypotheses.  Section 3 
introduces and describes the data.  Section 4 presents the multivariate tests.  Limitations and 
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extensions are discussed in section 5.  The last section provides a brief summary and concluding 
remarks. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Since the introduction of Sarbanes Oxley legislation in the U.S. in June 2002, and further 
regulatory changes since the aftermath of the financial crisis which started in the first week of 
August 2007, IPOs have become a relatively less common form of exit for investors in start-ups 
backed by VCs in the U.S. (Cumming and Johan, 2013a; Ritter, 2016) due to the very large 
regulatory costs and changes in rules for taking companies public (Ferran, Moloney, Hill, and 
Coffee, 2012).  The economics of investment banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis is such 
that firms need larger valuations to be taken public, and have substantially larger sales at the time 
of IPO and are older (Ritter, 2016).  For example, from 1980-2002, firms were on average 8 
years old at the time of IPO, while from 2002-2015, firms were on average 12 years old at the 
time of IPO (Ritter, 2016).  VC investments are normally from 2-7 years from time of investment 
to exit, as VC limited partnership agreements are normally 10 years with an option wind-up 
investments for a final 1-3 years (Cumming and Johan, 2013a).  Because it is tough to take a 
start-up with a couple of entrepreneurs at a valuation of a few million dollars at the time of 
investment to a billion dollar plus valuation in 2-7 years, it is now relatively much more common 
for U.S. VCs to successfully exit their investments in start-ups as acquisitions. 
 VC governance is characterized by very strong contractual rights and representation on 
boards of directors that typically enable the investor to replace the founding entrepreneur as the 
CEO, the right to force an acquisition through drag along and other rights, or some other type 
sale such as a buyback through redemption rights, or an IPO through demand registration rights 
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(Cumming, 2008).  VCs bargain hard at the time of initial investment to acquire these rights, and 
they are often used to direct governance and exit outcomes, particularly among the more 
reputable VC funds (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Cumming and Johan, 2013a).   
Entrepreneurs may have non-pecuniary preferences to wait until they can achieve an IPO 
if they prefer to be the CEO of a publicly traded company.  VCs, by contrast, prefer only to 
maximize their return on investment.  And since the aftermath of the financial crisis, this return 
is most likely achieved by selling the company in an acquisition exit.  VC control through board 
seat representation and other contractual rights will therefore mean that acquisitions are more 
likely with VC investors than without VC investors.   
H1. (VC Control): VCs on boards increase the probability of and reduce the time to 
acquisitions through VCs’ exercise of control. 
A technology park (is a collection of buildings or a single building in the case of an 
incubator) that hosts chosen entrepreneurial firms who share resources or services provided by 
the technology park.  Technology parks facilitate technology licensing, establishing trade shows, 
providing funds for commercialization, and/or distributing and disseminating information about 
the R&D activities of its tenants.  Technology parks add value to their tenants in many ways: (1) 
they offer an environment in which there is support provided; (2) they foster complementarities 
across different firms in the technology park that can facilitate the growth and financing of an 
entrepreneurial firm, thereby achieving agglomeration benefits (Shaver, 1998); (3) they attract 
outside investors, such banks, angel investors, and VCs. Firms exit technology parks after they 
are sufficiently independent and post-revenue and post-financing such that there are expansion 
(in terms of both space and geography) and other business reasons to relocate. Prior work is 
 
 
115 
 
consistent with the view that technology parks significantly facilitate the growth and success of 
start-ups (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Squicciarini, 2009; Bonardo, Paleari, Vismara, 2010, 
2011; Cumming and Fischer, 2012; Cumming and Johan, 2013a; Cumming et al., 2015). 
H2. (Incubator/Technology Park Advice and Support): Technology parks increase the 
probability of and reduce the time to acquisition through the park’s advice and support. 
A natural question arises as to whether or not VCs are complements or substitutes?  That 
is, for firms with VC investment and based in a technology park, is the advice and support 
provided by a technology park additive or in conflict with the control exercised by the VC?  On 
one hand, more sources of advice and help can benefit the firm if that support is provided in a 
consistent way.  On the other hand, differing sources of advice may come in conflict when the 
advice provided is in opposite directions or has conflicting interests.  For example, a technology 
park may prefer a different acquirer than the VC for strategic reasons (such as a local presence 
for a local firm that helps the technology park in other ways and other firms in the technology 
park), or could prefer an IPO to an acquisition to build the profile of the technology park.  In 
view of the potential scope of conflicts of interest is much wider than the narrow possibility that 
the VCs’ capitalists’ and technology parks’ incentives are directly aligned, we expect that 
conflicts are more likely than  not. 
H3. (Moderating Impact of VCs on Start-ups at Technology Parks): VCs on boards 
of entrepreneurial firms resident in technology parks increase the time and reduce the 
probability to acquisition, due to conflict of interests between VC and technology parks 
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3.3 Data 
Our analysis is based on firms listed in the CrunchBase online database (see 
www.CrunchBase.com). CrunchBase was developed and is maintained by TechCrunch, the most 
influential technology blog in the United States, and has been used in recent academic studies; 
e.g., Cumming, Walz, and Werth, 2016). Professionals in the technology community can add 
information to the database, which then goes through an approval process before being made 
available online. Our data covers a period from January 2007 to May 2014. Based on 
CrunchBase records, 680 startups were founded in 2007, and we only consider firms founded in 
2007 to enable a sufficient period of time to study these firms. In order to disentangle the 
influence of industry specific factors on startup activities, we included only two most represented 
and related sectors, web (174 firms) and software (102 firms), in our dataset. We further 
excluded the firms that were resulted from spin-offs and mergers. As such, we have the 
population of 251 firms in the CrunchBase data.  The data comprise comprehensive details over 
time on their board characteristics, their financing, whether or not they were part of a technology 
park, whether or not they received angel or VC finance and if so whether or not those investors 
also held board seats, whether or not the founding entrepreneur was replaced, among other 
things.  We hand-collected information on the founder of each of these startups from LinkedIn 
pages, personal websites, as well as from other sources such as Bloomberg Businessweek. The 
details of the variables used are outlined in Table 1. Our data allows us to describe the 
characteristics of all founder teams. 
Table 1 (Page 126) 
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Table 2 summarizes the cases in which the start-up either joined a technology park and/or 
a VC or angel investor, and the data are broadly consistent with Hypotheses 1-3.  For 49 of the 
251 firms there was neither an angel/VC nor a technology park involved with the start-up, and of 
these firms, 3 were acquired, 15written off, and 31 were still private as at May 2014, and 2 
experienced the replacement of the founding entrepreneur as CEO.  For 103 of the 251 firms 
there was an angel/VC but not a technology park involved with the start-up, and of these firms, 
37 were acquired, 9 written off, and 57 were still private as at May 2014, and 33 experienced the 
replacement of the founding entrepreneur as CEO.  For 21 of the 251 firms there was not an 
angel/VC but there was a technology park involved with the start-up, and of these firms, 14 were 
acquired, 4 written off, and 3 were still private as at May 2014, and 2 experienced the 
replacement of the founding entrepreneur as CEO.  For 78 of the 251 firms there was both an 
angel/VC and a technology park involved with the start-up, and of these firms, 23 were acquired, 
6 written off, and 49 were still private as at May 2014, and 14 experienced the replacement of the 
founding entrepreneur as CEO.   
Table 2 (Page 128) 
 The average time to CEO replacement when a VC was involved was 1.58 years (18.9 
months), and 47 of the 181 firms with a VC experienced CEO replacement.  The average time to 
CEO replacement without a VC was 23 months, and 4 of these 70 firms experienced CEO 
replacement.  The average time to CEO replacement with a technology park involved was 1.48 
years (17.8 months), and 16 of these 99 firms experienced CEO replacement.  The average time 
to CEO replacement without a technology park was 19.9 months, and 35 of these 152 firms 
experienced CEO replacement.  The average time to acquisition when a VC was involved was 
6.33 years (75.9 months), and 60 of the 181 firms with a VC were acquired.  The average time to 
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acquisition without a VC was 77.3 months, and 17 of these 70 firms were acquired.  The average 
time to acquisition with a technology park involved was 6.28 years (75.4 months), and 37 of 
these 99 firms were acquired.  The average time to acquisition without a technology park was 
76.5 months, and 40 of these 152 firms were acquired.  The average time to liquidation when a 
VC was involved was 6.36 years (76.4 months), and 15 of the 181 firms with a VC were 
liquidated.  The average time to liquidation without a VC was 74.25 months, and 19 of these 70 
firms were liquidated.  The average time to liquidation with a technology park involved was 6.22 
years (74.6 months), and 10 of these 99 firms were liquidated.  The average time to liquidation 
without a technology park was 75.0 months, and 24 of these 152 firms were liquidated.  
 Table 3 presents comparison of proportions tests for acquisitions, liquidations and staying 
private for the firms with and without an outside board member, for having a seed/angel round of 
external finance, for hiring new employees before or without appointing a new external CEO, for 
appointing a new CEO after angel or VC investment, for joining a technology park, and for 
different market conditions (MSCI index in the last exit month above or below the median over 
the sample years).  The data in Table 3 further indicate write-offs are significantly more likely 
without an outside board member (6.7% with an outside board member and 17.4% without), and 
this difference is significant at the 5% level of significance.  Write-offs are also more likely if the 
firm has not hired new employees before or without replacing the founding entrepreneur as CEO 
(7.9% with new employees and 17.3% without new employees) and this difference is significant 
at the 10% level.    
Table 3 (Page 129) 
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The data indicate acquisitions are significantly more likely if the firm has a seed/angel 
round of finance (36.4% with and 22.0% without), and this difference is significant at the 5% 
level, consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Write-offs are significantly less likely when the firm has 
passed the seed/angel round (6.6% with and 24.0% without) and this difference is significant at 
the 1% level.   
Acquisitions are significantly more likely if the firm had replaced CEO (34.8% with and 
19.4% without) and this difference is significant at the 5% level, consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Write-offs are more likely if the firm has not replaced the CEO after angel/VC investment (8.7% 
with and 26.9% without) and this difference is significant at the 1% level. 
Acquisitions are significantly more likely if the firm has joined a technology park (37.4% 
with and 26.3% without) and this difference is significant at the 10% level, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. Joining a technology park shows no significant difference for write-offs and 
staying private in the comparison tests in Table 3. 
Surprisingly, acquisitions are less likely when market conditions are above the median 
(22.7% when above and 60.2% when below) and this difference is significant at the 1% level.  
Write-offs are also more likely in down market conditions (21.2% when less than the median 
MSCI and 9.7% when greater than the median MSC) and this difference is significant at the 5% 
level.  Staying private is more likely when MSCI returns are above the median (67.6% when 
above versus 18.6% when below), and this difference is significant at the 1% level. 
3.4 Regression Analyses 
 Table 4 presents competing risks exits outcome regressions for acquisitions (Models 1-3) 
and write-offs (Models 4-6). Different sets of right-hand variables are included to show 
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robustness to different specifications.  The hazard rates are shown in Panel A and the coefficient 
estimates are shown in Panel B.  The Appendix presents analogous logit regressions to show the 
probability of different exit outcomes with matching sets of right-hand-side variables in the 
model specifications as those in Table 4. 
Table 4 (Page 130) 
Figure 1 (Page 139) 
Figure 2 (Page 140) 
 Table 4 shows that having a VC on the board has a competing risk hazard ratio of 1.98 in 
Model 1 (2.31 in Model 2 and 2.06 in Model 3), which reflects the faster time to acquisition and 
greater probability of acquisition, consistent with Hypothesis 1. The significance of VC influence 
is shown graphically in Figure 1. Similarly, Table A.I in the Appendix shows that the probability 
of an acquisition is 12.1% higher (Model 1, and 12.3% in Model 2 and 11.8% in Model 3) if 
there is a VC on the board.  By contrast, having an angel investor on the board does not 
materially affect the hazard ratio or the probability of an acquisition.   
The likelihood of an acquisition is heightened when the start-up replaces the founding 
entrepreneur as CEO, and this effect is significant at the 10% level in each of Models 1-3 in 
Table 4 with hazard ratios at 1.15 (Models 1 and 2) and 1.28 (Model 3).  This effect is 
graphically shown in Figure 2. Similarly, Table A.I in the Appendix shows that the probability of 
an acquisition is 10.8% (Model 1) to 13.9% (Model 3) higher when the founding entrepreneur is 
replaced as the CEO.  Furthermore, the hazard ratio for liquidations (Table 4 Models 4-6) and 
probability of liquidation (Table A-1 Models 4-6) is significantly lower when the founding 
entrepreneur is replaced as the CEO. 
 
 
121 
 
 Table 4 further shows that the competing risk hazard ratio for joining a technology park 
is 1.73 in Model 1 (4.14 in Model 2 and 4.40 in Model 3), which reflects the faster time to 
acquisition and greater probability of acquisition, consistent with Hypothesis 2.  However, there 
is no material change in the time to or likelihood of liquidation when the firm is affiliated with a 
technology park in Models 4-6 in Table 4.  These effects are graphically illustrated in Figure 3.  
Similarly, Table A.I in the Appendix shows that the probability of an acquisition is 21.0% higher 
(Model 2, and 22.5% higher Model 3) if the start-up joins a technology park.  
 Table 4 Models 2 and 3 show the interaction between VCs and technology parks has a 
dampening effect on the competing risks hazard ratio.  It is 0.58 in Model 2 and 0.59 in Model 3, 
implying a longer time and lower probability of an acquisition with VCs are mixed with 
technology parks, consistent with Hypothesis 3. Similarly, Appendix Table A.I shows a 
reduction in the probability of an acquisition by 4.5% in Model 2 and 5.1% in Model 3 when 
VCs and technology parks are mixed together. 
 Some of the control variables are significant in Table 4 in ways that we would expect as 
well.  For example, bringing in new employees and obtaining angel finance increases the hazard 
ratio for acquisitions (Models 1-3) and lowers the hazard ratio for write-offs (Models 4-6).  
Stronger market conditions at the time of exit lower the hazard ratios for acquisitions (not 
expected) and write-offs (expected).  Stronger market conditions are associated with a greater 
likelihood of the start-up remaining private, possibly with the entrepreneur waiting for better 
terms in an acquisition or aiming towards an IPO. 
3.5 Robustness Check  
 
 
122 
 
            In Table 4, we use CEO replacement as an independent variable to explain the variation 
in startup acquisition and written-off probabilities. However, it is not impossible that CEO 
replacement is affected by VC presence: when venture capitalists’ planned exit blocked by 
entrepreneurs, they make use of contractual power to replace existing CEO. In this case, the 
correlation between CEO replacement and VC board presence could bias our estimates.  
        In this section, we first test whether VC or technology park have impact on CEO 
replacement. Once the correlation between VC or technology park and CEO replacement is 
detected, we use instrument variable in competing risk models to address the endogeneity 
concern.  
Table 5 (Page 133) 
 Table 5 complements the analysis of acquisition and write-off exits in Table 4 by 
studying when and why firms replace the founding entrepreneur as the CEO.  CEO replacement 
is significantly faster and more likely among firms with a board of directors, particularly with 
VCs on the board, and when there are other executive managers and fewer other key employees; 
the significance of these effects is shown graphically in Figures  4.  The hazard ratio ranges from 
1.78 (Model 4) to 3.83 (Model 8) for having a VC on the board, and the probability of CEO 
replacement increases by approximately 2% on average with a VC on the board (see Table A.II 
in the Appendix).  This evidence supports our earlier findings and is consistent with Hypothesis 
1 regarding the role of control for VC.  Note that by contrast, joining a technology park has no 
significant effect on CEO replacement. 
Table 6 (Page 136) 
Figure 3 (Page 141) 
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Figure 4 (Page 142) 
    Table 6 checks the robustness of Table 4 by replacing the actual CEO replacement 
variable with predicted CEO replacement, where predicted CEO replacement is estimated by 
model 8 in Table 5 Panel B. Table 6 shows that the correlation between CEO replacement and 
VC presence does not materially change our regression results: VC presence significantly 
increases the probability of startup acquisition and reduces the probability of startup liquidation; 
joining a technology park increases the probability of startup acquisition; VC and technology 
park have offset impact on startup outcome.  
 Additional robustness checks are presented in appendix Table A.III, where predicted 
CEO replacement is used to test potential endogeneity problem under logit regression settings. 
Our results are robust under logit models.  
3.6 Limitations and Extensions 
In this paper we focused our comparisons on VCs, angels and technology parks in respect 
of acquisitions and liquidations. Our detailed data enabled these tests as the data were derived 
from the entrepreneurial firm, and not from a particular dataset on the source of capital such as a 
VC dataset as is often the case in VC studies.  There are of course limitations to our dataset and 
ways that this type of analysis can be extended in future studies.     
The cutoff point of May 2014 for our sample can lead to potential censorship bias; that is, 
some firms can be acquired or written off right after May 2014, and other firms may stay private 
for 20 more years, yet we cannot control for startup activities beyond sample horizon (although 
our econometric tests carried out above with competing risks hazard models account for such 
censorship). In addition, we do not have information on startups’ operating activities, although 
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angel and VC involvement can signal operating condition in general.  As well, we did not present 
a preliminary analysis of why some firms end up in incubators/technology parks and others 
obtain VC/angel finance.  Our outcomes of interest come many years after the initial assignment, 
and hence we do not believe selection versus treatment is a major concern with our sample.  We 
do not have ideal instruments to deal with these selection issues, but our investigations with 
various specifications such as market conditions at the time of entry into VC or incubators 
suggested our analysis is not distorted by selection effects.  Likewise, the selection of particular 
VC terms and control rights is beyond the scope of our dataset and relevant to the issue of 
selection versus treatment (see also Cumming, 2008). 
To extend our study, with other types of data it would be possible to compare innovation 
rates associated with VCs and technology parks, in the spirit of work such as Battisti, Colombo 
and Rabbiosi (2015).  It would be useful to know precisely what the VCs and the technology 
parks or incubators do for their investee firms, and when these value added activities come into 
conflict with each other and why.  As well, it would be possible to compare the role of higher 
education with VCs versus technology parks as done in work such as Bonaccorsi, Colombo 
Guerini, Lamastra (2015) and Meoli and Vismara (2016).  Furhter work could also examine 
other sources of finance such as crowdfunding (Colombo, Franzoni, Rossi Lamasstra, 2015; 
Vismara, 2015; Vismara, 2016) and debt finance (Cosh, Cumming and Hughes, 2009).  Finally, 
this type of comparative analysis of entrepreneurial finance could be applied in different 
institutional settings and different counties (in the spirit of work such as Acs, Audretsch, 
Lehmann, and Licht, 2016, Audretsch, 2007a, 2007b, Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007; Coad et al., 
2016; Engel and Keilbach, 2006; Schillo, Persaud, and Jin (2016),) to better understand the role 
of institutional constraints and public policy (McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2016). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper we argued that VCs and technology parks play very different but important 
roles in the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem. We examined the post-financial crisis 
environment over the years 2007-2014 in the U.S. for 251 software/Internet start-up firms that 
can be tracked on Crunchbase.  We argued that entrepreneurial firms that obtain VC finance are 
more likely to experience replacement of the founding entrepreneur as CEO, and subsequently 
exit by acquisition. VCs take control positions through their role on boards and with other 
contractual rights that can bring about changes in a start-up necessary to effect a successful 
acquisition.  By contrast, entrepreneurs that affiliate themselves with technology parks are more 
likely to achieve an acquisition exit without experiencing CEO replacement.  The probability of 
and time to acquisition, however, are significantly mitigated with VCs and technology parks 
come together, which is most likely due to differing objectives and conflicts of interest.  Overall, 
both VCs and technology parks have significant governance roles in the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, and further research could examine a number of extensions on how and where to 
optimize their respective roles in entrepreneurial development and innovation. 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
This table shows the summary statistics of the key variables we used in Competing Risk analysis. The dataset covers a period from January 2007 to May 2014.  
 
 
 
 Variable Name by Categories Definition  Mean Minimum 
25th 
percentile 
Median 
75 
percentile 
Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Start-Up Outcome 
        
Startup is acquired 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup is acquired in the sample 
horizon? Yes=1, No=0 
0.31 0 0 0 1 1 0.46 
Startup is written-off 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup is written-off in the 
sample horizon? Yes=1, No=1 
0.14 0 0 0 0 1 0.34 
Start-Up Characteristics 
        
Startup size 
The size of a startup (in US 
dollar) before its first round of 
external financing 
20789892.43 0 712000 3000000 13000000 1.10E+09 90672060.96 
New employees were hired before bringing in new CEO 
Dummy Variable: whether new 
employees are hired before the 
hire of new CEO? Yes=1, No=0 
0.40 0 0 0 1 1 0.49 
Number of all current key employees 
Total number of current key 
employees(i.e. developers, IT 
experts, technicians) 
3.03 0 0 2 5 19 3.69 
Number of executive managers 
Total number of executive 
managers in a Startup 
3.95 0 1 3 6 31 4.33 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup has joined an incubator 
or technology park in the past? 
Yes=1, No=0 
0.31 0 0 0 1 1 0.46 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup has passed seed/angel 
stage? Yes=1, No=0 
0.60 0 0 1 1 1 0.49 
Startup had a board of directors 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup has a board of directors? 
Yes=1, No=0 
0.57 0 0 1 1 1 0.50 
Startup had replaced CEO  
Dummy Variable: whether 
startup had replaced CEO in the 
sample period? Yes=1, No=0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 1 0.40 
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Table 3.1. (Continued)  
 
Variable Name by Categories Definition  Mean Minimum 
25th 
percentile 
Median 
75 
percentile 
Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Board Characteristics 
        
Number of outside board members 
Total number of outside board 
members 
1.14 0 0 0 2 9 1.76 
Number of founding team members on board 
Total number of founding team 
members on board 
2.3 0 1 2 3 5 1.08 
Average board serving time 
Average board serving time in 
months 
51.51 9 51.75 51.75 51.75 86 12.97 
Startup had Angel on board 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup had Angel on board? 
Yes=1,No=0 
0.37 0 0 0 1 1 0.49 
Startup had VC on board 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup had VC on board?  
Yes=1, No=0 
0.65 0 0 1 1 1 0.48 
Startup had inside chairman 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup had inside chairman? 
Yes=1, No=0 
0.17 0 0 0 0 1 0.37 
Startup had founder chairman 
Dummy Variable: whether a 
startup had founder chairman? 
Yes=1, No=0 
0.18 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 
Number of Financial Vehicle Corporations (FVC) on board 
Total number of FVC on startup 
board 
0.75 0 0 0 1 8 1.32 
Number of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) on board 
Total number of CVC on startup 
board 
0.02 0 0 0 0 1 0.14 
Financing Characteristics 
        
Total number of financing rounds 
Total number of financing rounds 
a startup had over the sample 
period 
2.18 0 1 2 3 8 1.42 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
Average growth rate of the 
amount of money raised by 
startup in all rounds of external 
financing 
2.61 -0.67 0 0 1.04 232.4 15.55 
Time span between the first round financing and exist month 
Time span (in month) between the 
first round financing and startup 
exit month 
40 6 27 39.5 53 81 17.95 
Market Conditions 
        
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month 
Local MSCI Index Return when 
Startup exited 
0.018 -0.1725 0.019 0.0251 0.0251 0.0943 0.0278 
Local MSCI Index Return on CEO Replacement Month 
Local MSCI Index Return when 
Startup replaced CEO 
0.0175 -0.1725 0.0251 0.0234 0.0242 0.0917 0.0258 
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Table 3.2. Summary of Startup Outcome 
This table summarizes the operational outcome of 251 startups in our dataset. The startups we analyze have 3 different outcomes: acquired by another firm, written-off or stayed private. We categorize 
the outcomes into 4 groups based on 2 conditions: whether a VC firm or Angel Investor invested in the startup, and whether a startup joined an incubator or technology park.  The categories Angel/VC 
and Incubator/Technology Park are not mutually exclusive and hence do not sum to 251.  Our dataset covers the period from January 2007 to May 2014. 
 
 
 
  
Startup Activities Frequency of Startup Outcome 
CEO 
Replacement 
 
Count 
Angel/VC 
joined? 
Joined Incubator/ 
Technology Park? 
Acquired Written-off Stay Private 
 
49 No No 3 15 31 2 
 
103 Yes No 37 9 57 33 
 
21 No Yes 14 4 3 2 
 
78 Yes Yes 23 6 49 14 
        
Count 251 181 99 77 34 140 51 
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Table 3.3. Probability Allocation on Startup Outcome 
 
This table presents the probability allocation of startup outcome by 5 types of firm-specific conditions and 1 type of market condition: whether a startup has outside board member, whether a startup has 
passed seed/angel stage, whether a startup hires new employees before/without appointing new CEO, whether a startup appoints new CEO after Angel/VC investment, whether a startup has joined an 
incubator/technology park and whether the local MSCI index return on the exit/last month is above median. For each type of condition, the sum of the probabilities of 3possible outcomes equals 1. 
Comparison tests are applied on each firm-specific condition to evaluate its influence on the firm’s operational outcome. Standard errors are in brackets.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 Startup has Outside Board Member   Startup Passed Seed/Angel Stage  
   
  Yes No Z value Yes No Z value 
Acquired 0.3667 0.2733 
-1.54 
0.3642 0.2200 
 -2.43** 
  (0.0508) (0.0351) (0.0392) (0.0414) 
Written-off 0.0667 0.1739 
 2.38** 
0.0662 0.2400 
 3.94*** 
  ( 0.0263) (0.0299) (0.0202)  (0.0427) 
Stay Private 0.5667 0.5528 
-0.21 
0.5695 0.5400 
-0.46 
  (0.0522) (0.0392) (0.0403) ( 0.0498) 
Number of observations  90 161 
 
151 100 
 
 
 
Startup Hired New Employees 
before/without Appointing New CEO 
 Startup had Replaced CEO 
 
  
   Yes No Z value Yes No Z value 
Acquired 0.3168 0.3000 
-0.26 
0.3478 0.1940 
 -2.35** 
  (0.0463) (0.0374) (0.0351) (0.0483) 
Written-off 0.0792 0.1733 
1.94* 
0.0870 0.2687 
 2.74*** 
  (0.0269) ( 0.0309) (0.0208) (0.0542) 
Stay Private 0.6040 0.5267 
-1.13 
0.5652 0.5373 
-0.36 
  ( 0.0487) (0.0408) (0.0365) (0.0609) 
Number of observations  75 176 
 
51 200 
  
 
Startup has joined incubator/technology 
park 
 
Local MSCI index in exit/last year is 
above median  
  
   Yes No Z value Yes No Z value 
Acquired 0.3737 0.2632 
-1.86* 
0.2271 0.6018 
6.02*** 
  (0.0968) (0.0304) (0.0291) (0.0702) 
Written-off 0.1010 0.1579 
1.29  
0.0966 0.2123 
2.53** 
  (0.0523) (0.0233) (0.0205) (0.0657) 
Stay Private 0.5253 0.5789 
0.84 
0.6763 0.1859 
-7.85*** 
  (0.0981) (0.0331) (0.0325) (0.0428) 
Number of observations  99 152 
 
125 126 
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Table 3.4. Competing Risks Analysis on Startup Outcome 
This table shows the influence of different firm activities on startups’ operational outcome using competing risks regressions. Panel A. presents the estimated subhazard ratio (SHR) of different firm 
activities for startup acquisition and written-off.   Subhazard ratio greater than 1stands for positive influence of the activity on the operational outcome of interest; smaller than 1, negative influence. 
Panel B. presents the coefficients of the same set of competing risks regressions. T values are shown in brackets. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Competing Risks Model--Subhazard Ratio Estimation 
 
Event of interest: Startup was acquired  (Model 1-3) 
 
Model 1 
 
                          Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
Start-Up Characteristics 
    
    
     
Startup size 1.000 0.0000 0.29 
 
1.000 0.0000 0.78 
 
1.000 0.0000 1.32 
New employees were hired before bringing in new CEO 1.175* 0.2065 1.87 
 
1.183** 0.1925 2.25 
 
1.203** 0.1705 2.45 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park    1.731* 1.6403 1.89 
 
 4.141** 2.3998 2.45 
 
 4.402** 2.5652 2.54 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 1.091* 0.3585 1.66 
 
 1.358* 0.4705 1.93 
 
  1.409** 0.4777 2.01 
Startup had replaced CEO   1.145* 0.5352 1.92 
 
 1.150* 0.4841 1.71 
 
 1.282* 0.5216 1.84 
Board Characteristics 
    
   
    
Number of outside board members 
    
 1.160* 0.0885 1.95 
 
 1.174** 0.0914 2.06 
Number of founding team members on board 
    
 1.239* 0.1537 1.73 
 
 1.241* 0.1492 1.81 
Average board serving time 
    
   
 
0.978*** 0.0081 -2.64 
Startup had Angel on board 0.811 0.2255 -0.75 
 
0.957 0.3176 -0.13 
 
0.959 0.3225 -0.12 
Startup had VC on board 1.977* 0.9641 1.76 
 
2.309* 1.1217 1.72 
 
2.061** 0.9743 2.13 
Financing Characteristics 
    
   
    
Total number of financing rounds 
    
0.629*** 0.0841 -3.47 
 
 0.624*** 0.0812 -3.62 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
    
   
 
0.989 0.0110 -0.99 
Market Conditions 
    
   
    
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month 0.0004** 0.0013 -2.07 
 
0.0004** 0.0016 -2.01 
 
0.0005** 0.0019 -1.99 
Interaction Variable 
    
   
    
Startup had VC on board* Startup had joined 
incubator/technology park     
0.579*** 0.2064 -3.78 
 
 0.588*** 0.2343 -4.13 
Observations 251 
 
251 
 
251 
 No. failed  77 
 
77 
 
77 
 No. competing 174 
 
174 
 
174 
 Wald chi^2 18.13 
 
28.84 
 
37.72 
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Panel A. (Continued) 
 
Event of interest: Startup was written off  (Model 4-6) 
  
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
  SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
Start-Up Characteristics 
           
Startup size 1.000 0.0000 -0.77 
 
1.000 0.0000 -0.38 
 
1.000 0.0000 -0.36 
New employees are hired before bringing in new CEO 0.663* 0.2683 -1.92 
 
0.753* 0.3166 -1.76 
 
0.665** 0.1558 -2.08 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  0.676 0.5533 -0.14 
 
0.833 0.7270 -1.01 
 
0.785 0.6262 1.23 
Startup passed seed/angel stage  0.743* 0.4435 -1.84 
 
0.839* 0.3483 -1.92 
 
0.777* 0.3247 -1.72 
Startup had replaced CEO 0.560* 0.2278 -1.72 
 
0.690* 0.1571 -1.69 
 
0.686* 0.1521 -1.70 
Board Characteristics 
           
Number of outside board members 
    
0.726 0.1416 -1.64 
 
0.736 0.1511 -1.49 
Number of founding team members on board 
    
0.723 0.1562 -1.50 
 
0.717 0.1535 -1.55 
Average board serving time 
        
0.981 0.0168 -1.10 
Startup had Angel on board 0.776 0.4534 -0.43 
 
0.917 0.5817 -0.14 
 
0.969 0.6312 -0.05 
Startup had VC on board 0.324** 0.2437 -2.51 
 
 0.438* 0.3624 -1.69 
 
0.445** 0.3495 -1.98 
Financing Characteristics 
           
Total number of financing rounds 
    
0.757 0.3512 -0.60 
 
0.751 0.3080 -0.70 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
        
0.851* 0.0715 -1.92 
Market Conditions 
           
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month 0.00004* 0.0002 -1.81 
 
0.0006* 0.0029 -1.69 
 
0.0004* 0.0019 -1.74 
Interaction Variable 
           
Startup had VC on board* Startup had joined 
incubator/technology park 
 
   
0.914*** 0.2567 -3.14 
 
0.661** 0.2912 -2.24 
Observations 251 
 
251 
 
251 
 No. failed  34 
 
34 
 
34 
 No. competing 217 
 
217 
 
217 
 Wald chi^2 26.95 
 
37.52 
 
41.11 
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Panel B. Competing Risks Model—Coefficients Estimation 
 
 
 
Startup was acquired  (Model 1-3) Startup was written off  (Model 4-6) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Start-Up Characteristics 
      Startup size 5.30E-10 3.74E-09 4.43E-09 -3.10E-08 -1.08E-08 -1.21E-08 
  (0.29) (0.78) (1.32) (-0.77) (-0.38) (-0.36) 
New employees are hired before bringing in new CEO 0.185* 0.194** 0.236** -0.423* -0.278* -0.417** 
  (1.87) (2.25) (2.45) (-1.92) (-1.76) (-2.08) 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park 0.313* 0.965** 1.056** -0.391 -0.178 -0.258 
  (1.89) (2.45) (2.54) (-0.14) (-1.01) (1.23) 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 0.124* 0.292* 0.346** -0.296* -0.173* -0.279* 
  (1.66) (1.93) (2.01) (-1.84) (-1.92) (-1.72) 
Startup had replaced CEO 0.173* 0.179* 0.278* -0.644* -0.527* -0.534* 
  (1.92) (1.71) (1.84) (-1.72) (-1.69) (-1.70) 
Board Characteristics 
      Number of outside board members 
 
0.185* 0.196** 
 
-0.296 -0.284 
  
 
(1.95) (2.06) 
 
(-1.64) (-1.49) 
Number of founding team members on board 
 
0.224* 0.229* 
 
-0.305 -0.342 
  
 
(1.73) (1.81) 
 
(-1.50) (-1.55) 
Average board serving time 
  
-0.0233*** 
  
-0.0169 
  
  
(-2.64) 
  
(-1.10) 
Startup had Angel on board -0.210 -0.0436 -0.0410 -0.253 -0.0856 -0.0308 
  (-0.75) (-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.43) (-0.14) (-0.05) 
Startup had VC on board 0.682* 0.837* 0.723** -1.126** -0.823* -0.810** 
  (1.76) (1.72) (2.13) (-2.51) (-1.69) (-1.98) 
Financing Characteristics 
      Total number of financing rounds 
 
-0.467*** -0.478*** 
 
-0.271 -0.278 
  
 
(-3.47) (-3.62) 
 
(-0.60) (-0.70) 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
  
-0.0126 
  
-0.152* 
  
  
(-0.99) 
  
(-1.92) 
Market Conditions 
      Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month -7.955** -7.807** -7.627** -8.167* -6.847* -7.460* 
  (-2.07) (-2.01) (-1.99) (-1.81) (-1.69) (-1.74) 
Interaction Variable 
      Number of Angel/VC on board* Startup had joined incubator/technology park 
 
-0.548*** -0.531*** 
 
-0.0897**** -0.420** 
  
 
(-3.78) (-4.13) 
 
(-3.14) (-2.24) 
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 
 No. failed  77 77 77 34 34 34 
 No. competing 174 174 174 217 217 217 
 Wald chi^2 18.13 28.84 37.72 26.95 37.52 41.11 
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Table3. 5. Competing Risks Analysis on CEO Replacement 
This table shows the influence of different firm characters on CEO replacement using competing risks regressions. Panel A. presents the estimated subhazard ratio (SHR) of different firm characters for 
startup CEO replacement during the sample period from January 2007 to May 2014.  Subhazard ratio greater than 1stands for positive influence on CEO replacement; smaller than 1, negative influence. 
Panel B. presents the coefficients of the same set of competing risks regressions. T values are shown in brackets. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Competing Risks Model--Subhazard Ratio Estimation 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3                             Model 4 
  SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
Start-Up Characteristics 
            
Number of all current key employees 
   
0.857*** 0.0355 -3.70 0.865*** 0.0378 -3.31 0.837*** 0.0482 -3.09 
Number of executive managers 
   
1.208*** 0.0511 4.46 1.233*** 0.0553 4.67 1.254*** 0.0674 4.21 
Startup had joined incubator/technology 
park    
0.551 0.4448 -0.74 0.928 0.8563 -1.25 0.772 0.8311 -1.09 
Startup had a board of directors 7.809*** 4.9634 3.23  7.524***  4.9400 3.07 10.576*** 7.3833 3.38 10.731*** 8.3178 3.06 
Board Characteristics 
            
Number of outside board members 
      
0.843** 0.0663 -2.17 0.878* 0.0681 -1.68 
Startup had Angel on board 0.838 0.2501 -0.59 0.939 0.2892 -0.21 0.904 0.3022 -0.31 0.720 0.2852 -0.83 
Startup had VC on board   2.374* 1.3144 1.92   1.931* 1.0729 1.84 2.525* 1.3775 1.70 1.783* 0.9769 1.85 
Startup had inside chairman 
      
1.255 0.3937 0.73 
Startup had founder chairman 
         
0.648 0.2497 -1.13 
Financing Characteristics 
            
Average growth rate of external financing 
amount       
0.749** 0.0866 -2.50 0.788** 0.1024 -2.26 
Market Conditions 
            
Local MSCI Index Return on CEO 
Replacement Month 
2.08e^-6***  7.97e^-6 -3.41  5.96e-6*** 2.14e^-6 -3.35 1.62e^-7***  6.63e^-7 -3.82 3.98e^-7***  1.69e^-6 -3.47 
Interaction Variable   
   
Startup had VC on board * Startup had 
joined incubator/technology park 
  
 
1.163***               1.4403                 9.42 1.767***               1.3888                    8.94 
Observations 251 251 251 251 
 No. failed  51 51 51 51 
 No. competing 200 200 200 200 
 Wald chi^2 24.32 48.57 60.55 41.47 
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Panel A. (Continued) 
 
 
   Model 5   Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
  SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
Start-Up Characteristics 
            
Number of all current key employees 0.872*** 0.0368 -3.25 0.872*** 0.0400 -2.99 0.856*** 0.0346 -3.86 0.855*** 0.0393 -3.41 
Number of executive managers 1.243*** 0.0547 4.94 1.228*** 0.0605 4.17 1.231*** 0.0543 4.71 1.245*** 0.0555 4.91 
Startup had joined incubator/technology 
park      0.622 0.5973 -1.25 
0.784 0.6753 -0.29 0.590 0.5541 -1.28 0.151 0.1685 -1.02 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 
   
1.283 0.6785 0.47 
      
Board Characteristics 
   
         
Startup had a board of directors 12.204*** 8.6384 3.59 11.685*** 8.8162 3.37 11.273*** 7.7796 3.51 10.201*** 7.3396 3.23 
Number of outside board members 0.843** 0.0654 -2.20 0.833** 0.066 -2.30 0.828** 0.0605 -2.58 0.939* 0.1988 -1.72 
Average board serving time 0.991 0.0083 -1.12 
   
   
   
Startup had Angel on board 0.885 0.2838 -0.38 0.868 0.2848 -0.43 0.737 0.2653 -0.85 0.869 0.2828 -0.43 
Startup had VC on board 2.469** 1.3666 2.13 2.361* 1.2778 1.79 2.294** 1.3021 1.99 3.829** 2.4551 2.09 
Number of Financial Vehicle 
Corporations (FVC) on board 
         
0.841 0.2248 -0.65 
Number of Corporate Venture Capital 
(CVC) on board 
         
4.048 3.8453 1.47 
Financing Characteristics 
         
   
Total number of financing rounds 
      
1.196 0.1143 1.47 
   
Average growth rate of external 
financing amount 
0.725*** 0.089 -2.62 0.726** 0.0915 -2.54 0.675*** 0.1014 -2.62 0.749** 0.0864 -2.50 
Market Conditions 
            
Local MSCI Index Return on CEO 
Replacement Month 
1.74e^-7*** 6.95e^-7 -3.89 2.27e^-7***  9.12e^-7 -3.80 3.92e^-7*** 1.63e^-6 -3.55 1.33e^-7***  5.27e^-7 -3.99 
Interaction Variable     
Startup had VC on board * Startup had 
joined incubator/technology park 
1.640***              2.0840                  9.45 1.648***               2.0236                  9.78 1.506***               1.847                    9.72 1.760***                1.0280                 8.31 
Observations 251 251 251 251 
 No. failed  51 51 51 51 
 No. competing 200 200 200 200 
 Wald chi^2 56.39 62.12 63.09 54.39 
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Panel B. Competing Risks Model—Coefficients Estimation 
 
Event of interest: Startup had CEO replacement 
 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Start-Up Characteristics 
        
Number of all current key employees 
 
-0.157*** -0.145*** -0.178*** -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.156*** -0.157*** 
  
 
(-3.70) (-3.31) (-3.09) (-3.25) (-2.99) (-3.86) (-3.41) 
Number of executive managers 
 
0.205*** 0.213*** 0.226*** 0.217*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.219*** 
  
 
(4.46) (4.67) (4.21) (4.94) (4.17) (4.71) (4.91) 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  
 
     -0.596      -0.136      -0.315      -0.412 -0.248       -0.523      -1.036 
  
 
     (-0.74)      (-1.25)      (-1.09)      (-1.25)      (-0.29)       (-1.28)      (-1.02) 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 
     
0.249 
  
  
     
(0.47) 
  Startup had a board of directors 2.174*** 2.169*** 2.728*** 2.735*** 2.870*** 2.769*** 2.711*** 2.654*** 
  (3.23) (3.07) (3.38) (3.06) (3.59) (3.37) (3.51) (3.23) 
Board Characteristics 
        
Number of outside board members 
  
-0.171** -0.130* -0.171** -0.182** -0.188*** -0.0633* 
  
  
(-2.17) (-1.68) (-2.20) (-2.30) (-2.58) (-1.72) 
Average board serving time 
    
-0.0094 
     
    
(-1.12) 
   Startup had Angel on board -0.332 -0.291 -0.101 -0.328 -0.122 -0.142 -0.305 -0.140 
  (-0.59) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.83) (-0.38) (-0.43) (-0.85) (-0.43) 
Startup had VC on board 0.926* 0.770* 1.061* 0.578* 0.954** 0.859* 0.830** 1.342** 
  (1.92) (1.84) (1.70) (1.85) (2.13) (1.79) (1.99) (2.09) 
Startup had inside chairman 
  
0.227 
      
  
(0.73) 
    Startup had founder chairman 
   
-0.434 
      
   
(-1.13) 
    Number of Financial Vehicle Corporations (FVC) on board 
       
-0.173 
  
       
(-0.65) 
Number of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) on board 
       
1.398 
  
       
(1.47) 
Financing Characteristics 
        Total number of financing rounds 
      
0.179 
   
      
(1.47) 
 Average growth rate of external financing amount 
  
-0.311** -0.289** -0.322*** -0.320** -0.393*** -0.311** 
  
  
(-2.50) (-2.26) (-2.62) (-2.54) (-2.62) (-2.50) 
Market Conditions 
        Local MSCI Index Return on CEO Replacement Month -13.08*** -12.24*** -15.64*** -14.74*** -15.57*** -15.30*** -14.75*** -15.84*** 
 
Interaction Variable 
(-3.41) (-3.35) (-3.82) (-3.47) (-3.89) (-3.80) (-3.55) (-3.99) 
Startup had VC on board * Startup had joined 
incubator/technology park 
  0.179*** 0.564*** 0.465*** 0.473*** 0.396*** 0.558*** 
   (9.42) (8.94) (9.45) (9.78) (9.72) (8.31) 
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 
 No. failed  51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
 No. competing 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
 Wald chi^2 24.32 48.57 60.55 41.47 56.39 62.12 65.29 54.39 
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Table 3.6. Robustness Check on Startup Outcome 
This table shows the influence of different firm activities on startups’ operational outcome using competing risks regressions. Predicted CEO replacement is estimated based on model 8 in Table 5 Panel 
B, in which only statistically significant variables are included in estimation. Panel A. presents the estimated subhazard ratio (SHR) of different firm activities for startup acquisition and written-off.  
Subhazard ratio greater than 1stands for positive influence of the activity on the operational outcome of interest; smaller than 1, negative influence. Panel B. presents the coefficients of the same set of 
competing risks regressions. T values are shown in brackets. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Competing Risks Model--Subhazard Ratio Estimation 
Event of interest: Startup was acquired  (Model 1-3) 
 
Model 1 
 
                          Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
Start-Up Characteristics 
           
Startup size 1.000 0.0000 0.61 
 
1.000 0.0000 0.54 
 
1.000 0.0000 1.12 
New employees were hired before bringing in new CEO 1.052** 0.3268 1.98 
 
1.082* 0.3183 1.77 
 
1.051** 0.3247 2.16 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  1.819* 0.7629 1.83 
 
3.249** 2.3273 2.15 
 
3.018** 2.3143 2.44 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 1.071* 0.4227 1.87 
 
1.591** 0.5971 2.24 
 
1.714** 0.6034 2.53 
Predicted CEO replacement 1.010* 0.0308 1.74 
 
1.011* 0.0289 1.73 
 
1.019* 0.0301 1.84 
Board Characteristics 
      
 
    
Number of outside board members 
    
1.175* 0.1164 1.69 
 
1.232** 0.1281 2.01 
Number of founding team members on board 
    
1.144* 0.1798 1.85 
 
1.176* 0.1789 1.88 
Average board serving time 
      
 
 
0.974*** 0.0089 -2.92 
Startup had Angel on board 0.803 0.2442 -0.72 
 
1.111 0.3798 0.31 
 
1.129 0.3928 0.35 
Startup had VC on board 1.851* 0.7962 1.93 
 
2.052* 0.8484 1.74 
 
1.858** 0.7580 2.52 
Financing Characteristics 
      
 
    
Total number of financing rounds 
    
0.536*** 0.0924 -3.62 
 
0.501*** 0.0904 -3.83 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
      
 
 
1.040 0.0289 1.41 
Market Conditions 
      
 
    
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month 0.0002** 0.0014 -2.18 
 
0.0001** 0.0007 -2.48 
 
0.001** 0.0048 -2.11 
Interaction Variable 
      
 
    
Startup had VC on board* Startup had joined incubator/technology 
park     
0.746*** 0.8906 -2.97 
 
0.654*** 0.8215 -3.05 
Observations 251 
 
251 
 
251 
 No. failed  77 
 
77 
 
77 
 No. competing 174 
 
174 
 
174 
 Wald chi^2 17.27 
 
34.76 
 
44.15 
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             Panel A. (Continued) 
 
           
 
        Event of interest: Startup was written off  (Model 4-6) 
  
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
  SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z   SHR 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
Start-Up Characteristics 
           
Startup size 1.000 0.0000 -0.20 
 
1.000 0.0000 -0.19 
 
1.000 0.0000 -0.16 
New employees are hired before bringing in new CEO 0.513* 0.2697 -1.77 
 
0.581* 0.3109 -1.81 
 
0.558** 0.2981 -2.09 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  0.641 0.7804 -0.37 
 
1.638 2.3476 0.34 
 
2.172 2.9839 0.56 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 0.913** 0.5475 -2.15 
 
0.986** 0.6371 -2.02 
 
0.914** 0.6413 -2.13 
Predicted CEO replacement 0.833* 0.0784 -1.81 
 
0.752** 0.1044 -2.31 
 
0.873* 0.0940 -1.71 
Board Characteristics 
           
Number of outside board members 
    
0.865 0.1929 -0.65 
 
0.865 0.2163 -0.58 
Number of founding team members on board 
    
0.807 0.1630 -1.06 
 
0.814 0.1599 -1.05 
Average board serving time 
        
0.988 0.0229 -0.52 
Startup had Angel on board 0.640 0.3602 -0.79 
 
0.619 0.3576 -0.83 
 
0.633 0.3561 -0.81 
Startup had VC on board 0.176** 0.1243 -2.46 
 
0.211** 0.1424 -2.30 
 
0.225** 0.1511 -2.22 
Financing Characteristics 
           
Total number of financing rounds 
    
1.029 0.5882 0.05 
 
1.115 0.6208 0.19 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
        
0.848* 0.1575 -1.89 
Market Conditions 
           
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month 0.0004** 0.0033 -1.98 
 
0.003* 0.0223 -1.71 
 
0.003* 0.0213 -1.72 
Interaction Variable 
           
Startup had VC on board* Startup had joined incubator/technology 
park 
 
   
0.856*** 0.0000 -11.63 
 
0.365*** 0.0000 -11.49 
Observations 251 
 
251 
 
251 
 No. failed  34 
 
34 
 
34 
 No. competing 217 
 
217 
 
217 
 Wald chi^2 21.53 
 
45.27 
 
47.32 
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Panel B. Competing Risks Model—Coefficients Estimation 
 
Startup was acquired  (Model 1-3) Startup was written off  (Model 4-6) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Start-Up Characteristics 
      Startup size 4.25E-09 7.63E-09 8.31E-09 -4.22e-09 -3.80e-09 -3.13e-09 
  (0.61) (0.54) (1.12) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.16) 
New employees are hired before bringing in new CEO 0.0505** 0.0788* 0.0494** -0.668* -0.543* -0.583** 
  (1.98) (1.77) (2.16) (-1.77) (-1.81) (-2.09) 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park 0.598* 1.178** 1.104** -0.445 0.494 0.776 
  (1.83) (2.15) (2.44) (-0.37) (0.34) (0.56) 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 0.0689* 0.464** 0.539** -0.0915** -0.0744** -0.0895** 
  (1.87) (2.24) (2.53) (-2.15) (-2.02) (-2.13) 
Predicted CEO replacement 0.0103* 0.0109* 0.0188* -0.138* -0.161** -0.127* 
  (1.74) (1.73) (1.84) (-1.81) (-2.31) (-1.71) 
Board Characteristics 
      
Number of outside board members 
 
0.161* 0.209** 
 
-0.145 -0.145 
  
 
(1.69) (2.01) 
 
(-0.65) (-0.58) 
Number of founding team members on board 
 
0.134* 0.162* 
 
-0.215 -0.206 
  
 
(1.85) (1.88) 
 
(-1.06) (-1.05) 
Average board serving time 
  
-0.0266*** 
  
-0.0120 
  
  
(-2.92) 
  
(-0.52) 
Startup had Angel on board -0.219 0.106 0.121 -0.446 -0.479 -0.457 
  (-0.72) (0.31) (0.35) (-0.79) (-0.83) (-0.81) 
Startup had VC on board 0.616* 0.719* 0.620** -1.736** -1.556** -1.491** 
  (1.93) (1.74) (2.52) (-2.46) (-2.30) (-2.22) 
Financing Characteristics 
 
     
Total number of financing rounds 
 
-0.624*** -0.691*** 
 
0.0281 0.109 
  
 
(-3.62) (-3.83) 
 
(0.05) (0.19) 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
  
0.0393 
  
-0.164* 
  
  
(1.41) 
  
(-1.89) 
Market Conditions 
      
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month -8.549** -9.066** -7.216** -7.830** -5.921* -5.973* 
  (-2.18) (-2.48) (-2.11) (-1.98) (-1.71) (-1.72) 
Interaction Variable 
      
Number of Angel/VC on board* Startup had joined incubator/technology park 
 
-0.354*** -0.478*** 
 
-0.131*** -0.782*** 
  
 
(-2.97) (-3.05) 
 
(-11.63) (-11.49) 
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 
 No. failed  77 77 77 34 34 34 
 No. competing 174 174 174 217 217 217 
 Wald chi^2 17.27 34.76 44.15 21.53 45.27 47.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Figure 3.1. The Influence of Venture Capital on Startup Exit 
This figure shows the influence of VC on startups’ operational outcome using cumulative incidence function (CIF). Cumulative incidence depicts the probability of an event occurs before given time. 
The figure is based on competing risks analysis using Model 3(exit through acquisition) and Model 6(exit through write-off) in Table 4 Panel A.  
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Figure3. 2. The Influence of CEO replacement on Startup Exit 
This figure shows the influence of CEO replacement on startups’ operational outcome using cumulative incidence function (CIF). Cumulative incidence depicts the probability of an event occurs before 
given time. The figure is based on competing risks analysis using Model 3(exit through acquisition) and Model 6(exit through write-off) in Table 4 Panel A.  
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Figure 3.3. The Influence of Incubator/Technology Park Experience on Startup Exit 
This figure shows the influence of incubator/technology park experience on startups’ operational outcome using cumulative incidence function (CIF). Cumulative incidence depicts the probability of an 
event occurs before given time. The figure is based on competing risks analysis using Model 3(exit through acquisition) and Model 6(exit through write-off) in Table 4 Panel A.  
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Figure 3.4.  Influences on CEO Replacement 
This figure shows the influence of VC, management, employee and board on CEO replacement using cumulative incidence function (CIF). Cumulative incidence depicts the probability of an event 
occurs before given time. The figure is based on competing risks analysis using Model 3 in Table 5 Panel A. 
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Figure 3.4 (Continued) 
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Appendix 
 
 
In this appendix, we present the results of robustness checks for Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 using logit regressions. For startup outcome analysis, exist 
year fixed effect is included in the analysis; for CEO replacement analysis, replacement year fixed effect is included in the analysis. 
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Table 3. A.I. Logit Analysis on Startup Outcome 
This table presents the logit regression results of startup outcome analysis. The dependent variable equals 1 if the outcome of interest occurs and 0 otherwise. T values are shown in brackets. *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Startup was acquired  (Model 1-3) Startup was written off  (Model 4-6) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Start-Up Characteristics 
      Startup size -3.18E-11 5.55E-10 6.20e-10* -1.05E-10 -4.39E-12 9.02E-13 
  (-0.10) (1.56) (1.75) (-0.45) (-0.02) (0.03) 
New employees are hired before bringing in new CEO -0.03 -0.0365 -0.0391 -0.0296* -0.0149** -0.0160** 
  (-0.49) (-0.59) (-0.64) (-1.66) (-2.32) (-2.35) 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  
 
0.210** 0.225** 
 
-0.0366 -0.0254 
  
 
(2.12) (2.17) 
 
(-0.50) (-0.33) 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 0.109* 0.156** 0.150** -0.0918* -0.0632** -0.0618** 
  (1.69) (2.08) (2.02) (-1.79) (-2.14) (-2.11) 
Startup had replaced CEO 0.108* 0.129* 0.139* -0.115** -0.101* -0.100* 
  (1.83) (1.76) (1.91) (-2.15) (-1.87) (-1.84) 
Board Characteristics 
      Number of outside board members 
 
0.0433** 0.0458** 
 
-0.0184 -0.0183 
  
 
(2.25) (2.40) 
 
(-1.29) (-1.28) 
Number of founding team members on board 
 
0.0529* 0.0491* 
 
-0.0375* -0.0379* 
  
 
(1.94) (1.81) 
 
(-1.86) (-1.87) 
Average board serving time 
  
-0.00545** 
  
-0.000356 
  
  
(-2.49) 
  
(-0.22) 
Startup had Angel on board -0.0308 -0.0238 -0.0222 -0.0285 -0.0161 -0.0189 
  (-0.52) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.61) (-0.33) (-0.38) 
Startup had VC on board 0.121** 0.123** 0.118** -0.149** -0.165** -0.163** 
  (2.27) (2.23) (1.98) (-2.00) (-2.13) (-2.10) 
Financing Characteristics 
      
Total number of financing rounds 
 
-0.105*** -0.103*** 
 
-0.0125 -0.0124 
  
 
(-3.69) (-3.65) 
 
(-0.59) (-0.59) 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
  
-0.00195 
  
-0.000739 
  
  
(-1.01) 
  
(-0.51) 
Market Conditions 
      Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month -0.617 -0.908 -0.88* -0.276 -0.542* -0.501 
  (-0.65) (-0.95) (-1.92) (-0.37) (-1.73) (-1.60) 
Interaction Variable 
      
Startup had VC on board * Startup had joined incubator 
 
-0.0448** -0.0507** 
 
-0.0727** -0.0812* 
  
 
(-2.25) (-2.18) 
 
(-2.32) (-1.78) 
Exit Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.175*** 0.161** 0.442*** 0.310*** 0.396*** 0.414*** 
  (2.95) (1.99) (3.19) (7.25) (6.62) (3.99) 
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 
R-squared 0.032 0.106 0.131 0.093 0.112 0.113 
F 4.049*** 5.177*** 5.263*** 5.013*** 6.380*** 9.772*** 
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Table 3.A.II. Logit Analysis on CEO Replacement 
This table presents the logit regression results of startup CEO replacement. The dependent variable equals 1 if a CEO is replaced and 0 otherwise. T values are shown in brackets. *, **, *** Significant 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Start-Up Characteristics 
        
Number of all current key employees 
 
-0.0047 -0.00490* -0.000712* -0.0051 -0.00502* -0.00358** -0.00450* 
  
 
(-1.51) (-1.69) (-2.20) (-1.61) (-1.72) (-2.12) (-1.85) 
Number of executive managers 
 
0.0000734** 0.000276*** 0.00108** 0.0000741*** 0.000435*** 0.0000551*** 0.000406*** 
  
 
(2.03) (3.10) (2.34) (3.09) (3.15) (3.02) (3.14) 
Startup has joined incubator/technology park  
 
-0.0196 -0.00381 -0.00302 -0.00385 -0.00535 -0.0126 -0.00138 
  
 
(-0.83) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.11) (-0.26) (-0.03) 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 
     
0.0177 
  
  
     
(0.82) 
  
Board Characteristics 
        
Startup had a board of directors 0.00169** 0.00904*** 0.00263** 0.00344** 0.00151** 0.00427** 0.00444** 0.00448** 
  (2.10) (3.49) (2.13) (2.15) (2.07) (2.20) (2.22) (2.31) 
Number of outside board members 
  
-0.00392* -0.00389* -0.00406* -0.00500** -0.00543* -0.00798* 
  
  
(-1.78) (-1.70) (-1.80) (-1.98) (-1.67) (-1.73) 
Average board serving time 
    
-0.000256 
   
  
    
(-0.44) 
   
Startup had Angel on board 0.0118 0.00867 0.00644 -0.00289 0.00764 0.00869 0.000298 0.00614 
  (0.79) (0.58) (0.42) (-0.17) (0.50) (0.57) (0.02) (0.40) 
Startup had VC on board 0.0223* 0.0170* 0.0163* 0.0298* 0.0167* 0.00967** 0.0122* 0.0223** 
  (1.73) (1.94) (1.89) (1.90) (1.91) (2.45) (1.66) (1.99) 
Startup had inside chairman 
  
-0.0196 
     
  
  
(-0.93) 
     
Startup had founder chairman 
   
-0.0101 
    
  
   
(-0.44) 
    
Number of Financial Vehicle Corporations (FVC) on board 
       
-0.0178 
  
       
(-1.26) 
Number of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) on board 
       
-0.018 
  
       
(-0.33) 
Financing Characteristics 
        
Total number of financing rounds 
      
0.0101 
 
  
      
(1.48) 
 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
  
-0.000236 -0.000204* -0.000241 -0.000109** -0.00028 -0.000205 
  
  
(-0.52) (-1.86) (-0.52) (-2.23) (-0.62) (-0.45) 
Market Conditions 
        
Local MSCI Index Return on CEO Replacement Month -0.0000227 -0.0345 -0.000773* -0.0306** -0.0235** -0.00732** -0.0191** -0.0196** 
  (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.68) (-2.09) (-2.36) (-2.02) (-2.35) (-2.25) 
Interaction Variable 
        
Startup had VC on board * Startup had joined incubator 
  
0.0239* 0.0241* 0.0239** 0.0215** 0.0263** 0.0251** 
  
  
(1.74) (1.81) (2.19) (2.40) (2.49) (2.46) 
CEO Replacement Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.183*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.212*** 0.194*** 0.180*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 
  (11.73) (11.46) (11.43) (11.49) (15.83) (11.31) (10.18) (11.28) 
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 
R-squared 0.013 0.033 0.04 0.018 0.037 0.042 0.045 0.043 
F 4.806*** 6.344*** 11.082*** 7.336*** 12.006*** 16.023*** 12.236*** 9.046*** 
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Table 3.A.III. Robustness Checks on Startup Outcome under Logit Analysis 
This table presents the logit regression results of startup outcome analysis. The dependent variable equals 1 if the outcome of interest occurs and 0 otherwise. Predicted CEO replacement is estimated by 
model 8 in Table A.II. , in which only statistically significant variables are included in estimation. T values are shown in brackets. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Startup was acquired  (Model 1-3) Startup was written off  (Model 4-6) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Start-Up Characteristics 
      Startup size 1.00e-10 2.45e-10 2.77e-10 -9.67e-11 -3.26e-10 -3.60e-10 
  (0.27) (0.62) (0.70) (-0.34) (-1.06) (-1.17) 
New employees are hired before bringing in new CEO 0.0194 0.00152 0.000751 -0.0505* -0.0535** -0.0530** 
  (0.32) (0.02) (0.01) (-1.86) (-1.97) (-2.05) 
Startup had joined incubator/technology park  
 
0.168* 0.168* 
 
-0.189* -0.186 
  
 
(1.90) (1.88) 
 
(-1.71) (-1.27) 
Startup passed seed/angel stage 0.0214** 0.0535* 0.0622* -0.00455** -0.0253** -0.0336** 
  (2.25) (1.76) (1.69) (-2.07) (-2.36) (-2.48) 
Predicted CEO replacement 0.00937* 0.00652* 0.00570* -0.00318** -0.00358*** -0.00265** 
  (1.83) (1.86) (1.73) (-2.57) (-2.65) (-2.44) 
Board Characteristics 
      
Number of outside board members 
 
0.0360 0.0389* 
 
-0.00919 -0.0120 
  
 
(1.63) (1.75) 
 
(-0.54) (-0.70) 
Number of founding team members on board 
 
0.0170* 0.0158 
 
-0.0310 -0.0298 
  
 
(1.72) (1.54) 
 
(-1.37) (-1.32) 
Average board serving time 
  
-0.00257** 
  
0.00253 
  
  
(-2.11) 
  
(1.42) 
Startup had Angel on board 0.0112 0.0504 0.0587 -0.0159 -0.0297 -0.0376 
  (0.18) (0.76) (0.88) (-0.33) (-0.58) (-0.73) 
Startup had VC on board 0.187** 0.188** 0.179* -0.170** -0.172** -0.164** 
  (2.13) (2.06) (1.96) (-2.50) (-2.44) (-2.32) 
Financing Characteristics 
      
Total number of financing rounds 
 
-0.0671** -0.0681** 
 
0.0521 0.0532 
  
 
(-2.10) (-2.13) 
 
(1.11) (1.15) 
Average growth rate of external financing amount 
  
0.00121 
  
-0.00171 
  
  
(0.15) 
  
(-0.27) 
Market Conditions 
      
Local MSCI Index Return on Exit Month -0.390 -0.467 -0.367** -0.736* -0.920* -0.810* 
  (-1.28) (-1.34) (-2.26) (-1.69) (-1.86) (-1.75) 
Interaction Variable 
      
Startup had VC on board * Startup had joined incubator 
 
-0.0509** -0.0613** 
 
-0.0115** -0.0228** 
  
 
(-2.24) (-2.28) 
 
(-2.07) (-2.14) 
Exit Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.153** 0.181** 0.309** 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.151 
  (2.46) (2.12) (2.15) (5.64) (4.19) (1.35) 
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 
R-squared 0.087 0.122 0.130 0.128 0.167 0.179 
F 9.868 15.791 31.623 11.902 19.572 34.367 
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